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Professor Adriana Lleras-Muney, Chair
This dissertation explores topics in urban and labor economics, separately and together.
In Chapter 1, I explore human capital spillovers between workers and across neighbor-
hoods. I first show that college-educated and non-college workers tend to work in the same
Census tracts. I then estimate an economic geography model and find a positive spillover
effect of nearby college workers but a negative spillover effect of nearby non-college workers
on a worker’s income. Both spillover effects decay very quickly, having no effect beyond
three miles. I conduct counterfactual exercises to assess the benefits of a Los Angeles policy.
The exercise shows that policies increasing density of college jobs provide benefit to both the
targeted and surrounding areas, suggesting an important margin for urban policymakers to
influence worker productivity in local areas.
Chapter 2 studies the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) to provide the first compre-
hensive assessment of the short- and long-term effects of means-tested youth employment
programs. We use digitized enrollee records from the CCC program in Colorado and New
Mexico and matched these records to the 1940 Census, WWII enlistment records, Social
Security Administration records, and death certificates. Overall, we find significant long-
ii
term benefits in both longevity and earnings, suggesting short and medium-term evaluations
underestimate the returns of training programs, as do those that fail to consider effects on
longevity.
Chapter 3 examines the housing market effects of inclusionary zoning policies (IZPs).
IZPs have been implemented to spur construction of below-market housing to tackle the issue
of housing affordability. They are popular with local governments because the direct costs
of creating affordable housing are borne by developers, but their effects are theoretically
ambiguous. I implement an empirical strategy that exploits variation in geography and
timing in a difference-in-discontinuity framework to examine the effect of New York City’s
mandatory IZP on housing supply and prices. I find that, while transaction prices increase
following the policy, building activity also increases. This suggests that models considering
IZP as a tax on development are too simplistic and further research is required to disentangle
these findings.
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CHAPTER 1
Benefits of Working Near College Workers: Human
Capital Spillovers Across Neighborhoods
1.1 Introduction
When Los Angeles opened new metro stations in 2016, the city council proposed a new
zoning scheme to almost triple the allowable density near some of its stations and make the
new developments more suitable for types of jobs that involve high-skill workers. Across the
nation in recent years, there has been a newfound focus of firms and urban policymakers on
dense, high human capital developments (Katz and Wagner 2014). Google, once a firm well-
known for its large suburban campus Googleplex, is opening new offices in London, expanding
in Manhattan, and taking up space in Los Angeles’ Westside Pavillion Mall. Florida and
Mellander (2014) document that venture capital firms have been flocking to urban centers
with high human capital. Even in the suburbs, developments are favoring dense, transit-
oriented neighborhoods. Meanwhile, some firms have transformed areas nearby by attracting
more jobs and workers close to them. For example, Quicken Loans in Detroit and Amazon
in Seattle have transformed their respective cities’ downtowns.
What drives firms and workers to locate in dense employment clusters and co-locate in
high-density, high human capital areas? This chapter examines neighborhood-level human
capital spillovers of density as a possible reason. For example, do workers benefit from high
density of high-skill workplaces nearby? Are there similar benefits from nearby low-skill
workplaces? And what is the spatial extent of these benefits? These are the questions that
1
I answer in this chapter.1
To examine these questions, I proceed in three steps. First, I document that people of
different education levels work in geographical proximity using LEHD2 Origin Destination
Employment Statistics (LODES) data in 2010. I provide new stylized facts that show how
college and non-college jobs3 are co-located within American cities: 1) college and non-
college workplaces are co-located unlike college and non-college residences, 2) college and
non-college workplaces are both very concentrated, but college workplaces more so, and 3)
denser work locations tend to have higher college share of workers. These stylized facts
provide preliminary evidence on neighborhood-level agglomeration economies within and
between skill levels.
With these stylized facts in mind, I investigate whether workers who work in areas with
higher nearby college or non-college worker density earn more using individual-level data
with income and detailed workplace geography. I find descriptive evidence that there is a
positive association of nearby college employment density on income, while there are negative
effects of nearby non-college employment density. Moreover, both of these effects decay very
quickly, becoming statistically insignificant beyond 3-5 miles. Quantitatively, a 1% increase
in college workers 0-3 miles away is associated with an increase in wages by 0.075%. The
same increase 3-5 miles away is only associated with a wage increase of 0.026%. In contrast,
a 1% increase in non-college workers 0-3 miles away is correlated with a 0.086% decrease in
worker’s wages, while for 3-5 miles away, with a 0.035% decrease. These effects are similar
whether the worker herself is college educated or not.
Identifying causal effects of nearby worker density is challenging given the limitations of
1Throughout the paper I use the term “neighborhood” and “local-level” to mean effects across Census
tracts. Census tracts are on average 15 square miles in urban areas and contain 600 to 3,000 residents.
2Longitudinal Establishment-Household Dynamics.
3I use the terms college jobs and college workplaces to denote jobs held by workers with a bachelor’s degree
at a location. Similarly, I use the terms non-college jobs and non-college workplaces as jobs or workplaces
held by workers without a bachelor’s degree.
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the individual-level dataset. In particular, I only observe individuals in California in the
cross-section at 2010. Selection of productive individuals into productive tracts is one source
of endogeneity. Another source is unobservable tract-level characteristics that are spatially
correlated, such as a train station that increases the productivity of all nearby tracts.
To identify the spillovers, I extend an economic geography model and solution methods
developed by Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) to include college and non-college workers in both produc-
tion and density spillovers across space. In the model, workers make a workplace-residence
pair location decision given idiosyncratic Freche´t preference draws on each pair. This Freche´t
distribution assumption on the preference shock allows me to recover the wages that should
be paid at each workplace location to justify the observed distribution of workers across
workplaces and residences in the data. In addition, the model assumes a representative firm
in each location with spillovers from nearby college and non-college workers enhancing its
productivity.
The model assumptions allow me to use sparser data to estimate the parameters of
interest. I use information on workplace counts, residence counts, bilateral distance, land
area, and floor price, which I can obtain for multiple years and for multiple cities in the U.S.,
to form estimating equations on differences over 2010-2015. The estimation differences out
time-invariant tract-level unobservables as well as city-level fixed effects that affect all tracts
within a city.
The parameters of interest in the model are the strength and sign of the spillover ef-
fects and how fast they decay over distance. In order to estimate the parameters, I need
instruments that are uncorrelated with tract-level changes in fundamental productivity but
correlated with the distribution of workers across the city. I use Bartik instruments that
are constructed using past industry composition in each zip code and industry-level human
capital growth outside each city. I also use historical residential segregation. Using these
instruments and the structural residuals recovered from the model, I estimate the parameters
using non-linear GMM.
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The estimates are qualitatively similar to what I find in the descriptive OLS regressions:
nearby college workers have a positive spillover effect while nearby non-college workers have
a negative spillover effect. The estimated decay of these spillover effects are faster than in my
descriptive results, decaying to half by only around 0.75 mile for nearby college workers and
0.6 miles for nearby non-college workers. These estimates suggest that the spillover effects
of human capital are again very localized. This is in line with the literature estimating other
types of agglomeration at the local level. For example, Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) estimates that
local productivity spillovers from nearby total employment density decay to about 0 after
15 minutes of travel time.
Magnitudes of the spillover are on the lower end compared to estimates of human capital
spillovers on the whole city. For example Moretti (2004c) estimates that a one percentage
point increase in college share in the city leads to about 1.9% increase in wages of high-school
drop-outs, 1.6% increase for high-school graduates, and 0.4% for college graduates. At the
mean value of college share across tracts (1/3) and assuming that the one percentage point
increase in college share is a result of an equal increase in college and decrease in non-college
workers, my estimates imply an increase of roughly 0.4% in wages following a one percentage
point increase in the college share of tracts 0-3 miles away. However, they are larger than
another study of more local-level, human capital spillovers. Fu (2007) estimates that in the
Boston metropolitan area, a one percentage point increase in college share 0-1.5 mile away
is associated with a 0.14% increase in wages, and 1.5-3 miles away associated with a 0.1%
increase in wages.
Finally, I use the model estimates to examine the impact of Exposition Corridor Transit
Neighborhood Plan in Los Angeles, a proposed policy to re-zone areas near the city’s new
light rail stations. The plan seeks to add density by increasing the floor area ratio (FAR),
which determines how tall you can build, and changes the land use from light industrial to
hybrid industrial, aiming to convert warehouses into office spaces to attract high-productivity
jobs. I find that the combination of increased density and re-purposing the area to attract
4
college jobs have a significant spillover effect that not only benefit the targeted area itself,
but also the neighbors of the targeted area. These findings have important policy impli-
cations. Because localities wield significant decision power in land use and density, these
spillover effects of density and human capital should be taken into account to make accurate
assessments on the efficacy of local-level policies.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In the rest of this section, I review the literature related
to the paper and summarize my contribution. In Section 1.2, I provide some stylized facts
about workplace location and its relation to human capital distribution within the city. In
Section 1.3, I provide descriptive evidence on positive, fast-decaying human capital spillovers
that come from density of surrounding college workplaces. In Section 1.4, I outline the model
framework. In Section 1.5, I provide details on the model estimation procedure and present
parameter estimates. Finally, in Section 1.6, I use the estimated model to explore the effects
of Los Angeles policy.
1.1.1 Literature Review
This chapter contributes to two main strands of literature in urban economics. First, I
contribute to the literature on agglomeration economies. Many empirical papers estimate
the effect of density on productivity of cities by regressing wages on city-level population
or employment density (Combes and Gobillon 2015). The estimates range from 0.04-0.07,
indicating that a 1 percent increase in the city-level density affects wages by around 0.05
percent, or alternatively, a doubling of density increases productivity by about 4%. A more
recent review by Ahlfeldt and Pietrostefani (2019) corroborates these estimates and summa-
rizes the evidence on density’s effect on more outcomes such as rent, external welfare, and
amenity provision.
Papers utilizing finer spatial definitions have found that agglomeration economies exist
even at a smaller spatial scale. Henderson and Argazhi (2006) document extremely local-
ized agglomeration effects in Manhattan’s advertising industry, where the effect disappears
5
beyond 200m. Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) uses an economic geography model with the division
and reunification of Berlin as an exogenous shock and find that productivity agglomeration
spillovers decay to about 0 by 15 minutes of travel time.
I contribute to the agglomeration literature by introducing the human capital margin at
a smaller spatial scale. The agglomeration spillover estimates have either used total worker
counts (Ahlfeldt et al. 2015) or assumed that there are only certain industries that benefit
from spatial spillovers (Berkes and Gaetani 2019). In this chapter, I instead separate out the
educational component of local agglomeration spillovers, and find that there is a meaningful
distinction between the two education groups in how they generate spillovers across space.
This chapter’s focus is similar to Rosenthal and Strange (2006), who also separate out
agglomeration spillovers between college and non-college workers. However, their paper uses
Place-of-Work Public Microdata Area (PWPUMA) as the geographic definition of workplace
and assumes that any count of workers in each PWPUMA is evenly distributed within the
area. This is a very crude measure of worker counts, especially given that I document the
uneven distribution of workplaces within larger spatial units.
Second, I contribute to the literature on city-level human capital spillovers. Moretti
(2004a,b) find that there exist social benefits of high-skill workforce within the city. He finds
that an increase in college share leads to positive wage gains for all workers, but especially
uneducated ones. Ciccione and Peri (2006) are more skeptical about the extent of human
capital within cities. Controlling for the composition effect, they find negligible effect of
city-level average years of schooling on city-level productivity. Diamond (2016) also provides
estimates of city-level cross-skill spillovers, especially from college to non-college workers.
My estimated fast-decay of spillovers provide an additional dimension of the effect of human
capital. Due to the very local nature of the human capital spillovers that I estimate, it is
possible that even when there are strong effects in the city as a whole, the effect may be
unevenly distributed.
Fu (2007) is one of the few papers examining local human capital spillovers at a spatial
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scale as fine as mine. He explores neighborhood-level spatial spillovers of various agglomera-
tion mechanisms using confidential Decennial Census data for the Boston metropolitan area,
which has detailed geographical information on each respondent. Like other papers exploring
human capital spillovers, he focuses on the share of college workers in nearby workplaces. He
finds a very localized average education spillover effect that decays rapidly down to about 0
by 3 miles, similar to the results provided in this chapter.
I rely on the modeling and solution methods developed in Ahlfeldt et al. (2015). Ahlfeldt
et al. (2015) develops an economic geography model incorporating joint residence-workplace
location decision, commuting, and agglomeration spillovers across neighborhoods. I include a
CES production technology with college and non-college workers and agglomeration spillovers
with college and non-college nearby density separately. To the best of my knowledge, this
paper is the first paper to estimate human capital agglomeration spillovers across neighbor-
hoods in the U.S. in such an economic geography model.
1.2 Stylized Facts
While residence patterns by education group within cities have received bulk of the attention
in the urban literature (Florida and Mellander 2015), the distribution of jobs by education
group has been rarely studied. In this section, I provide novel summary measures on the
distribution of workplaces by skill across Census tracts within cities. To do so, I use data on
workplace location by educational attainment from Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-
Household Dynamics (LEHD) program’s LEHD Origin-Destination Employment Statistics
(LODES).
LEHD collects administrative data from unemployment insurance database from each
state for private jobs and government employee statistics for public jobs. It contains data
on the employee-employer link for each job that is in the unemployment insurance system,
which is about 95% of all private wage or salary jobs (Graham et al. 2014). LODES data
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counts the number of jobs and residences by counting the worker in each Census block. It also
contains data of these counts by four levels of educational attainment: high school dropout,
high school or equivalent, some college, and bachelors degree or advanced degree.4 I refer to
workers with bachelor’s degrees or above as college (high-skill) workers, and workers without
bachelor’s degree as non-college (low-skill) workers.5 I aggregate the counts from Census
block to the Census tract-level. Additionally, I use data on residential counts of workers by
college status by Census tract from the American Community Survey 5-year Summary Files.
A number of new patterns of density and co-location of workplaces emerge. First, work-
places tend to be co-located by skill level even while residences are segregated. Figure 1.1
shows the distribution of residences (1.1a) and workplaces (1.1b) within the Los Angeles-
Long Beach-Anaheim Core-Based Statistical Area (CBSA) as an example, with each shade
of color indicating bins of 20 quantiles. Figure 1.1a shows a familiar picture of residential
segregation. We see that there is a cluster of non-college residents in South Central near
downtown Los Angeles, while there is a cluster of college residents by the beach and on
the Westside. Although there is some overlap in the patterns of residence, there is mostly
a considerable level of separation between where college residents and non-college residents
locate. In fact, the index of dissimilarity,6 a common measure of segregation in the literature,
is 0.42 in the CBSA.
In contrast, Figure 1.1b shows a different picture. We see that the workplace heat map
for college and non-college workplaces are very similar. The index of dissimilarity calculated
with workplaces is 0.18, less than half of the residence index. These two figures show that
4Some of the demographic details and workplace location are imputed. I verify the data quality by
checking against different sources of data and find a high degree of correlation with other available datasets.
See Section 1.5.2 for more details.
5This definition of college and non-college workers is the margin that matters the most in recent redis-
tribution of workers across and within cities (Diamond 2016, Baum-Snow and Hartley 2017, Couture et
al. 2017)
6Index of Dissimilarity for two groups A and B is 12
∑
i
∣∣ai
A − biB
∣∣, where ai, bi are group A and B population
in tract i and A,B are total population of group A and B in the city. It has the interpretation as the share
of people that need to be moved to have equal share of residents by group in all areas.
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Figure 1.1: Residential and Workplace Location in Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim CBSA
(a) Residence quantiles of college (left) and non-college (right) residents
(b) Workplace quantiles of college (left) and non-college (right) workplaces
Plots the distribution of residences (a) and workplaces (b) for workers with bachelor’s degree or higher
(college) and without bachelor’s degree (non-college). Darker shades are higher quantile categories, where
20 quantiles were used for both graphs.
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Figure 1.2: Histogram of Difference Between Residence and Workplace Segregation
The difference plotted is calculated as (index of dissimilarity for residence) - (index of dissimilarity for
workplace), where the indices of dissimilarity are calculated across college and non-college residents/workers
in CBSAs with more than 500,000 residents in 2010 Census.
for the Los Angeles metropolitan area, residences tend to be much more segregated than
workplaces. This pattern holds in general for the CBSAs with more than 500,000 people
in 2010.7 Figure 1.2 is the histogram of the difference between residence and workplace
dissimilarity indices. It shows that in virtually all cities residential segregation is more
pronounced than workplace segregation.
Another way to illustrate the fact that workplaces tend to be more co-located is to
run rank-rank regressions of tracts by their relative rank in college versus their relative
rank of non-college employment. First, I rank each tract from highest to lowest college
employment count, calling this Rankcol. Then I rank each tract from highest to lowest non-
college employment count, calling this Ranknon. Regressing Rankcol on Ranknon provides a
7The population cutoff of 500,000 in CBSA roughly corresponds to Top 100 CBSAs (it is top 104), so I
use this number throughout
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summary measure of how correlated the rank by skill groups are. I do this for residences as
well. Figure 1.3a provides an example for Los Angeles metropolitan area, and 1.3b provides
the distribution of these rank-rank regression coefficients for both workplace and residence
in CBSA with more than 500,000 inhabitants.
We can see in Figure 1.3a that correlation of college and non-college ranking of tracts for
workplace is very high. This shows that tracts with more college jobs relative to the entire
city are also tracts with relatively more non-college jobs. Meanwhile, in the residential rank-
rank regression, no such pattern emerges. Looking at the distribution of these coefficients
across different metro areas in Figure 1.3b, we see two other interesting patterns. First,
workplace rank-rank regression coefficients are larger than residence rank-rank regression
coefficients. This pattern is expected from workplaces being much more co-located than
residences. Second, workplace regression coefficients are much more concentrated than resi-
dence coefficients. This seems to suggest that while residential co-location patterns differ by
city, workplace co-location patterns tend to be universal across cities.
Finally, I show that 1) both college and non-college employment tends to be highly
concentrated, but college employment more so and 2) high density areas tend to have higher
college share of employment. Figure 1.4 gives one summary measure of the concentration of
college and non-college employment across CBSAs: it shows the distribution of the share of
employment in the top 10% of area by CBSA. To calculate this number for college workplaces,
I use Rankcol and calculate the cumulative share of area these tracts occupy in each CBSA.
I take the tract at which the cumulative share of area is around 10% of CBSA total area and
examine how much cumulative share of employment that tract contains. So, for example,
if this number is 30% in one CBSA, it means that 30% of the CBSA’s college employment
is located within 10% of its area. I do this for non-college workplaces as well, and plot the
distribution of the share of employment for both college and non-college jobs. Figure 1.4
shows that non-college workplaces tend to be less concentrated than college workplaces, with
average share being around 45% for non-college and 56% for college workplaces.
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Figure 1.3: Rank-Rank Regression Coefficients
(a) Rank-Rank Scatterplots for Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim CBSA
(b) Kernal Density Estimate of Workplace and Residence Rank-Rank Coefficients
Coefficients from a regression of rank of tract by college worker counts on rank of tract by non-college worker
counts, and similarly for residence counts. The regression is plotted for Los Angeles (a) and distribution of
coefficients is plotted for all cities above 500,000 population in metro area (b).
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of Top 10% Concentration of Employment
Distribution of a measure of concentration of jobs in CBSAs with more than 500,000 population in 2010
Census. The measure is the share of employment in top 10% of tracts by area in the CBSA. The mean for
non-college workplaces is 45% and for college workplaces is 56%.
On the other hand, Figure 1.5 shows that denser areas tend to be occupied by more
college workers relative to non-college workers. For example, in Figure 1.5a, I plot three
histograms for Los Angeles CBSA. The first histogram in black restricts the sample to tracts
above the 10th percentile of tracts with by the number of total workplaces. The second
histogram in blue restricts the sample to those above the 50th percentile of tracts, and the
third histogram in red restricts the sample to those above the 90th percentile. Thus, the
histograms sequentially restrict the sample to denser areas to examine whether there tend
to be higher college share of total workplaces for denser tracts. And indeed, we see that
denser workplace locations (by count of total number of workers) tend to have higher college
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Figure 1.5: Histogram of College Share by Number of Workers in Tract
(a) Los Angeles
(b) All CBSAs with Population 500,000+
Histogram of college share of jobs in tracts in (a) Los Angeles and (b) all CBSAs with more than 500,000
population in 2010 Census. The histogram is plotted restricting the sample to tracts with more total
employment than 10th percentile of tracts by total employment (black), 50th percentile (blue), and 90th
percentile (red). Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic for the null that the distribution above 10 percentile is
equal to the distribution above 90th percentile.
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share, as can be seen from the right-shifted red histogram compared to the black histogram.
Figure 1.5b shows that this pattern holds across all CBSAs with the Kolmorogorov-Smirnov
test statistic of 0.26 and a p-value near 0.8 This is in line with qualitative evidence of higher
concentration of college workers, and dense locations becoming more concentrated by high
human capital firms (Katz and Wagner 2014).
This set of stylized facts indicate a high degree of co-location and concentration for college
and non-college workplaces. Urban economists have traditionally seen the density of firm
location as a sign of agglomeration economies and co-location of firms as a sign of spillovers.
Therefore, these stylized facts provide preliminary suggestive evidence on the existence of
very local agglomerative spillover effects of both college and non-college workers. I now turn
to exploring this evidence further.
1.3 Descriptive Evidence
In this section, I provide descriptive evidence on the existence of spatial spillovers by skill level
using individual-level data on workplace and income. I estimate ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression coefficients of worker wages on nearby college and non-college worker density,
providing preliminary evidence on the existence and fast decay of agglomeration spillovers
by skill level.
1.3.1 Estimation Framework
I use a standard Mincerian approach used in the agglomeration literature, taking wages as
an indirect measure of productivity. Suppose each location j produces goods using a Cobb-
Douglas production function Yj = AjN
α
j F
1−α
j with Total Factor Productivity (TFP), Aj, in-
puts using floor (or office) space Fj and CES labor aggregatorNj =
(
ajLL
σ−1
σ
j + ajHH
σ−1
σ
j
) σ
σ−1
8The null of the Kolmorogorov-Smirnov test is equality of two distributions, one distribution for tracts
above the 90th percentile in total worker counts and one for below the 90th percentile.
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that aggregates college and non-college workers. The first-order condition and the profit-zero
condition yields the following expression for wage wjg at location j for skill group g:
logwjg = log ajg +
1
σ
log
Nj
Gj
− 1− α
α
log qj +
1
α
logAj (1.1)
where Gj denote labor for group g and qj is floor price at j.
Suppose now that the productivity Aj is determined by a function of own-location pro-
ductivity aj and surrounding employment density of college Hj′ and non-college Lj′ workers
in tracts j′ 6= j:
logAj = log aj + fH({Hj′}j′ 6=j) + fL({Hj′}j′ 6=j) (1.2)
where fH(·), fL(·) are functions that determine how surrounding density affects productivity
at j.
Combining equations (1.1) and (1.2), we arrive at the following equation,
logwjg = γ˜L logLj + γ˜H logHj + γ˜F qj + f˜H({Hj′}j′ 6=j) + f˜L({Hj′}j′ 6=j) + log εjg (1.3)
where γ˜L, γ˜H , γ˜F are reduced-form parameters that combine various model parameters and
functional form assumptions, and εjg combines the two unobservable fundamentals aj, ajg,
the productivity terms at location j and for location-group j × g.
I augment the estimating equation to include individual worker o characteristics. Fol-
lowing the literature, individual characteristics are thought of as augmenting individual’s
productivity, where her final productivity is a function of her own observable characteristics
Xo and unobserved characteristics εo. So the productivity worker o working in location j is
given by logAjgo = logAj + ΓXo + εo.
Finally, assume a functional form for f˜ to be log-additive in the sum of employment in
concentric rings around tract j of varying radii. So for example, Hj2−3 sums all high-skill
workplaces in tracts that are 2-3 miles away from workpalce tract j. With this assumption,
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equation (1.2) becomes,
logAj = log aj +
∑
d>0
γHd logHjd +
∑
d>0
γLd logLjd (1.4)
where d denote rings. Therefore, the final estimation regresses individual wages on charac-
teristics of individuals, tract, and surrounding workers in concentric circles,
logwjgo = γ˜L logLj + γ˜H logHj + γ˜F qj +
∑
d>0
γHd logHjd +
∑
d>0
γLd logLjd (1.5)
+ ΓXo + log εjg + log aj + εo
The parameters of interest are γHd, γLd and how they vary with distance. I cluster the
standard errors of these parameters on the workplace tract-level in my OLS specifications.
There are two main sources of endogeneity in the current regression framework. First,
high skill individuals may also select into more productive tracts, which could bias the
estimates. For example, high ability individuals may receive higher wages ceteris paribus,
but also select into more productive workplaces. This will bias the estimates for nearby
density away from 0. I include individual and household controls to mitigate these concerns
as much as possible, but there may still be remaining selection on unobservables. Rosenthal
and Strange (2009) argue that as long as the selection effect is constant across sources of
productivity increases (e.g., first ring versus second ring, etc.), comparing the coefficient
estimates between different rings should still give a consistent estimate of the decay. If we
make that assumption, we can get an unbiased estimate of relative magnitude of productivity
increases in the presence of selection even though the absolute magnitude of productivity
increases from surrounding density may be biased.
Second, there may be omitted tract-level variables that may be correlated across space.
For example, consider a newly built train line with multiple stations nearby. Suppose this
train station offers an identical access to a productivity-enhancing technology and easier
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access for workers to two nearby tracts. These will each show up as an increase in own-
tract productivity and increase in nearby workers. However, this enhanced productivity is
not due to spillovers, but a common benefit from a third source. Therefore, anything that
affects productivity of locations across space will raise both the wages in tract j while raising
employment in surrounding tracts j′. This is a crucial concern. Addressing this issue in the
current framework is extremely difficult: it would require an instrument for each ring with
independent sources of variation for both college and non-college workers. For now, I include
possible tract-level characteristics such as public transport accessibility to control for shared
spatial characteristics as much as possible.
1.3.2 Data
I use 2010 California Household Travel Survey (CHTS) data to get information on individ-
ual’s workplace and household income. Because LODES does not have data on wages at
each location, I cannot use it directly to examine the question of productivity across loca-
tions. CHTS is a publicly available dataset from a travel survey conducted on a sample
of households. Crucially, the data contains information on income and workplace tract of
the individuals, which makes it one of the only publicly available individual/household-level
sources with such geographic precision and income information. The survey also contains
information on various demographic and work-related variables, which I include in the re-
gression as controls to proxy for selection effects.
To obtain information on the surrounding density of college and non-college employment,
I use information from LODES on tract-level employment by skill group. I form concentric
rings of various radii around the centroid of each tract, summing up the number of jobs in
each concentric circle rings. For example, for tract j, I sum the college employment in tracts
j′ whose centroids are within 3-5 miles from the centroid of tract j. This gives me the college
measure for the 3-5 mile ring. I compute the measures for college and non-college workplaces
within 0-3 miles (excluding the own-tract), 3-5 miles, 5-10 miles, 10-25 miles, 25-50 miles,
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and 50-100 miles.
In the regression, I choose to include up to and including 10-25 miles, which was chosen
by sequentially adding the rings, computing the Aikake Information Criterion (AIC), and
finding the specification minimizing the AIC. Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) gives
a slightly more parsimonious specification, excluding one ring at 10-25 miles. I choose to
include up to 10-25 miles in favor of completeness. Therefore, there are total of 4 rings in
the regression specification for each skill group.9
I use household income bins as the dependent variable. The bins are defined as follows: $0
– $9,999, $10,000 – $24,999, $25,000 – $34,999, $35,000 – $49,000, $50,000 – $74,999, $75,000
– $99,999, $100,000 – $149,999, $150,000 – $199,999, $200,000 – $249,999, and $250,000 or
more. Because income is only observed in bins, I estimate both an interval regression model
directly using the bins and an OLS model with midpoints of each bin as the outcome. In
addition, I include four sets of controls in the regressions. First, I include controls relating
to the individual’s demographics: race, Hispanic status, nativity status, whether the person
has a valid driver’s license, age indicator variables in bins, college status, and male indicator.
Second, I include individual’s employment characteristics: full-time status, hours per week,
industry and occupation of employment. Third, I include some household controls: whether
the household owns the home and the total worker count of the household.
Last, I include characteristics of the workplace tract: 1) the median residential housing
rent, 2) total road network density, 3) aggregate frequency of transit service within 0.25
miles of the boundary 4) log working age population residing within 45 minutes of driving
time, and 5) CBSA fixed effects. Median residential housing rent data is from 2006-2010
American Community Survey 5-year Summary File. The three accessibility measures are
from EPA’s SmartLocationDb. The median housing rent is a proxy for floor price faced
by firms locating in tract j. Total road network density and aggregate frequency of transit
9In the appendix, I present results for a specification disaggregating the first 5 miles into 0-1, 1-2, 2-3,
3-4, 4-5 miles.
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service both measure the tract’s infrastructure. While roads are infrastructures that is
both productivity- and commute-enhancing, transit service may be thought of as commute-
enhancing but not necessarily a productivity-enhancing. Working age population residing
within 45 minutes of driving time measures the accessibility of workers for a firm but also is
a measure of geographic centrality within the city.
Summary statistics for the estimation sample is presented in Table 1.1 for all workers,
non-college workers, and college workers. The two education-specific sample restricts age to
26+ in order to avoid including workers who may still be completing their education. As
expected, college workers on average belong to higher household income groups, have higher
share of natives, valid driver’s licenses, and home ownership. In addition, a higher share
of college workers are white and Asian compared to non-college workers, and a significantly
lower share of college workers are Hispanic. However, the age groups are distributed similarly,
and workers of both groups work similar number of hours.
Comparing workplace tract characteristics of the two groups reveal interesting patterns.
First, college workers seem to work in more connected workplaces, measured by total road
network density, aggregate frequency of transit nearby, and working age population within
45 minutes of car travel. It is particularly interesting that college workers tend to work
in areas that are more accessible by public transit, although almost all of them have valid
driver’s licenses. Second, college workers work in areas with higher residential floor price.
These summary statistics go hand-in-hand with the styled fact I presented in Section 1.2
that shows that college workers tend to work in denser areas.
1.3.3 Results
As described above, I estimate two different models: 1) an OLS specification with income
bins converted to log income level by using the midpoint of the bins, and 2) an interval
regression specification, which uses information on the endpoints of the intervals to estimate
an ordered multinomial probit model without the need to estimate the cutoffs of the intervals.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for CHTS Estimation Sample
Sample
All Non-college College
Individual/HH Characteristics
Household income category 6.01 5.08 6.77
Income, median of bracket 107,733 77,707 131,784
Male 0.52 0.52 0.51
College 0.54 0.00 1.00
Nativity 0.80 0.74 0.82
Valid Driver’s License 0.96 0.94 0.99
Hours Per Week 37.20 37.58 38.49
Full Time (Hours > 35) 0.73 0.75 0.77
Number of Workers in HH 1.89 1.84 1.79
Home Ownership 0.80 0.73 0.85
White 0.73 0.67 0.77
Black 0.03 0.04 0.03
Native American 0.04 0.07 0.02
Asian 0.08 0.05 0.11
Other 0.09 0.15 0.05
Hispanic 0.20 0.32 0.10
Age Group
Age Group 16-25 0.09
Age Group 26-35 0.12 0.15 0.12
Age Group 36-45 0.19 0.20 0.21
Age Group 46-55 0.28 0.32 0.30
Age Group 56-65 0.25 0.26 0.29
Age Group 66-79 0.05 0.04 0.06
Workplace Tract Characterisitcs
Total road network density 19.37 18.25 20.30
Agg. freq transit within 0.25 mi 133.60 107.20 159.00
Working age pop. within 45 min 1,212,000 1,176,000 1,245,000
Residential Floor Price 83,495 78,621 87,519
N 29,576 11,474 15,507
Means presented for each sample. The sample are restricted to have no missing values for all variables and
are identical to the estimation sample. Non-college and College columns only include those with ages 26+
to avoid including workers who are still completing education.
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Interval regressions are better than ordered probit models because the coefficient estimates
have a straightfoward meaning of x’s partial effect on y, just like in linear regressions.
The parameter estimates of the regressions are presented in Table 1.2. I present results
for both specifications on three different samples: 1) the whole sample of workers, 2) only
non-college workers aged 26+, and 3) only college workers aged 26+. Therefore, we can
consider the estimates on different samples as estimating cross-skill and own-skill spillover
effects from surrounding skill densities. I also plot the coefficients on distance by different
sample of workers using the OLS specification (columns 2 and 3 in Table 1.2) in Figure 1.6.
For example, column (3) tells us that an increase of 1% in own-tract college workers is
associated with a 0.12% increase in worker’s household income for if the worker is college-
educated. This effect seems to decrease with distance rapidly, with a 1% increase in college
workers in 0-3 mile radius having 0.07% increase in household income, and only 0.02%
increase for 3-5 miles. Also, the estimates are no longer statistically significant beyond 3-5
miles. Meanwhile, there is an opposite effect of nearby non-college workers. A 1% increase
of non-college workers in the own tract decreases college worker household income by 0.1%.
College worker income decreases by about 0.06% and 0.03% in 0-3 miles and 3-5 mile radii,
respectively. Again, the estimates are not statistically significant beyond 3-5 miles. These
estimates are stable between OLS and interval regression specifications.
These fast decaying effects of surrounding density is more easily visible when the coef-
ficients are plotted against distance in Figure 1.6. We can see that for both college and
non-college workers, the effect of surrounding density from college workers are positive and
decays to close to 0 by 3-5 mile radius. On the other hand, the effect of surrounding density
of non-college workers is negative and also close to 0 by 3-5 mile radius. Also, note that the
R-squared is much larger for non-college workers than for college workers, suggesting more
heterogeneity of workplace location choice for college workers than for non-college workers.
The regression results display two patterns. First, the density effect of nearby college
workers seem similar on both college and non-college workers and the density effect of nearby
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Regression Results
Model OLS Interval Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample All Non Col All Non Col
Col Own 0.0925*** 0.0446** 0.124*** 0.0998*** 0.0498*** 0.130***
(0.0120) (0.0191) (0.0151) (0.0103) (0.0170) (0.0133)
Col 0-3 mi 0.0923*** 0.0760** 0.0711** 0.0883*** 0.0652** 0.0723***
(0.0222) (0.0322) (0.0284) (0.0186) (0.0292) (0.0249)
Col 3-5 mi 0.0257 0.0190 0.0235 0.0329* 0.0258 0.0282
(0.0201) (0.0320) (0.0263) (0.0196) (0.0310) (0.0260)
Col 5-10 mi -0.0154 0.00141 -0.0286 -0.0170 0.00274 -0.0306
(0.0265) (0.0420) (0.0344) (0.0248) (0.0398) (0.0330)
Col 10-25 mi 0.0143 -0.00955 0.0455 0.0200 -0.000841 0.0509
(0.0320) (0.0533) (0.0400) (0.0308) (0.0484) (0.0412)
Non Own -0.0766*** -0.0214 -0.110*** -0.0837*** -0.0275 -0.115***
(0.0134) (0.0214) (0.0169) (0.0115) (0.0189) (0.0150)
Non 0-3 mi -0.0858*** -0.0771** -0.0588* -0.0815*** -0.0660** -0.0594**
(0.0244) (0.0351) (0.0316) (0.0209) (0.0328) (0.0280)
Non 3-5 mi -0.0350 -0.0343 -0.0259 -0.0424* -0.0416 -0.0301
(0.0226) (0.0361) (0.0297) (0.0221) (0.0352) (0.0292)
Non 5-10 mi 0.0329 0.0366 0.0342 0.0357 0.0357 0.0376
(0.0298) (0.0473) (0.0387) (0.0280) (0.0448) (0.0373)
Non 10-25 mi 0.00399 0.0209 -0.0250 -0.00267 0.00994 -0.0299
(0.0350) (0.0591) (0.0437) (0.0339) (0.0535) (0.0453)
Constant 10.53*** 10.14*** 11.16*** 10.60*** -0.593*** -0.648***
(0.263) (0.429) (0.327) (0.240) (0.387) (0.00628)
Observations 29,576 11,474 15,507 29,576 11,474 15,507
R-squared 0.451 0.438 0.304
Std. errors Clustered (employment tract) White HAC
Clustered standard errors at the employment tract level in parentheses in OLS and White HAC standard
errors in parentheses in interval regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Independent variables displayed
are in logs. Columns (1)-(3) present results from the OLS specification, while columns (4)-(6) present results
from the interval regression specification. Columns (1) and (4) use the entire sample, while columns (2), (5)
and columns (3), (6) estimate the model only using non-college and college workers in the regression sample,
respectively.
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Table 1.3: OLS Regression Table with Varying Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Controls FE Add Ind Add Emp Add HH Add Tract
Col Own 0.323*** 0.141*** 0.0987*** 0.0991*** 0.0925***
(0.0159) (0.0130) (0.0126) (0.0117) (0.0120)
Col 0-3 mi 0.161*** 0.0782*** 0.0803*** 0.0942*** 0.0923***
(0.0293) (0.0241) (0.0230) (0.0211) (0.0222)
Col 3-5 mi 0.0144 0.0122 0.00858 0.0174 0.0257
(0.0290) (0.0237) (0.0223) (0.0197) (0.0201)
Col 5-10 mi -0.0274 -0.0265 -0.00371 0.00388 -0.0154
(0.0361) (0.0305) (0.0290) (0.0253) (0.0265)
Col 10-25 mi -0.00493 0.0333 0.0433 0.0150 0.0143
(0.0444) (0.0355) (0.0343) (0.0313) (0.0320)
Non Own -0.298*** -0.115*** -0.0859*** -0.0846*** -0.0766***
(0.0174) (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0129) (0.0134)
Non 0-3 mi -0.170*** -0.0789*** -0.0823*** -0.0915*** -0.0858***
(0.0330) (0.0269) (0.0257) (0.0233) (0.0244)
Non 3-5 mi -0.0399 -0.0282 -0.0229 -0.0307 -0.0350
(0.0327) (0.0268) (0.0251) (0.0221) (0.0226)
Non 5-10 mi 0.0429 0.0372 0.0106 0.00800 0.0329
(0.0405) (0.0346) (0.0328) (0.0284) (0.0298)
Non 10-25 mi 0.00547 -0.0261 -0.0295 -0.00600 0.00399
(0.0484) (0.0389) (0.0376) (0.0342) (0.0350)
Constant 11.10*** 10.91*** 10.92*** 10.64*** 10.53***
(0.258) (0.207) (0.199) (0.175) (0.263)
Observations 34,388 33,941 33,085 33,085 29,576
R-squared 0.096 0.290 0.338 0.452 0.451
FE CBSA CBSA CBSA CBSA CBSA
OLS regression with log of midpoint income of each bin as outcome variable. Clustered standard errors at the
employment tract level in parentheses. Sample is all workers. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Independent
variables displayed are in logs. The regressors included are: (1) density measures and CBSA FE, (2)
individual controls, (3) individual employment characteristics, (4) household-level controls, (5) workplace
tract controls.
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Figure 1.6: Plot of Attenuation
Coefficient estimates on the concentric circles plotted over distance. Dotted lines are effect of surrounding
college density on college (black) and non-college (green) workers. Solid lines are effect of surrounding non-
college density on college (blue) and non-college (brown) workers. Distance is the mean of distance band,
rounded up to the nearest integer.
non-college workers is also similar on college and non-college workers. Second, the spillover
effect decays very quickly over space, in line with the estimates that are available in the
literature. In particular, Fu (2007) estimates that in Boston, the college share of nearby
locations has an effect that disappears past 3 miles, which is similar to what I find here.
Therefore, these regressions suggest that there exist symmetric, fast-decaying spillover effects
of distance.
In terms of the magnitudes, these estimates are on the lower end of Moretti’s (2004b)
city-level estimates but larger than Fu’s (2007) tract-level estimates using only data from
Boston. Moretti estimates a model with wages as the dependent variable and college share
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in the city as the independent variable. He finds that a one percentage point increase in
the college share leads to about a 1.9% increase in wages of high-school drop-outs, 1.6%
increase for high-school graduates, and 0.4% increase for college graduates. If I convert my
estimates by assuming the mean value of college share across tracts (1/3) and increase the
college share purely by increasing college workers, my estimates imply about 0.4% increase in
household income for a one percentage point change in college share 0-3 miles away. However,
the estimates are much larger than Fu’s estimate, which shows that a one percentage point
increase in college share 0-1.5 miles away is associated with a 0.14% increase in wages.
In the appendix, I present several specifications for robustness analysis. First, I use a
finer subset of distances in the first 0-5 mile radius by disaggregating the range into 0-1, 1-2,
2-3, 3-4, 4-5 miles. The resulting coefficients are plotted in Figure 1.A.1. In Figure 1.A.1a
I plot the original specification using 0-3 and 3-5 mile circles for all workers. In Figure
1.A.1b I plot the specification with disaggregated concentric circles. The qualitative results
are similar, although the decay pattern is not as clear-cut in the earlier miles. However, the
estimates in the earlier miles are not statistically distinguishable from each other. Moreover,
the decay of the effect to 0 still holds beyond 3 miles. In Table 1.A.1, I present coefficient
estimates for varying worker sample definitions. The estimates show similar results across
sample definitions.
To examine some of the concerns of endogeneity, in Table 1.3, I present results of the OLS
specification, sequentially adding in various controls. Column (1) only includes the density
measures and CBSA-level fixed effects in the regression. Column (2) adds the individual
controls, column (3) adds individual’s employment characteristics controls, column (4) adds
household-level controls, and finally column (5) adds tract-level controls. We see that in
column (1) when no controls are included, the coefficients on the density measures are a lot
larger than in column (2), which includes individual-level controls. This seems to suggest
that the individual controls are controlling for some positive selection effect, on both own
and surrounding tracts. However, the relative decay of the spillover coefficients are still
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qualitatively similar to before, with the spillover effect going to near zero by 3-5 miles.
Moreover, once the individual-level controls are included, additional controls do not seem
to change the estimates by very much, and the coefficients are stable across specifications.
This is suggestive evidence that perhaps selection effect is the most relevant bias in the
estimation of the spillover effects. This suggests that further research using mover-design in
Glaeser and Mare´ (2001) with individual-level panel data might be beneficial in exploring
causal impact of neighborhood-level spillover effects.
Given the remaining concerns of endogeneity that I cannot fully deal with using the data
at hand, I use an economic geography model framework using tract-level data that allows me
to recover characteristics of workplaces that are unobserved. This introduces identification
conditions that are less stringent to estimate parameters of interest, at the cost of imposing
modeling assumptions, allowing me to provide additional evidence of human capital spillovers
across neighborhoods and run counterfactual policy simulations. In the next sections I
introduce the model, estimate it, and run policy simulations.
1.4 Model
The model is heavily based on Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), henceforth ARSW, and its multi-city
extension by Berkes and Gaetani (2019). I augment the model in ARSW by incorporating
skill groups and agglomeration spillovers of each skill employment across space.10
10Although Tsivanidis (2018) has a similar extension of CES aggregator of college and non-college workers,
he does not consider spillovers across space. Moreover, because he does not observe college and non-college
workplace directly in his data (Bogota´, Colombia), he has to use an additional assumption of constant shares
of college workers in industries across space. Berkes and Gaetani (2019) incorporate two industry groups.
However, they do not consider cross-spillovers in production, but only in amenities. In addition, the two
industries are separate economies and therefore do not interact with each other in production, while in my
model, the workers of two types are imperfect substitutes in the CES aggregator.
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1.4.1 Workers
Within each city, a worker o of skill group g ∈ {H,L} (high or low-skilled) living in tract i
and working in tract j has the following utility,
Uijgo = Cijgo =
Bigzijgo
dij
(
cijgo
β
)β (
hijgo
1− β
)1−β
(1.6)
where Big is residential amenities, dij is disutility of commuting from i to j, zijgo is the
idiosyncratic preference shock on residence-workplace pair (i, j), cijgo is goods consumption,
and hijgo is housing consumption. zijgo is distributed Freche´t, independent across locations,
F (zijgo) = e
−Tiz−εgijgo (1.7)
where Ti > 0 is the average utility living in block i, and εg > 1 is the dispersion parameter
of the idiosyncratic utility and varies by skill group.
Consumers face the following budget constraint:
cijgo +Qihijgo ≤ wjg (1.8)
where Qi is housing cost at location i and wjg is wages received from working at j for worker
of skill g. Here the assumption is that the only object a worker values at the workplace tract
is the wage, which is her only source of income.
The utility form in (1.6) leads to indirect utility,
uijgo =
zijgoBigwjgQ
β−1
i
dij
(1.9)
which, combined with Freche´t preference shocks, leads to the following commute probability
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equations,
piij|g =
Ti(dijQ
1−β
i )
−εg(Bigwjg)εg∑S
r=1
∑S
s=1 Tr(drsQ
1−β
r )−εg(Brgwsg)εg
≡ Φijg
Φg
(1.10)
piRi|g =
S∑
j=1
piij|g =
∑S
j=1 Φijg
Φg
(1.11)
piMj|g =
S∑
i=1
piij|g =
∑S
i=1 Φijg
Φg
(1.12)
piij|ig =
piij|g
piRi|g
=
(wjg/dij)
εg∑
s(wsg/dij)
εg
(1.13)
where (1.10) is the probability that a worker of group g chooses to live in i and work in j,
(1.11) is the probability that a worker lives in i, (1.12) is the probability that a worker works
in j, and (1.13) is the conditional probability that a worker living in i chooses to work in j.
Let LMjg denote count of workers of skill g employed in j and LRig denote count of workers
of skill g living in i. Then,
LMjg =
∑
i
piij|igLRig =
∑
i
(wjg/dij)
εg∑
s(wsg/dij)
εg
LRig (1.14)
I parametrize the disutility of commuting dij = e
κgτij as standard in the commuting literature,
where κg is the disutility parameter for group g and τij is the distance between tracts i and
j.
The reservation level of utility for group g is therefore,
U¯g = Γ
(
εg − 1
εg
)[ S∑
r=1
S∑
s=1
Tr
(
drsQ
1−β
r
)−εg
(Brgwsg)
εg
]1/εg
(1.15)
where Γ(·) is the Gamma function.
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1.4.2 Production
I modify the production function by adding in a CES labor aggregator over skill groups.
Final goods at location j is produced by a representative firm with technology,
yj = AjN
α
MjH
1−α
Mj (1.16)
NMj =
 ∑
g∈{H,L}
ajgL
σ−1
σ
Mjg
 σσ−1 (1.17)
where NMj is the CES labor aggregator given by (1.17), σ is the elasticity of substitution
between skill groups, and HMj is floor space used in production in j. Firms are perfectly
competitive. The wage and labor demand at each location is given by
wj =
(∑
g
aσjgw
1−σ
jg
) 1
1−σ
(1.18)
LMjg =
(
wjg
ajgwj
)−σ
NMj (1.19)
HMj =
(
wj
αAj
)1/(1−α)
NMj (1.20)
qj = (1− α)
(
α
wj
)α/(1−α)
A
1/(1−α)
j (1.21)
where (1.18) is the wage index of location j, (1.19) relates the skill group labor demand to
the total labor demand, (1.20) relates the labor demand with demand for floor space, the
wage index, and productivity, and (1.21) is the floor price.
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1.4.2.1 Production Spillovers Across Space
I incorporate production spillovers across space in the Hicks-neutral productivity term Aj,
Aj = ajΥ
λH
jHΥ
λL
jL (1.22)
Υjg =
∑
s
e−δgτjs
(
LMsg
Ks
)
(1.23)
where Ks is the land area of location s, so LMsg/Ks is the density of employment of skill
group g in location s. The spillover of nearby density to productivity decay with distance
τjs, with δL, δH governing the speed of decay for low- and high-skill workers nearby. Finally,
λL, λH determine the contribution of low- and high-skill worker density on productivity in
location j. In other words, a location’s productivity benefits from a distance-weighted sum
of different worker types across space.
In addition, there are no differential cross-skill spillovers but spillovers occur both to col-
lege and non-college workers at the same level. Fajgelbaum and Gaubert (2018) incorporate
spillover effects on the share parameters of the CES labor aggregator, which incorporates
differential cross-skill productivity spillovers. However, motivated by my descriptive exer-
cise, I choose to model spillovers on the TFP term instead. So all spillovers from one worker
type affects the whole production, and there are no type-differential benefit of one worker
type on another.
1.4.3 Land Market
Floor space is produced by a competitive sector using land and capital as inputs. As in
ARSW, I assume that the production function for floor space is Cobb-Douglas. With the
assumption that capital prices are the same across tracts and cities, total floor space produced
in i is Hi = ϕiK
1−µ
i , where ϕi could be thought as the density of development. Land market
imposes a no-arbitrage condition between residential use with price Qi and commercial use
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with price qi. Denoting the share of floor space for commercial use in location i as θi,
θi = 1 if qi > Qi
θi ∈ [0, 1] if qi = Qi (1.24)
θi = 0 if qi < Qi
and observed price is ri = max{qi, Qi}.
The floor space market clearing condition is therefore as follows,
(
(1− α)Ai
qi
)1/α
Ni = θiHi (1.25)
(1− β)
∑
g E[wsg|i]LRig
Qi
= (1− θi)Hi (1.26)
where E[wsg|ig] =
∑
s piis|igwsg, with piis|ig defined by (1.13). The market clearing condition
(1.25) comes from first-order conditions of the firm’s profit maximization problem and (1.26)
comes from first-order conditions of the utility maximization problem, taking expectation
over the wage of residence area i.
1.4.4 Equilibrium
Given parameters {β, κL, κH , εL, εH , α, σ, λL, λH , δL, δH}11, reservation utilities {U¯g}, and ex-
ogenous location characteristics {Hi, Ti, Bi, ϕi, Ki, τij, ajL, ajH}, an equilibrium is defined
by prices {wjL, wjH , qj, Qj} and endogenous quantities {LRiL, LRiH , LMiL, LMiH , θi, Aj} that
solve the following:
1. Labor market clearing: labor supply (commuting decisions) of each group (equation
(1.14)) is consistent with labor demand for each group (equation (1.19))
11{Consumption share, disutility of commuting, Freche´t parameters, labor share in production, elasticity
of substitution between groups in production, spillover elasticities, spillover spatial decays}
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2. Floorspace market clearing: commercial floor space market clearing condition in
equation (1.25) and residential floor space market clearing in equation (1.26) hold and
floor space allocation satisfies equation (1.24)
3. Spatial Spillovers: productivity is determined by equation (1.22)
4. Spatial Equilibrium: everyone receives their group’s respective reservation utility
level as in equation (1.15).
1.4.5 Recovering Endogenous Quantities
The central benefit of the model is to use the model inversion technique in ARSW to recover
the endogenous (unobserved) model quantities of the model, {wjL, wjH , Aj} (low-skill wage,
high-skill wage, productivity) given data on {LMjL, LMjH , LRiL, LRiH , τij, Ks, qi}, (Low-skill
employment, high-skill employment, low-skill residence, high-skill residence, bilateral travel
distance, area, and floor price). In the next section, I detail the inversion and estimation
procedure for the model.
Since I am interested in the productivity spillovers in the production, for now I abstract
from residential amenities. Because the productivity and residential spillover parameters are
estimated independently, excluding residential amenities does not affect parameter estimates
of productivity spillovers.
1.5 Estimation
In this section, I detail the procedure for estimating parameters without fully solving the
model and describe instruments and their construction for the GMM estimation. I estimate
the central parameters of interest—agglomeration externalities in the production by skill,
λL, λH , and the decay of spillovers δL, δH—using GMM specification laid out in Section
1.5.1.5. However, for other parameters, I either use moments in the data (β), take estimates
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from the literature (α, µ, σ), or estimate them using model-derived specifications without
fully solving for the model (νg, εg).
1.5.1 Model Inversion and Moment Condition
The model inversion allows me to recover unobserved variables of the model. At the final
step, it allows me to form the moment condition for a GMM estimation procedure.
1.5.1.1 Obtaining {νL = κLεL, νH = κHεH} for each city
I estimate the gravity equation for commuting to get ν for each city using LODES data,
which provides commute flows between tracts. However, LODES does not have commuting
flows by education so I cannot compute ν by education. Instead, I use the rough cuts of
income group in LODES ($3,333+/month and $1,250 – $3,333/month) to first calculate the
ratio of higher-to-lower income νs, then take the average of these ratios as a universal scaling
factor.
The assumption is that 1) the relative commute semi-elasticity between college and non-
college worker is constant across cities, and 2) the difference in the commute semi-elasticity
between the cuts of income group can roughly estimate the relative commute semi-elasticity
between college and non-college workers. The procedure gives a scaling factor of around
0.95, which suggests a lower commute semi-elasticity for college workers. This is consistent
with Tsivanidis (2018), where he uses actual college and non-college commuting flow data
from Bogota´, Colombia. So I estimate the gravity equation using all workers to obtain v, set
νL = ν, νH = νL ∗ 0.95 for each city.12 The semi-elasticities that are estimated from LODES
has an average of about 0.04 across cities.
12As an additional verifying exercise, I calculate the relative commute elasticities between college and
non-college workers using Zip Code commute flows in CHTS and find that the median value to be around
0.91.
34
1.5.1.2 Given {νL, νH}, get wages
From equation (1.14), for each g ∈ {H,L},
LMjg =
(
w
εg
jg/e
νgτij
ij
)∑
s
(
w
εg
sg/e
νgτij
is
)LMig (1.27)
I can recover ωjg ≡ wεgjg uniquely up to a normalization via Lemma S.7 in ARSW.
In order to obtain estimates of εg, I use the relation V ar(lnωjg) = ε
2
gV ar(lnwjg) and
so set the value of εg to make (1/ε
2
g)V ar(lnωjg) equal to the variance of observed wages in
the data for each city and each skill group, as in ARSW. The problem here is that I do not
observe the variance of wages across workplace districts, which is what the model requires to
compute ε. The approach I take is to use the dispersion of median wages across residential
districts. The assumption I have to make is that the dispersion of residential district-level
wages is similar to dispersion of workplace district-level wages.13
The Freche´t parameters εH , εL that I estimate from this method has an average of about
5.21 for non-college workers and 4.87 for college workers. This is consistent with educated
workers having greater dispersion of residence-workplace pair choices in the literature, and
therefore can serve as a validity check for the procedure. Figure 1.7 shows the distribution
of the ε for college and non-college workers. An interesting pattern emerges: ε across cities
for non-college workers is more concentrated than for college workers. This suggests that
there is more across-city heterogeneity in the dispersion of college idiosyncratic shocks than
for non-college idiosyncratic shocks.
A final normalization needs to be done for the recovered wages within cities. They are
13I could also assume a value of κ = 0.01 from Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) and Tsivanidis (2018) and calculate ε
from estimated νs. However, I take this approach for following reasons. 1) I can use information on college
and non-college wages separately. 2) The estimated epsilon values line up better with Ahlfeldt et al. (2015)
(around 6.7). 3) Mean kappa values from this calculation is around 0.01 without imposing it. 4) Comparing
residential log wage variance with workplace log wage variance from the Zip Code Business Patterns annual
wages per employee, the average difference is about 17% of the variance. Therefore, I take the approach to
be the best way out of the limited ways to get the values of epsilon.
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Figure 1.7: Distribution of ε for College and Non-college Workers
Histogram of recovered εg parameters. Commute data was used to estimate the gravity equation to esti-
mate the semi-elasticity of commuting. Then, εg were estimated using distribution of median wages across
residences.
normalized such that the mean of each skill group’s recovered wages in each city is equal
to the observed counterpart in the data. This is necessary because the recovered wages are
only unique up to a normalization.
1.5.1.3 Given {α, σ} and {wjg}, recover normalized Aj
I can retrieve Aj as in ARSW by using equation (1.21),
qj = (1− α)
(
α
wj
)α/(1−α)
A
1/(1−α)
j
In order to recover the productivity terms Aj, I need to first recover the wage index wj.
The FOCs of the production-side yields the familiar wage index expression from a CES
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aggregator,
wj =
(
aσjLw
1−σ
jL + a
σ
jHw
1−σ
jH
) 1
1−σ (1.28)
I need to recover ajL and ajH to recover wj. Given the recovered wages from the previous step,
wjL, wjH , the FOCs with respect to high- and low-skill labor yield the following expression,
ajH
ajL
=
wjH
wjL
(
LMjH
LMjL
) 1
σ
(1.29)
I normalize the share parameters such that ajL = 1 − ajH . The above equation yields an
expression for ajH given σ, LMjH , LMjL, wjL, wjH . With ajH recovered, I can calculate wj,
and in turn I can recover Aj using equation (1.21).
1.5.1.4 Given {λg, δg} and Aj, recover aj
From the productivity spillover equation (1.22),
aj = AjΥ
−λH
jH Υ
−λL
jL , where,
Υjg =
∑
s
e−δgτjs
(
LMsg
Ks
)
The aj terms are fundamental productivities of location j and are the structural residuals
of the model. These are the central terms that are used to form the moment conditions for
estimation.
1.5.1.5 Constructing Moments
The above procedure allows us to express the normalized structural residuals aj in terms of
observed data and model parameters for all years and all locations in the data. I use the
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time-differenced and demeaned expression:
∆ log
ajt
a¯t
= (1− α)∆ log Qjt
Q¯t
+ α∆ log
wjt
w¯t
− λH∆ log ΥHjt
Υ¯Ht
− λL∆ log ΥLjt
Υ¯Lt
(1.30)
where x¯t denotes geometric mean over space.
14 This equation is an augmented version
of ARSW with measures of density in surrounding areas for both college and non-college
workers. The expression in (1.30) could be re-written as:
α∆ log
wjt
w¯t
= λH∆ log
ΥHjt
Υ¯Ht
+ λL∆ log
ΥLjt
Υ¯Lt
− (1− α)∆ log Qjt
Q¯t
+ ∆ log
ajt
a¯t
(1.31)
The error term ∆ log
ajt
a¯t
is the fundamental productivity of tract j that does not depend
on surrounding density of college and non-college workers. It is similar to the error term
in equation (1.5) in the OLS estimation in the previous section. We need instruments
that are correlated with the distribution of workers but uncorrelated with the fundamental
productivities. However, due to the imposed structure of the model that allows me to recover
the adjusted wages at each location, I can use multiple years that allows me to difference out
the common city-level terms (from the geometric mean in the denominator) and difference
over time. This makes the identification conditions weaker, at the expense of imposing model
assumptions.
Given a set of instruments Z, we can form the following moment conditions:
E
[
Z ·∆ log ajt
a¯t
]
= 0 (1.32)
Note that because the wage and density measures are both non-linear functions of the data
and model parameters, these moment conditions constitute a non-linear GMM estimating
equation. Denoting the moment functions as m(Xi,Θ) with inputs of data Xi for observation
14Units are determined from the choice to set the geometric mean of floor space and wage index equal to
one in New York CBSA.
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(tract) i and parameters Θ = (δL, δH , λL, λH), the GMM estimator Θˆ solves,
Θˆ = arg min
(
1
N
∑
i
m(Xi,Θ)
′
)
W
(
1
N
∑
i
m(Xi,Θ)
)
(1.33)
where W is the GMM weight matrix. I use a two-step GMM procedure, first estimating the
parameters using an identity matrix as the weight matrix, then using the efficient weight
matrix calculated at the parameter values in the first step. Finally, White heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) variance-covariance matrix of the parameter estimates
are used to calculate the standard errors on the parameters.
I use three types of variables as instruments in the GMM estimation. First, I use Bartik-
instruments using industry shares in 1994 from Zip Code Business Patterns (ZBP) data and
growth in college employment, non-college employment, and college share in each industry.
More specifically,
BartikLj =
∑
ind
Empj,ind,1994
TotEmpj,1994
(Lind(−c)2010 − Lind(−c)1990) (1.34)
where Lj is low-skill employment. Similarly, for Hj, high-skill Bartik is calculated.
15. The
requirement for instrument validity here is that 1) the industry shares in 1994 are uncor-
related to changes in tract-level productivity from 2010-2015, while still being relevant for
the distribution of high- and low-skill workplaces and 2) the industry-level growth shock in
college or non-college workers outside the city is uncorrelated with tract-level productivity
changes from 2010-2015.16
For (1), to the extent that there are industry-share correlates that persist through the
estimation period, 2010-2015, the estimates may be biased. However, unlike other literature
15For growth in college share, I use
Hind(−c)2015
Hind(−c)2015+Lind(−c)2015
− Hind(−c)2010Hind(−c)2010+Lind(−c)2010
16There currently is a lively debate about Bartik instruments, whether the identification assumption should
be placed on the shares or on the shocks. See Borusyak et al. (2018) and Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018).
I do not take a stance here, and assume that both needs to hold for the instrument to be valid.
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utilizing Bartik instruments, I use the past shares of industry composition, not the baseline
shares. This means that industry mix 15 years ago in a tract must have effects that cannot be
differenced out between 2010-2015. That is a strong assumption, unless there is a persistent
shock that is changing over time and correlated with the past industry shares. For (2), even
though the mechanical correlation own-city growth is removed, if there are shocks that are
correlated across the U.S., then the instruments may not satisfy the exclusion restriction.
However, for this to happen, the national shocks must be correlated differentially across
tracts within the city, as the city-level variation is absorbed by the geometric mean.
Second, I use city-level historical residential segregation in 1980 as an instrument. The
idea is that historical residential segregation affects the distribution of workers through the
combination of residential choices and commute costs, but does not affect the changes in
residual productivity of individual tracts. It is unlikely that historical residential segregation
will have a direct effect on production fundamentals. Additionally, there indeed is a rela-
tionship between historical residential segregation and current workplace segregation, with
a coefficient of about 0.2 and F-stat of about 17 (not shown). This provides evidence that
historical segregation is related to the current distribution of workplace location.
Third, in some specifications I use elevation within tracts as another instrument. The
idea comes from Saiz (2010), who uses the fact that the share of land above 15% slope is
deemed “undevelopable” by architectural guidelines and therefore restricts density in these
areas. Therefore, I calculate for each tract the share of land that is above 15% slope. In
essence, the elevation instruments capture the extent to which the tracts can sustain a level of
density. The assumption then is that this pre-determined geographical feature does not affect
changes in productivity of locations over-time, while affecting the distribution of workers via
available density. In the next section, I describe the data I use for estimation.
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1.5.2 Data
For model estimation, I need tract-level data on the following: 1) workplace and residence
counts of workers by education level, 2) floor price, 3) land area, and 4) distance between
tracts. For instrument construction, I need historical shares of industry, industry-level
growth rates in college and non-college employment, and elevation. In this section, I de-
tail the sources of data.
As before, I use LODES data for information on the residence and workplace counts
of workers by educational attainment and tract location. Consistently with the previous
sections, I designate workers without bachelor’s degree as non-college, or low-skill, workers
and those with bachelor’s or above as college, or high-skill, workers. I take two years of data,
2010 and 2015, and use Primary Jobs as the measure of workplaces, which tries to measure
workers, as one worker could potentially hold multiple jobs. Massachusetts and Wyoming
are missing 2010 and 2015 data, respectively, so I exclude CBSAs from the two states in my
analysis. Additionally, I only include cities with Census 2000 population more than 500,000.
The final count of CBSAs is 89.
There are two crucial limitations of the LODES data. First, except for Minnesota, un-
employment insurance data only contain information to the State Employer Identification
Number (SEIN) level, which is insufficient to link workers to establishment location for
multi-establishment firms. Therefore, for multi-establishment firms, LEHD imputes links of
workers to establishments by first linking workers to firms, then distributing those work-
ers across establishments using a firm-establishment manifest and a probabilistic matching
model. Second, some demographic data such as education is also missing in the state un-
employment insurance files. Therefore, LEHD links about 1/6 of workers to the Census and
imputes the educational attainment for the remainder. Details of the imputation proce-
dures is available in Abowd et al. (2005). Despite these imputations, comparing LODES to
other available sources of data for college and non-college residence/workplace distribution
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shows high degrees of correlation.17 Additional data on residence locations by education for
1970-2010 is provided by Geolytics. Geolytics compiles Decennial Census long-form data
(for 1970-2000) and ACS 5-year data (for 2010) into consistent-boundary tract-level data,
matched to tract definitions in 2010. The historical data is used to construct historical
residential segregation indices of dissimilarity.
I also obtain tract-level floor price, demographics, and income information on residents
from Census Bureau’s ACS 5-year Summary Files for years 2010 and 2015 by using the
5-year files from 2006-2010 and 2011-2015, respectively. These files contain data at the
tract-level. I also obtain tract-level residential median income for each major educational
group (high school dropout, high school graduate, some college, bachelors and above). For
floor price data, I use median rent at each tract. Because I need information on floor price
of housing, the ideal data would include the housing rent or value per square feet. However,
that data is not available at the tract-level. In order to mitigate concerns that the median
rent is uncorrelated to rent per square feet, I compare the measure to average price per room,
calculated by using aggregate rent and aggregate rooms by tract from the ACS. The idea is
that I can use the total number of rooms in each tract as a proxy for total housing area. The
median rent measure and the housing rent per room measure are highly correlated at around
0.91, so I use the median rent measure instead because it has better coverage than aggregate
rent and rooms. Additionally, I compare my floor price measure to Zillow’s Median Rent
Index Per Square Feet by ZCTA. I aggregate the tract-level floor price measure from the
ACS to the zip code-level and compare the measure to Zillow’s measure, and find a high
correlation of 0.77. Therefore, it seems that median rent can sufficiently capture the patterns
of floor price per square feet.
17To mitigate the concern that the imputations are causing significant issues in data quality, I compare
LODES residential data to the ACS, and workplace data to the CHTS, which is limited to California.
Correlation coefficients are presented in the Appendix, Table 1.A.2. Overall, there is a high degree of
correlation between measures provided by LODES and alternative sources. ACS-LODES correlation is 0.85
for college and 0.79 for non-college residents, while CHTS-LODES correlation is 0.86 for college and 0.71 for
non-college workplaces.
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For instrument construction, I use Zip Code Business Patterns (ZBP) data to calculate
the industry shares in each zip code in 1994. I use 3-digit SIC codes (and the equivalent
4-digit NAICS codes) to define an industry. Because the ZBP data in 1994 uses SIC codes
while the newer data sources use NAICS codes, I map the 3-digit SIC code to 4-digit NAICS
codes. For increase in college and non-college employment in these respective industries, I
use ACS 1-year data from University of Minnesota’s Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS) for years 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2015. For tract-level elevation data, I obtain the
share of area above 15% slope by processing NASA’s 1-arcsecond Digital Elevation Model
(DEM) data. The data contains information on elevation at the 30m×30m grid-level, which
is finer than what Saiz (2010) used for his calculation (3-arcsecond or 90m×90m).
I use three sources of data for geography. First, GIS shapefiles for various Census geogra-
phies are obtained from Census Bureau’s TIGER products. TIGER also provides interior
points (latitude/longitude), land area, and water area of each geography. These shapefiles
and geography data are used for GIS processing and calculation of various statistics. Second,
concordance between different levels of geographies are obtained from University of Missouri
Census Data Center’s Geocorr 2014 database. Third, Zip Codes to Zip Code Tabulation
Area (ZCTA) concordance is obtained from UDS Mapper to match Zip Codes in ZBP to
ZCTA which is used by rest of the data sources.
1.5.3 GMM Estimation
I first need to set values for parameters that I am not estimating from the full model.
First, the housing share of consumption, (1 − β), is set at 0.25. This value comes from
spending share on shelter, household operations, and housekeeping supplies from the 2010-
2011 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). I set a constant value across skill groups because
the share of consumption on housing for various education groups are stable in the in the CES.
Because CES only has separate table for 21 cities, data limitations prevent me from setting
a different value for each city. However, the standard deviation of the share on 21 cities that
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Table 1.4: Paramter Estimates from GMM Estimation
Preferred Robustness Checks
Parameter (1) (2) (3)
δL 1.179*** 1.98 0.5938***
(0.423) (2.419) (0.171)
δH 0.882*** 0.8758* 0.7831***
(0.197) (0.543) (0.244)
λL -0.4415*** -0.3653*** -0.502***
(0.078) (0.1722) (0.0763)
λH 0.497*** 0.5225*** 0.5186***
(0.078) (0.2175) (0.111)
White HAC standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Preferred estimates in Column
(1) use instruments of historical residential segregation and Bartik instruments. Column (2) use instruments
of residential segregation and static Bartik instruments with employment at 2010 instead of employment
growth from 1990-2010. Column (3) uses the current specification with elevation instruments.
are available is only about 3 percentage points. Also, the value is consistent with estimates
from Davis and Ortalo-Magne´ (2011). I set the floor space share in production, (1− α), to
0.2. This value comes from ARSW, who get the number from Valentinyi and Herrendorf
(2008). Finally, I set the elasticity of substitution between high- and low-skill workers, σ, to
1.3, from Card (2009), as in Tsivanidis (2018). As described in the previous section, Freche´t
dispersion parameters εg, and commute disutilities κg are estimated separately.
I construct the moments in Section 1.5.1.5 and use MATLAB’s patternsearch algorithm
to estimate the parameters. To verify that the estimates are not sensitive to initial guesses,
I run the estimation algorithm for various initial values within the range of parameter values
suggested by the literature. I confirm that the resulting estimates are robust to starting
points.
1.5.4 Results
Results from the GMM estimation are presented in Table 1.4. In column (1), I present my
preferred estimates using historical residential segregation and Bartik instruments. Columns
(2) and (3) present results from robustness checks with alternative instrument specifications.
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In all specifications, the elasticity of productivity to density measures, λL, λH , is negative for
non-college density and positive for college density, just like in the previous regressions. These
parameter estimates are actually large compared to traditional agglomeration estimates using
total employment density. For example, Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) estimates range around 0.07
for all workers and Berkes and Gaetani (2019) estimates an elasticity of 0.12 for “knowledge-
intensive sectors”. However, when college and non-college elasticities are combined, the two
elasticities form an estimate of about 0.06, which is in line with estimates of agglomeration
in the city-level literature and with estimates from Ahlfeldt et al. (2015).18
In addition, the decay parameter for both college and non-college workers is very high,
implying a very fast decay rate. In Panel A of Table 1.5, I document the implied elasticity of
density on production spillovers for each mile from a given tract using the preferred estimates.
For example, the row with mile 3 has numbers 0.026 for college and -0.013 for non-college
employment. This implies that if employment of college workers 3 miles away increases by
1% holding worker count in other distances fixed, productivity of the tract increases by about
0.026%; if employment of non-college workers 3 miles away increases by 1%, productivity of
the tract decreases by about 0.013%.
These numbers show how quickly externalities fade away as distance increases. We can
see that by mile 2, the effect of increase in college worker density more than halves compared
to the effect in mile 1. Moreover, the effect goes to virtually 0 by mile 5. For non-college
externalities, the decay is even faster, disappearing to almost 0 by mile 3. This decay is in
line with the preferred estimate from Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) for all workers in Berlin, where
their estimate implies production externalities decaying to almost 0 by 15 minutes of travel
time, which is about 3 miles of straight-line distance in the United States by automobile.
Their higher-end of the estimate of overall decay from total employment is in line with my
college decay speed.
18This value would come from an equal percentage rise in the density measure.
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Table 1.5: Implied Elasticity Decay over Distance
Panel A: Elasticity
Mile Col Non
1 0.153 -0.135
2 0.064 -0.042
3 0.026 -0.013
4 0.011 -0.004
5 0.005 -0.001
Panel B: Comparison
OLS
0-3 0.092*** -0.086**
3-5 0.025 -0.035
Model-equiv
0-3 0.151 -0.136
3-5 0.017 -0.008
Panel A shows the distance decay of 1% increase at each mile employment, assuming that initial employment
is distributed uniformly over distance. Panel B compares the descriptive regression estimates (Table 1.2
column 1) to the model estimates, where Model-equivalent estimates are from sums of elasticity parameters
of each mile parameters.
The decay parameter estimates imply faster decay than what was estimated in the
reduced-form regressions. Panel B of Table 1.5 presents the estimates from 0-3 and 3-5
mile rings again, and compares with a crude measure that is model-equivalent by averaging
the effects within the bin. For example, for 0-3 mile ring, I take the elasticity effects of miles
1, 2, 3 and take the average of the three to get the model-equivalent effect.19 We see that
the model-equivalent and OLS elasticities are similar for 0-3 miles. The model-implied elas-
ticities falls sharply below the OLS estimates by the outer ring, although the OLS estimate
is not statistically significant.
These parameter estimates are somewhat robust to alternative instrument specifications.
I run two additional specifications 1) with residential segregation instrument and static
Bartik, where I use the employment at year 2010 instead of growth of employment, and 2)
19Starting from 1 mile is appropriate because most tracts in the descriptive estimates have tracts with
significant employment starting at the 1-mile radius
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my current specification with elevation instruments. The college decay parameter δH stays
stable with a range of 0.78-0.88 and college elasticity parameter λH also stays stable with a
range of 0.49-0.52. Non-college elasticity parameter λL is less stable, with a range of -0.37
to -0.5 but are within reasonable bounds. Non-college decay parameter δL, however is the
least stable, ranging from 0.6-1.9, with my preferred estimate being around the middle. Still,
the estimates imply the same qualitative results with positive spillovers from nearby college
density, negative spillovers from nearby non-college density, and fast speed of decay.
1.5.5 Over-Identification Checks
In this section, I evaluate the fit of the model against moments in the data that I did not use
for estimation. First, I compare the recovered wages obtained from the model to the crude
data on wages per employment in ZBP data. ZBP contains data on the total first quarter
payroll as well as total mid-march employment of businesses for each zip code. Taking the
ratio of the payroll to employment gives a measure of wage per job in the particular zip
code. To compare this measure to the model, I take the tract-level recovered wages from
the model, link the tracts to ZCTA, and compute a measure of total wages by computing
the weighted sum of college and non-college recovered mean wage in the ZCTA. I then
plot the standardized measures of the two variables in Figure 1.8. Overall, although they
do not coincide perfectly, they have a high degree of correlation (0.51). It seems that the
model-recovered wages can replicate the data quite well.
Another over-identification check that I do is to compare the actual floor space density
in tracts with the model-implied density. I have information on approximate floor space
in four areas: New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, and the county of Los Angeles.20 In
New York, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles County, I obtain data on the height and area
of building outlines. I use height ∗ area as a measure of total available floor space of the
20These are not CBSAs, but rather the city or county boundaries. Together, these three cities and one
county constitute the center of 4 out of top 5 CBSAs by 2010 population.
47
Figure 1.8: Over Identification Check: Wages
Plots wages per employment in Zip Code Business Patterns (Wages in Data) against recovered wages in the
model (Wages in Model). 45-degree line is also added for comparison. Correlation between two measures is
0.51.
building. In Chicago, I obtain data on the number of stories and area of building outlines. I
use (#ofstories) ∗ area as a measure of total available floor space of the building. I match
each building to tract, sum all the building floor space within the tract and divide by tract
area to get a measure of floor space density.
These measures are not perfect measures of floor space: the actual floor space available
can only be measured using information on each floor’s area of a building. For New York,
Philadelphia, and Los Angeles County, I assume that building height proxies for number of
floors. For both all cities, I assume that the area of usable space is the same for each floor.
In reality, each floor on a building can have different areas of usable space. Nevertheless,
Figure 1.9 shows that the model measure and the data measure of density line up relatively
well with a correlation coefficient of 0.59. To mitigate the concern that the three geographies
have different information on buildings in the data, I present separate figures for the areas
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Figure 1.9: Over Identification Check: Floor Space
Plots model-implied density of floor space (Density in Model) and available data measure of floor space by
area in New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles County (Density in Data). Both are normalized by their
geometric mean within geography. Correlation between two measures is 0.59. The figure plots only data
points below 10 for each measure for visibility, but the correlation coefficient is computed using whole data.
The cutoff excludes 64 (1.2%) observations from the plot.
in Figure 1.A.2. The results hold separately as well.
Using the preferred estimates, I now utilize the model and run a policy experiment to
analyze a Los Angeles Policy to increase density and improve productive externalities within
the city.
1.6 Counterfatual Analysis
In 2016, the City of Los Angeles completed the construction of new Metro stations on their
light rail transit, the Exposition Line (Expo Line). Along with the new stations, Los Angeles
proposed to re-zone areas around the newly built Exposition Metro Line stations to allow
for higher-density commercial, industrial, residential developments to attract a high-skill
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workforce to these areas. The resulting Exposition Corridor Transit Neighborhood Plan
(henceforth Expo Plan) was approved and finalized in 2018. In this section, I use my model
and parameter estimates to simulate the impact of this plan on productivity, floor space
prices, employment, and residence in the targeted and surrounding areas under various
scenarios of development.
From the viewpoint of the model, the Expo Plan does two things. First, it increases
the density of development of the targeted tracts. Second, it shifts the composition of the
workforce in targeted tracts toward college employment. The first effect can be thought
of as an increase in the density of development parameter ϕj, while the second effect can
be thought of as in increase in the college share parameter in the CES aggregator of each
location, ajH .
To assess the impact of the two effects separately, I first simulate a policy where I only
increase the density parameter in the targeted locations. Then, I increase both the density
parameter and the college share parameter to examine the total effect of the policy. Lastly,
because I implement the policy simulation by changing the exogenous parameters ϕj and
ajH , I compute multiple counterfactuals by changing the parameters by different amounts
to quantitatively assess the effect of the policy under different scenarios of development.
1.6.1 Details of Exposition Corridor Transit Neighborhood Plan
The Expo Plan implements two different urban policy instruments. First, the Plan signif-
icantly increases maximum floor-area ratios (FAR), which determines the number of floors
that is allowed per area of plot.21 Increasing FAR therefore allows denser development in the
target areas. Second, it is re-zoning the target areas to permit office spaces, different from
what is currently allowed. Last, it is giving “density bonuses” to developers who include
21By “per area of plot”, I mean given the area of land and the building coverage ratio (BCR). Fixing the
area of land and BCR, increase in FAR determines the increase in floor density
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Table 1.6: New Zoning Policies
Current Zoning New Zoning Max FAR Purpose
Light Industrial Hybrid Industrial 1:1.5 → 4 Attract skill-intense jobs
General Commercial Community Commercial 1:1.5 → 3.6 Increase live-work space
Summary of the zoning changes in the Expo Plan.
affordable housing units within the new developments.22 Figure 1.10 shows the geographic
extent of the proposed policy.
More specifically, the Expo Plan targets two types of areas for re-zoning: areas currently
zoned Light Industrial and General Commercial. Both area types currently have a low FAR
of 1.5, which means that for every 1 square mile of buildable area, the permissible amount
of floor space is 1.5 square miles. An example target area can be seen in Figure 1.11. This
area is currently occupied by low-rise warehouse buildings and low-density businesses such as
gas stations. A summary of new zoning regulations compared to old regulations is listed in
Table 1.6. The city expects to attract an additional 3,369 units of housing, 7,124 residents,
10,521 jobs, 3,230,060 of non-residential square footage by 2035.23
The counterfactual equilibrium is computed using the technique in ARSW. First, change
the relevant location-specific fundamentals of the model. Then, calculate equilibrium objects
with the changed fundamentals, starting as guesses the values of endogenous variables from
the observed data. Update the guess as a weighted average of the new equilibrium values and
the previous equilibrium values, with a larger weight on the previous guess. Repeat until the
old and new values converge. This algorithm gives the interpretation that we are selecting
the new equilibrium that is closest to the observed equilibrium. As described above, the
model fundamentals that I am interested in changing are 1) the density of development, ϕj,
22I do not explicitly model the density bonus policy. The policy’s guarantee to allow higher FAR for
developments with affordable housing units can have two effects. It can mitigate the effect of house price
increases in the surrounding area, while depressing the house price in the target tracts even further.
23Source: “Exposition Corridor Transit Neighborhood Plan” (Terry A. Hayes Associates Inc. 2017).
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Figure 1.10: Targeted Tracts and Re-zoning
Highlighted areas of proposed change, with “Project Area” boundary in dotted red. Source: “Environmental
Impact Report”, Los Angeles Transit Neighborhood Plan.
and 2) the college share in the CES labor aggregator, ajH .
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1.6.2 Policy Simulations
In accordance with the proposed plan, I conduct policy simulations under three different
scenarios. First, I increase the density of development parameter in the proposed targeted
tracts by 4/1.5 ≈ 2.6 times in current Light Industrial Zones and by 3.6/1.4 = 2.5 times
in current General Commercial Zones.25 Second, in addition to increasing the density of
development parameter, I increase the college share parameter in the labor CES aggregator
to increase the college to non-college employment ratio by 50% in current Light Industrial
Zones. This captures the effect of replacing warehouses with office spaces suitable for higher
24The share of density devoted to commercial use (θj) is endogenous and left to vary according to the
model.
25Ratio of new to old FAR.
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Figure 1.11: Current View of an Example Area Zoned Light Industrial
Area around Barrington Ave. and Olympic Blvd. in Los Angeles, CA. This area is currently zoned Light
Industrial and will be rezoned Hybrid Industrial. Map data: Google, Maxar Technologies, U.S. Geological
Survey, USDA Farm Service Agency.
college-share workplaces. The interpretation of an increased college share parameter in the
CES function is a change in the production technology favoring college labor input. Since
the current General Commercial Zones do not benefit from change in land use but only in
increased density, I keep the college share parameter the same in these zones.
Figure 1.12 shows the results of the first exercise, where I only increase density in the
target areas. The targeted tracts are in purple borders. The immediate affect of increasing
the density parameter is the change in employment and residence of the targeted tracts. I
take as an example Tract 2676.00 by Bundy Ave and Exposition Ave, which is the Northwest
targeted tract and is also the example tract shown in Figure 1.11. As can be seen in Panels
1.12c and 1.12d, there is a large increase of college workers (40%) and non-college workers
(42%) in the tract. In addition, as shown in Panel 1.12b there is a decrease in floor space
price (-39%), driven by a large increase supply.
Panel 1.12a shows the decrease in productivity in the tract and surrounding areas. There
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Figure 1.12: Policy Simulation with Only Density Increase
(a) Productivity (b) Floor Price
(c) College Employment (d) Non-college Employment
The effect of the policy simulation with only density increase to the maximum FAR on each tract’s (a) pro-
ductivity, (b) floor price, (c) college-educated worker employment, and (d) non-college worker employment.
Purple boundaries indicate the targeted tract.
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is very little productivity spillover effect of such a policy. In fact, while there are negative
effects in the targeted tracts, in the surrounding tracts there is almost no effect. This is
because these zones are currently occupied by low-skill workplaces in the observed equilib-
rium so the increase in density of these locations lead to a higher count of low-skill workers
relative to high-skill workers. Due to the negative spillover effects, this increased density
of low-skill workers in the target tracts decreases the productivity of the immediately sur-
rounding areas. However, the overall magnitude of the spillovers are very small due to the
fast decay of non-college workplace density spillovers.
Figure 1.13 shows the results of a policy increasing both the density of development and
the share parameter for college workers in the CES function. Here, as before, the density of
development parameter is increased by the amount of FAR increase and the share parameter
is increased by amount that implies a 50% increase in college to non-college employment
ratio. It can be immediately noticed that 1) the effect on the targeted tract is different from
the previous policy experiment, and 2) the spillover effects are much larger, coming from
increased college worker density.
In targeted tracts, we see a large shift of worker composition from non-college to college
workers. Going back to our example tract 2676.00, there is around a 50% increase in college
workers, but only a 7% increase in non-college workers. However, resident composition is
preserved and there is an equal percentage increase of college and non-college residences
(not shown). Floor prices fall at the targeted areas again (42%). There are also pronounced
spillover effects affecting tracts that are not directly targeted. For example, one adjacent
tract 2712.00 next to our example tract experiences around 30% rise in both college and
non-college employment, while a 5% increase in both college and non-college residence. The
share of floor space for commercial use increases by 1 percentage point, and college and
non-college wages go up by 2%. Housing prices rise by 3%.
Overall, these policy experiments suggest that indeed, policies that merely increase the
density of development are not enough to produce meaningful spillover effects, unless these
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Figure 1.13: Policy Simulation with Both College Share and Density Increase
(a) Productivity (b) Floor Price
(c) College Employment (d) Non-college Employment
The effect of the policy simulation with both density increase to the maximum FAR and change in share of
college workers in tracts re-zoned to Hybrid Industrial on each tract’s (a) productivity, (b) floor price, (c)
college-educated worker employment, and (d) non-college worker employment. Purple boundaries indicate
the targeted tract.
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areas are already occupied by a large share of college workers. When incorporating policies
that increase the density of areas, it is best to either target locations with a healthy mix of
college workers or be used in combination with land use policy to attract college workplaces.
The counterfactual policy simulations presented here are limited in a few ways. First, the
density policies pertain to “allowable” density via zoning regulations, not the actual density
of development. However, in the simulations I assume that the target areas get developed
to the fullest allowable extent. In reality, the actual density will be an endogenous decision
made by developers, dependent on the demand for office spaces in the area. Similarly, the
extent to which the new developments in the policy area will be occupied by college jobs also
depend on the endogenous decisions of firms, while in the policy exercises, these values are
assumed. To address the two concerns, I simulate the policy for different values of density
of development and college share increase and characterize the quantitative effect of the
policy under different scenarios. Specifically, I conduct experiments with some combination
involving: 1) density increase to maximum of the FAR increase, 2) density increase to half of
the FAR increase, 3) college-to-non-college employment ratio increase by 50%, and 4) college
employment ratio increase by 25%.
Table 1.7 summarizes the effect of different policy scenarios on changes in college employ-
ment, non-college employment, average productivity, college wages, and non-college wages
for each policy scenario in the project area.26 It also includes the City’s projection on total
employment increase. The simulations show that different assumed increases in fundamen-
tals have non-monotonic effects. For example, fixing the college share increase by 50%,
comparing the scenarios with half the density increase (fourth row) and full density increase
(third row), we see that the average productivity increases slightly more in the case with
half the increase. This is because the smaller density increase limits the absolute increase
of non-college workers, in turn producing less negative spillover effects and causing a larger
average productivity gain.
26Project area includes neighboring tracts as well as the target areas shown in Figure 1.10.
57
Table 1.7: Policy Simulation Effect on Employment and Productivity in Project Area
Effect On
Col Non Avg Col Non
Simulated Policy Emp Emp Prod Wage Wage
Density Max 21.78 21.32 -0.66 5.47 4.96
College Ratio by 50% 5.42 -7.58 0.92 1.70 -2.78
Density Max + College Ratio 50% 30.08 9.52 0.68 7.73 2.16
Density Half + College Ratio 50% 19.39 2.08 0.78 5.34 0.21
Density Max + College Ratio 25% 26.18 14.03 0.14 6.70 3.37
Density Half + College Ratio 25% 16.08 5.89 0.31 4.41 1.42
Projection From City 27.85
The values indicate percentage change if the simulated policy is implemented. Density Max is if policy
induces maximum increase of density laid out by the plan. Density Half is if policy only induces half the
intended density increase. College Worker 50% is if the change in zoning increases ajH such that college
worker ratio increases by 50%; similarly for College Worker 25%. Last row is Los Angeles’ own prediction
on the gains to total employment (Soruce: “Environmental Impact Report”, Table 3-1, percentage change
calculated with Difference Between Current Plan and Proposed Plan and Existing Conditions). Changes in
productivity and wages is calculated by taking the weighted average of increases in each tract, weighted by the
intial total employment share for productivity, college employment share for college wages, and non-college
employmentshare for non-college wages.
Another implication of the policy simulations is that the density increase acts as an
equalizer of benefits across skill groups. For example, comparing the scenarios with maximum
increase in density with half the increase with 50% rise in college employment ratio (Table
1.7, rows 3 and 4), we see that college wages rise by around 6% in both scenarios but
the increase in non-college wages between the two scenarios is quite different. With only
half the density increase, non-college wages experience a negligible increase, while with the
full density increase, non-college wages increase by about 2%. This difference is even more
pronounced when compared to no density increase (row 2), which decreases non-college wages
by about 3%. This is due to the fact that with an increase in the floor space, an increase in
college employment does not have to replace non-college employment in the area. Therefore,
combining the change in land use policy with an increase in density can mitigate unbalanced
development across skill groups.
One margin the policy exercises does not take into account is workplace congestion from
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increased commuting. Increased jobs in the targeted areas may create congestion effects on
certain commute modes. Although the city is targeting areas around newly built transit
stations to lessen the load on automobile traffic, congestion in public transportation could
affect commuter utilities and make these workplaces less desirable. Therefore, the gains from
the policy in the model will miss the possible benefits (less automobile traffic) and possible
costs (public transport commuting congestion).
Overall, the policy experiments show two important margins of the policy. First, density
increase alone does not produce meaningful spillover effects because keeping the land use
the same would mostly increase non-college workplaces in the area. Combining the density
policy with changes in land use to induce more college workplaces can produce spillover
effects that benefit both college and non-college workers. Second, change in land use alone
produces a large negative effect to non-college workers that currently occupy the project
area. Increasing density in these areas in conjunction allows the benefits to accrue to both
college and non-college workers. Thus, using both policy instruments and making sure that
the policy attracts the intended level of density and college jobs is crucial to the success of
such plans.
1.6.3 Re-locating of the Expo Plan
I perform another counterfactual exercise to examine whether there are differential effects
to welfare of implementing a policy like the Expo Plan on other tracts within Los Angeles.
I examine the increase in ex-ante expected utility of college and non-college workers from
increasing the current density of development by around threefold and the college ratio
of employment by 50% in each tract within Los Angeles. Essentially, this exercise seeks
to understand the optimal location of such a policy to increase the welfare of college and
non-college workers.
I present the results in Figure 1.14. In the Figure, each tract’s color represents the
magnitude of the percentage increase in expected utility of the whole city of an education
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Figure 1.14: Expected Utility Gain of Targeting FAR increase in College Share in Each Tract
(a) College Welfare Gain (b) Non-college Welfare Gain
The welfare gain of increasing FAR threefold and college ratio of employment by 50% in each tract to (a)
college and (b) non-college workers. Red denotes lower gain, and blue denotes higher gain.
group when implementing the policy on the tract. Blue represents a higher welfare gain
and red represents a lower welfare gain. Figure 1.14a shows the welfare change of college
workers and Figure 1.14b shows the welfare change of non-college workers. Since the policy
is a relatively mild change to the supply of density and employment in the view of total
supply of workplaces within the city, the expected utility gain is very mild, ranging from
-0.05% to 1% gain in expected utility. However, there is meaningful differences in impact
across location and skill groups.
Two interesting patterns emerge from these figures. First, there are both similarities and
differences on the welfare gains of the two education groups for the same target location. For
example, certain tracts near downtown Los Angeles benefit college workers more than non-
college workers, while tracts on the edge of South Los Angeles benefit non-college workers
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while being worse for college workers. Meanwhile, where Expo Plan is being implemented
seems to be beneficial for both college and non-college workers to a similar degree.
Second, there seems to be an interesting relationship between location of residence, work-
place, and the optimal location of such policies. For example, tracts that are traditionally
occupied by mostly non-college and poorer workers—such as those in South Central Los
Angeles and in the center of South Los Angeles—seem to be bad locations for a density
policy for both college and non-college worker welfare. Also, tracts far from college worker
residences seem to be worse locations for density policies. Non-college workers are particu-
larly worse-off when density policies are located in areas of high non-college worker residence
density, probably due to displacing of non-college residences. The largest benefit seems to
come from tracts that are currently occupied mostly by workplaces rather than residences.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter documents the very local human capital spillovers within cities. College employ-
ment density raises the productivity of workers around them, while non-college employment
density is associated with congestive forces that decrease the productivity of workers around
them. Moreover, both of these effects only occur within 2-3 miles, so the reach is limited.
I started with some stylized facts on the geographical distribution of workplaces within
cities that the literature has not yet shown. Then, I presented both descriptive evidence
of this phenomenon and framed the results using an economic geography model that takes
into account commuting, agglomeration, and human capital spillovers across tracts. These
rapidly decaying human capital spillovers are consistent with previous papers estimating
local spillovers of density of all workers (Ahlfeldt et al. 2015), of certain industries (Arzhagi
and Henderson 2006, Berkes and Gaetani 2019), and of human capital (Fu 2007, Rosenthal
and Strange 2008).
With model estimates at hand, I explored the consequences of a Los Angeles policy
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enhancing density and re-zoning to allow for higher-quality office spaces to attract high-skill
jobs into certain neighborhoods. By varying the level of density of development and increase
in college share, I find that if development follows the desired density alone, there will be a
fall in average productivity due to an increase in non-college workplaces in the area. When
coupled with policies to encourage the creation of more high-skill jobs, these policies create
spillover effects that benefit beyond the targeted locations.
The estimates of local spillover effects of human capital presented in this chapter are
relevant to urban policymakers who must consider where to place employment centers and
the effect density on the surrounding areas. The parameter estimates and model framework
presented in this chapter can inform policymakers as to what would be the general equi-
librium effects of human capital density, and how they affect the targeted and surrounding
areas. However, the fast decay of these effects will also limit the reach of density and growth
in the city. Especially worrisome is the recent trend in the loss of accessibility to job clusters
for the urban poor as gentrification picks up across the United States (Kneebone and Holmes
2015). These fast-decaying spillovers imply that the loss of accessibility to jobs near high
human capital centers will exacerbate the welfare loss of the urban poor in the coming years.
I end this chapter with some avenues for extension. First, better individual-level data
with finer geography and a panel structure, such as the underlying LEHD data, could be
used to better empirically estimate the human capital spillover effects. Second, incorporating
the endogenous response of developers and firms in a model with spatial spillovers will be
important; unlike the counterfactual exercises presented in this chapter, such a model will
better predict outcomes from changes in zoning. Third, exploring potential mechanisms
behind human capital spillovers I document will provide the right context to interpret the
estimates of this chapter.
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1.A Appendix Tables and Figures
Table 1.A.1: Robustness Checks for Different Sample Definitions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample One Worker Two Workers Two Workers Full-time
in HH One Full-time in HH
Log Col Own 0.102*** 0.104*** 0.0958*** 0.106***
(0.0197) (0.0200) (0.00702) (0.0105)
Log Col 0-3 mi 0.0972*** 0.0610 0.0782*** 0.0805***
(0.0341) (0.0365) (0.0189) (0.0240)
Log Col 3-5 mi -0.00863 0.0634** 0.0216 0.0602***
(0.0381) (0.0246) (0.0151) (0.0213)
Log Col 5-10 mi -0.0320 -0.0371 -0.0186 -0.0535
(0.0372) (0.0289) (0.0200) (0.0381)
Log Col 10-25 mi -0.0276 -0.00600 -0.00258 0.0500
(0.0647) (0.0397) (0.0395) (0.0395)
Log Non Own -0.0735*** -0.0825*** -0.0778*** -0.0890***
(0.0192) (0.0205) (0.00802) (0.0116)
Log Non 0-3 mi -0.107*** -0.0596 -0.0722*** -0.0712**
(0.0375) (0.0414) (0.0212) (0.0278)
Log Non 3-5 mi 0.00340 -0.0799*** -0.0295 -0.0740***
(0.0412) (0.0271) (0.0198) (0.0228)
Log Non 5-10 mi 0.0608 0.0687* 0.0404* 0.0749*
(0.0400) (0.0356) (0.0221) (0.0398)
Log Non 10-25 mi 0.0405 -0.000457 0.0180 -0.0407
(0.0777) (0.0483) (0.0450) (0.0428)
Constant 10.56*** 10.05*** 10.08*** 10.34***
(0.453) (0.579) (0.328) (0.426)
Observations 9,848 10,617 24,591 21,565
R-squared 0.492 0.491 0.483 0.461
OLS specification with clustered standard errors at the employment tract level in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column (1) uses only households with one worker in the sample. Column (2) uses only
“primary earners” defined by the only full-time worker in households with two workers. Column (3) uses
only households with 2 workers or less. Column (4) uses only full-time workers.
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Table 1.A.2: Correlation of LODES Between Different Data Sources
Employment Residence
vs CHTS vs ACS
College 0.863 0.847
Non-college 0.713 0.791
Correlation coefficients of LODES dataset against different data sets. First column checks employment
location against CHTS and second column checks residence location vs American Community Survey 2010.
Both data restricts samples to workers (employeed).
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Figure 1.A.1: OLS with Finer Spatial Definition
(a) OLS with Same Specification As Paper
(b) OLS Disaggregating 0-5 miles
Coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from pooled OLS regression specification as in Table 1.2
column (1) with varying distance ring definitions. Figure 1.A.1a plots the specification from column (1) and
Figure 1.A.1b plots the specification with 0-3 miles and 4-5 miles disaggregated to 0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4, 4-5 mile
rings.
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Figure 1.A.2: Over-Identification Check for Floor Space by Area
(a) Chicago (b) New York
(c) Los Angeles (d) Philadelphia
Over-identification checks for density of development separately by area. Chicago, New York, Philadelphia
data are for the city boundaries. Los Angeles data is for the County of Los Angeles. Correlation coefficients
for Chicago, New York, Los Angeles, Philadelphia are 0.48, 0.7, 0.7, 0.79, respectively.
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CHAPTER 2
Do Youth Employment Programs Work? Evidence
from the New Deal1
2.1 Introduction
Unemployment rates are typically highest among the young, particularly those from poor
backgrounds and during recessions. At the height of the Great Recession, unemployment
rates for those over age 25 peaked at 8.4% in 2010 but were as high as 19.6% for those aged
16-24 (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018). To address youth unemployment, government-
run employment training programs specifically target young adults. However, the short run
effects of these programs have been shown to be modest, at best, and there is very limited
evidence of their effectiveness over the long run. There is also very limited evidence on the
effects of these programs on non-labor market outcomes and on the mechanisms by which
1Anna Aizer, Brown University (aizer@brown.edu), Shari Eli, University of Toronto
(shari.eli@utoronto.ca), Keyoung Lee, UCLA (keyounglee@ucla.edu), and Adriana Lleras-Muney, UCLA
(allerasmuney@gmail.com). We are very grateful to many research assistants that worked on this project,
especially to Ryan Boone, Taehoon Kang and Kyle Sherman. We have benefitted from comments from
participants in the various conferences. We are particularly indebted to Rodrigo Pinto for many valuable
contributions. This research was funded by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada
and by the Social Security Administration Grant #NB17-16. This research was also supported by the U.S.
Social Security Administration through grant #5-RRC08098400-10 to the National Bureau of Economic
Research as part of the SSA Retirement Research Consortium. The findings and conclusions expressed are
solely those of the author(s) and do not represent the views of SSA, any agency of the Federal Government,
or the NBER. This project was also supported by the California Center for Population Research at UCLA
(CCPR), which receives core support (P2C-HD041022) from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute
of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD). Finally, his material is based upon work supported
by the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship under Grant No. DGE-1650604. Any
opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. All errors are our own.
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labor market effects operate (Card, Kluve, and Weber 2018, Barnow and Smith 2015, Crepon
and van den Berg 2016).
We re-evaluate the short- and long-run effects of means-tested employment and training
programs targeted at young adults by studying the impact of the Civilian Conservation
Corps (CCC). The CCC was the first and largest employment program in U.S. history and
was implemented during a period of profound levels of youth unemployment—the Great
Depression. Unemployment rates among young adults during the Depression were estimated
to be as high as 60 percent, depending on how partial employment is counted.2 To address
high youth unemployment, the CCC was created in 1933 by the Roosevelt Administration. It
employed young men aged 17 to 23 in unskilled, manual labor. Under the Army’s supervision,
enrollees were sent to work in camps in rural areas where they were also fed, housed and given
access to medical treatment. In addition to work experience, the CCC provided academic
and vocational courses as well as cash transfers to the families of poor unemployed youths.
The CCC also helped enrollees obtain employment upon completion. Enrollment in the CCC
was voluntary and enlistment periods lasted 6 months with an option to re-enlist up to three
times. Between 1933 and 1942, the CCC had three million enrollees and operated about
2,600 camps. Several programs in existence today such as Job Corps, Youth Conservation
Corps, JobsFirstNYC, and CalWORKs are modeled after the CCC.3
We collect a new, large individual-level data set of CCC participants and their long-
term outcomes. We digitize administrative records from the CCC program in Colorado and
New Mexico covering the population of men in the CCC program between 1938 and 1943.
Our data include dismissal records on more than 25,000 men and details their demographic
characteristics, compensation, enlistment duration and reasons for leaving the program. We
matched these enrollee records to 1940 Census records, WWII enlistment records, Social
2Salmond (1967) reports that in 1932, 25 percent of youths were unemployed, and another 29 percent
were only employed part-time. Rawick (1957) estimates that about 20% of youths were unemployed and
another 30% were working part-time.
3Levine (2010).
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Security Administration records, and individual death certificates. These data allow us to
investigate the effects of the CCC on important long-run outcomes and mediators including
education, health, geographic mobility, employment, earnings and longevity.
To estimate the effect of the program, we exploit variation in the service duration of the
enrollees. Treatment duration varied from a few days to more than two years with the average
enrollee participating for approximately nine months. We show that the determinants of
duration are complex and that those who trained for long periods were not necessarily
from higher or lower SES backgrounds. Moreover, many ended their training for arbitrary
reasons. We confirm these observations by investigating the reasons for dismissal. To assess
the validity of our approach, we use the rich data from Colorado to perform some placebo
tests. We find that duration does not predict pre-CCC labor outcomes or health, though
we do find some effects on education. We then explicitly control for many individual and
aggregate characteristics that predict participation and long-term outcomes and assess the
sensitivity of our results to adding these covariates, informally and formally, as suggested by
Oster (2017).
We find that individuals who trained longer in the CCC also lived longer. These gains
appear to be driven by the improved health of the participants (measured by height and
weight) as well as their increased geographic mobility towards richer areas, and their larger
lifetime incomes. These effects are larger among Hispanics, and for those serving in times
of high unemployment. We also find modest increases on educational attainment and in the
probability of serving in WWII. In the short run, we find no evidence that their labor force
participation, employment, or wages increased—these effects are very small and statistically
insignificant. Overall, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the program pro-
vided important in-kind goods and services to disadvantaged populations in a time of need,
improving their long-term health and survival. They are also consistent with the program
having returns in the labor market.
To further investigate the internal and external validity of our findings, we make use
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of publicly available experimental data from the Job Corps (JC) program, the largest job
training program in the US targeting youth with an annual budget of $1.7 billion. The JC
experiment followed randomly assigned participants for four years.4 With these data, we are
able to follow Lalonde (1986), using experimental data to shed light on the internal validity
of a study based on observational data. Although the JC data pertains to youth training
that took place in the 1990s, the program was modeled after the CCC and so retained many
similar features. We focus on men that participated in the RCT for comparability. We
document that JC participants are quite similar to CCC participants with regard to socio-
economic characteristics (with some notable exceptions), and that they train for similar
durations and quit for similar reasons.
The estimated treatment effects of training from the JC RCTs are similar in both di-
rection and magnitude to the effects of duration in a simple OLS model that controls for
basic observables at baseline, suggesting that our estimation strategy is internally valid.
The results also speak to external validity. The original JC RCT reported that the program
increases education levels, has small effects on employment rates and has positive, but statis-
tically insignificant, effects on wages among those employed. We replicate these findings for
men. We also document that JC and CCC both increased geographic mobility and improved
health. Our results from CCC are similar in the short-term to the effects of JC, except for
employment and wages.
This suggests that our long-run estimates of job training based on the CCC are likely
informative about the long-run effects of JC particularly for health. There does exist a single
study examining the effects of JC on labor market outcomes over 20 years using administra-
tive tax data. Schochet (2018) finds no employment or earnings effects in the overall sample,
though there are some positive effects for individuals who were older at baseline. They also
report a 40% reduction in SSDI benefits, suggesting JC improved health, consistent with our
longevity results. Using data from the Social Security Administration, we find CCC resulted
4There was a longer 9-year follow-up as well but these data are not publicly available.
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in a 3.9% increase in pension amounts, which are a function of individuals’ highest 35 years
of earnings. This corresponds to an increase of roughly 6% in lifetime earnings. These effects
are larger than the 2% (imprecise) increase Schochet (2018) documented, suggesting that
the 20-year evaluation underestimates the returns of the program, or alternatively, that the
economic conditions prevailing in the 20 years after the training took place have large effects
on its return.
Our results suggest that JC participants today may live longer as a result of the program.
As such, job training evaluations that focus only on the labor market impact of the program
may underestimate the overall benefits. Our findings also suggest that there are in fact
positive returns to investing in young adults, contrary to the commonly stated findings that
returns on human capital investment are low after age 18. Our conclusion differs from that
of Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020), who report low values for JC, because we are able
to incorporate large increases in longevity, as well as increases in lifetime earnings into the
benefits of the program.
This paper also contributes to the broader evaluation of the New Deal programs developed
during the Great Depression. The Great Recession of 2008 renewed interest in understanding
whether and for whom government programs deployed during large economic crises can be
effective. Fishback (2017) provides a comprehensive survey of the literature on the effects of
New Deal programs, and reports that studies show New Deal programs increased internal
migration, lowered crime and reduced mortality in the short run. (See also Fishback, Haines
and Kantor, 2007 and Vellore 2014.) Our results are consistent with these findings for
migration and health. To our knowledge, there have not been any statistical studies of the
long-term causal effects of the CCC program or of any other New Deal program on individual
lifetime outcomes. Our results suggest that cost benefit analysis that do not include such
outcomes may generate incorrect estimates.
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2.2 Background: The CCC Program
Program Overview. The CCC, which was signed into law on March 31, 1933, was created
by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt by executive order “for the relief of unemployment
through the performance of useful public work and for other purposes.”5 The CCC had two
objectives: 1) to provide relief to unemployed youth; and 2) to preserve and enhance natural
resources. Because of the prevailing view at the time that the provision of work would be
more beneficial to the unemployed than the receipt of cash transfers “relief through work”
rather than “direct relief” was a basic tenet of all the work programs in the New Deal. There
was also a belief that idle youth would commit crimes and cause social disturbances (Brock
2005).
The untapped work capacity of idle youth was to be used to create national parks and
forests, and to help cope with the Dust Bowl. One of the primary appeals of the CCC
was that the work of enrollees would not directly compete (in terms of labor) with private
sector activities. As the program evolved, it added education components, which became
mandatory in 1937. The nature of the program changed again in 1941 when military training
was added to the program as a result of growing tension in Europe during World War II.6
Size and allocation of projects and enrollees. The federal government commissioned the
CCC to build national parks, preserve forests and irrigate land. Within weeks of the creation
of the CCC program, 1,250 projects had been submitted and 749 camp sites had been
approved by the director of the CCC and the President.7 Camp locations were chosen to be
5The program was extended in 1935, 1937 and 1939, and ended in 1942 when Congress voted against
another renewal, despite prior efforts to make the program permanent. In addition, the program was orig-
inally called the Emergency Conservation Work Program, but its name was changed in 1937 to Civilian
Conservation Corps, its popular name. Data Appendix Figure 1 contains a timeline describing the major
changes to the program throughout its existence.
6Although perhaps unintended, and due to the fact that the military was in charge of running the camps,
another perceived benefit of the CCC program was that “enrollees made splendid soldier material” (McEntee
1942).
7US Department of Labor Report, 1933.
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close to work sites, and to minimize the distance to communities that would supply them.
Most camps had 200 enrollees at a time. Many smaller “side camps” were also created to
allow for work in remote locations.8
Eligibility. Only unmarried unemployed men, ages 17 to 25, who were American citizens,
were eligible.9 Preference was given to those in greater need—in practice, CCC enrollees
were often selected from families already enrolled in relief programs.10 Government reports
at the time confirm that enrollees were poorly educated, with little work experience, and
undernourished (McEntee 1942).11 Enrollees had to present in good physical condition (an
examination was required at enlistment) and have no history of criminal activity.12 Finally,
they had to be willing to send a substantial portion of their wages to an assigned family
member and to move to the designated camp location for the duration of the enrollment
period. After the enrollee signed the contract there was a two-week conditioning period,
after which enrollees were sent to a camp.13
Compensation and program cost. Enrollees were required to work 40 hours per week
8Local labor could be employed when there were needs for specific skills to complete a project. Although
initially some communities were concerned with possible increases in crime resulting from nearby camps,
most communities eventually welcomed and moreover demanded camps be placed nearby, with the notable
exception of black-only camps, and camps with a large share of Hispanics. The CCC program was popular
and many communities welcomed the camps and the monies that it brought (Parham, 1981). A nation-wide
poll in 1936 showed that more than 80 percent supported the continuation of the program, and this support
was larger in the Rocky Mountain states (Paige 1985). However, there were racial tensions (Rawick 1957).
9There were some changes to these initial criteria, importantly age eligibility of juniors was modified
twice. Data Appendix Figure 1 documents some of the important changes in the history of the program.
10In 1935 when the program was expanded, it became a requirement that enrollees be drawn from relief
rolls, though in practice this was not always the case. In 1937 this requirement was eliminated.
11For example, in 1939 and 1940, about 52% had 8 years of schooling or less (Annual Report 1940).
12Enrollees were vaccinated against typhoid, paratyphoid and smallpox at enlistment.
13In addition to accepting “juniors”—that is youth 18-25 to be trained, the CCC program also made
veterans eligible. There was also a large CCC program for American Indians, which operated under somewhat
different rules and was managed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Finally, the CCC also enrolled LEM “local
enlisted men” which had skills and knowledge not available among its Army personnel. The total number
of men training in the CCC was reported to be 3.2 million, LEMs accounted for 263,000, Indians 127,000,
and veterans. There was a small separate program for women started in 1936 which eventually served about
8,500 women nationwide in about 80 camps.
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and paid $30 per month, of which $25 was sent home to a designated family member.14
The government also paid for the transportation to and from the camp, provided housing,
uniforms, food, dental and medical care, and workers’ compensation insurance. Thus, it
is estimated that the real monthly wages of CCC enrollees was $66.25 per month.15 CCC
administration estimated that on average a CCC camp would spend about $5,000 per month
in local markets.16
Duration of enrollment. Individuals initially enrolled for a six-month period, and were
allowed to re-enroll, for a maximum of two years (4 terms). Although the average enrollee
worked for 9 months, there is large variation. CCC contracts could be terminated unilaterally
by the government, based on governmental needs, at any point. Many individuals deserted,
resigned or were expelled prior to completing their contract. Enrollees could leave early if
they had secured employment, were enrolled in a formal schooling program or for “urgent and
proper call” reasons, for instance the death of a parent or some other personal emergency.
Enrollee turnover was costly, and efforts were made to keep it low.
Education and training components. Vocational training and skill provision were always
a part of the program. In addition to on-the-job training, camps offered several vocational
courses. Attendance was voluntary. Soon after the creation of the CCC, there was a real-
ization that an educational component would be needed as a large number of enrollees were
illiterate or had education levels so low it prevented them from performing their assigned
tasks at the camp.17 An education program was put into place by March of 1934, and
the 1937 extension of the CCC program included an important requirement that the CCC
14Later in the program, a portion was retained as savings and given to enrollees upon dismissal.
15See BLS (1941). Levine (2010) reports this program was considerably more expensive than Works
Progress Administration as it was estimated to cost approximately $800 per enrollee. Critics of the program
pointed out that direct relief would have cost an estimated $250 per year instead (McEntee 1942). The value
of the training and of the work achieved in terms of conservation is of course not considered in this estimate.
16Paige (1985).
17Britton reports than in Northern camps an average of 3 to 5 percent of enrollees were illiterate, but as
many as 25% were illiterate in Virginia camps.
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provide at least ten hours a week of general or vocation training.18 Participation was not
mandatory unless the enrollee was illiterate.
2.2.1 The CCC in Colorado and New Mexico
We study the program using administrative data from Colorado (CO) and New Mexico
(NM). Both CO and NM were relatively poor states during the Great Depression, though
NM was poorer and arguably one of the poorest states at the time. Estimates from National
Income Accounts for 1930 suggest that per capita annual personal income was $571 in CO,
and $329 in NM, while the nationwide average was $618.19 About a quarter of the population
in CO was on relief in 1933; New Mexico had the highest share of the population on relief
in the nation (Hinton 2008).20
Due to the large number of parks and forests in these states, and the severe impact of
the Dust Bowl, CO and NM had disproportionate participation in the CCC Colorado and
New Mexico had disproportionate participation in the CCC program. In a given year, on
average, there were 34 main camps operating in CO and 32 in NM in operation in a given
year.21 The number of individuals training in CO and NM was disproportionately large.
In CO, a total of 57,944 men served, of which 35,000 came from CO. In NM, a total of
54,500 served of which 32,300 came from NM.22 Enrollees in Colorado and New Mexico were
disproportionately Hispanic.23
18Act of June 28, 1937, Public No 163, 75th Congress.
19Bureau of Economic Analysis NIPA 1929-today. SA1-3
20Census of relief 1933. Table 9.
21Final report. This number does not include the so-called side camps, which were smaller in size than
typical camps, whose population hovered around 200 men.
22Cohen (1980).
23New Mexico also had a large share of Native Americans. Native Americans had their own CCC programs
which operated separately within Indian reservations and were administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
See Parman (1971) for details. We have no data on the Indian CCC program.
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2.3 Estimation Strategy and Estimation Issues
We estimate the effect of the program on lifetime outcomes by comparing outcomes for those
who served longer and shorter periods among individuals who served. This strategy is similar
to what Flores et al. (2012) do to estimate the returns to the number of courses taken in JC
and to Lechner et al. (2011), who evaluate impacts of short and long training programs in
Germany. The intuition behind this approach is simple: if training increases skills through
some standard production function, then more training should result in greater skills, though
the rate of increase might change with the level of training.
We use the following specification,
Yibj = c+ b ∗ (duration of CCC service ibj) +XibjB + eibj (2.1)
where Yibj is an outcome, such as employment or age at death for individual i born in
year b training in CCC camp j, and Xibj includes individual-level and camp-level covariates.
The independent variable of interest is duration of CCC service ibj, the duration of training
in years. We estimate equation (2.1) clustering the standard errors at the application county
and enrollment year-quarter level, though the results are not sensitive to this choice.24
The coefficient b identifies the causal effect of duration on a given outcome only if duration
is uncorrelated with other determinants of the outcome, conditional on the observables.
There are several threats to identification. First, duration is measured with error because
dates are often incomplete or missing, possibly causing downward bias in the estimates.
Second, there is a possible omitted variable bias: it may be that individuals with higher
abilities trained longer because they benefitted more from the program and were able to
better adapt to military life in camps (positive selection). Alternatively, poorer individuals
24We also experimented with alternative approaches and estimate results clustering at the application
county, enrollment year level. Overall, we found these alternatives do not materially impact our conclusions,
and the evidence suggests that there is little correlation across individuals in the data.
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may have had stronger incentives to train in the CCC because they were more in need of the
payment that they and their families received (negative selection). Third, it is also possible
that camp characteristics are omitted. For example, individuals might have stayed longer
in camps with good weather, and good weather could improve long-term health (positive
selection). Demand for work might have been greater in places where the dust bowl hit,
leading enrollees to stay longer in unhealthy locations (negative selection). In these cases,
the coefficient on duration would be biased.
To address these concerns, we take multiple approaches. First, we investigate the deter-
minants of duration to determine the extent of possible selection issues. We also make use of
the reasons why individuals dropped out to understand who leaves early and why. Then, to
account for selection on observables, we explore how the inclusion of individual- and camp-
level covariates affect the estimates of the effect of duration. We estimate bounds using the
method proposed by Oster (2017). For a subset of the data we also conduct placebo tests to
see if duration predicts pre-CCC enrollment outcomes (education, labor market experience,
height and weight). Finally, we use the data from JC to investigate whether our approach
generates biases in the estimates by comparing OLS type estimates to the estimates derived
from the RCT.25
2.4 Data and descriptive statistics
2.4.1 Data Collection
Colorado (CO) Enrollees. We digitized the entirety of CCC records contained at the State
Archives of Colorado. These records include original applications of all individuals who ap-
25We also investigated a large number of IVs to instrument for individual duration including the use of
weather, camp closures, measures of the intensity of the Dust Bowl and leave-out duration at the camp.
Unfortunately, most of the IV estimates we produced had large standard errors and suffered from weak IV
problems.
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plied.26 The entire collection, which includes 21,538 individuals, accounts for the population
of individuals who trained between 1937 and 1942 but not for those who enrolled prior to
1937.27 The applications contain the following: name, address, date of birth, place-of-birth,
height, weight, race, and social security number (SSN), marital status, whether the father
or mother is living, number of brothers, number of sisters, number of family members in
household, rural status, farm ownership, occupation of main wage earner in household, ed-
ucational details, employment status and history. With the exception of information on
height, weight and race, which were collected upon medical examination, the rest was self-
reported. In addition, previous CCC enrollment information was collected, and information
on the designated allottee(s) (the family member who would receive the allotment from the
CCC): name, relationship and amount allotted, for up to two allottees. If the individual was
rejected, it is noted in the file. Otherwise we observe the discharge information detailing the
company and camp the individual attended, reason for dismissal, the date of dismissal, and
whether the dismissal was honorable.
New Mexico (NM) Enrollees. We digitized the entirety of CCC records from the New
Mexico State Records Center, which has the entire set of discharge forms for the state
from 1938 to 1942. These records include information on 9,699 individuals, covering the
population of individuals that trained in state from 1938 to 1942.28 For each individual,
the records contain the following: name, date of birth, address, family information (head of
family, address of family, and relationship to enrollee), allottee information (name, address
and relationship to allottee, for up to two allottees), enrollment date, assigned camp, date
and reason for dismissal and whether the dismissal was honorable. Because enrollment forms
26Of the 35,000 that trained in CO and came from CO, about 30,000 were junior and veterans, and 5,000
were non-enrolled personnel (hired from local population), and about 500 were part of the Indian CCC
program.
27We established based on published reports from the CCC that the records account for the complete
population of records starting in 1937 (see Data Appendix Figure 4).
28We established based on published reports from the CCC that the records account for the complete
population of records starting in 1938 (see Data Appendix Figure 4).
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are unavailable, NM records contain substantially less information on participants than CO
records.
Camp-level Data. We collected information on the exact location of camps. In particular,
each camp was assigned to a zip code within a county using post-office codes. Then, we
coupled camp location information (latitude and longitude) with historical weather patterns
(temperature and precipitation), which come from PRISM Climate Group. Additionally, we
retrieve longitude and latitude information of closest towns and individual’s residence cities
from the United States Board of Geographic Names, and use them to compute (Euclidian)
distances to the closest towns and to each enrollee’s hometown. Using the camp name, we can
construct indicators for the agency (and thus the type of work) that created the camp. We
use our records to construct average characteristics of enrollees (such as the fraction under
age 18) in each camp and point in time. Finally, we match camps to census county-level
information about the county in which it was located, such as unemployment rates.
Death Records. The administrative data from CO and NM was matched to death records
(including the Social Security Death Master File and state-level death records) to identify
the date of death and social security number of each enrollee. This match was done manually
by trained genealogists at BYU, who found CCC enrollees in the collection of records kept by
Ancestry.com and FamilySearch.org. A summary of this process is available in Appendix 6.
We find death dates for 88% of CO recipients and 75% of NM recipients, representing much
higher match rates than typically found in the literature.29 We use these data to compute
the age at death using the date of death in the death certificate and date of birth in the CCC
29Our match rates are higher than those typically found in the literature (which range from 20 to 50%) for
two reasons (Bailey et al. 2017, Abramitzky et al. 2019 ). First, administrative records contain information
not just on individuals but also on their family members. This greatly improves our ability to find individuals
by using information from family trees and various vital registration records. Second, the death records come
from various sources. Most commonly these come from the Death Master File (DMF) which includes the
universe of death certificates in the US starting in the mid 1970s. But the collection also includes records
from other sources, including state vital registration sources, deaths during WWII, and gravestones. A few
individuals are observed as dying during CCC training.
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application.30 We also match the data using automated methods as a robustness check.
1940 and WWII records. We match our records to the Federal Census of 1940 and to
WWII Enlistment Records. These matches are made using the Abramitzky, Mill, and Perez
(2018) algorithm. Details of the procedure are available in Data Appendix D and E. The
1940 census includes location, demographics (race and ethnicity, marital status, place of
birth, household information), and labor market information (employment occupation and
wages). We successfully match 44% of individuals to the census, and about 29% to WWII
enlistment records. This lower match rate to WWII records is to be expected: not all
individuals enlisted or served in WWII, even when they were eligible. Also, not all records
of those who served survived.31
Social Security Records. We match our data to the Master Beneficiary Record File (MBR)
in the Social Security administration, which contains information on individual lifetime earn-
ings, disability, and retirement. (More details are available in Data Appendix 1F.) We merge
these data on SSNs.32 We are able to match 52% of our records to the MBR records. But
only those that apply for benefits (social security pensions or disability) appear in the MBR.
We have information on 80% of individuals who survived to age 65, so our match rate for the
targeted population is high. In these records we can observe the Primary Insurance Amount
(PIA), which is a proxy for lifetime earnings. The PIA corresponds to the pension a person
30Mortality information is missing for some individuals for several reasons. First, some individuals died
prior to 1975, which is the first year of complete death records in the Social Security Death Master File (For
more information about coverage of the DMF, refer to Hill and Rosenwaike (2001). In this case, we might
find a death record for them if one exists in state vital records. Second, some individuals might still be
alive, so the age at death is censored. Based on SSA life tables we compute that about 1.1% of individuals
born in 1920 (our median birth year) would be expected to be alive by 2017. Lastly, we might not have
found individuals who died in the 1975-2017 interval due to measurement error and matching errors. The
key issue for estimation will be whether missing data is differentially missing for those that trained for linger
durations.
31Several cards were lost to fire or were unreadable. See https://aad.archives.gov/aad/
series-description.jsp?s=3360&cat=all&bc=sl
32We only observe SSN if they person reported it in the application in CO, or if it is available in the death
certificate. However, SSNs are not available for anyone who died after 2008 (these are masked for privacy
reasons) or for those who died young and never applied for a SS card.
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receives if they start receiving retirement benefits at his/her normal retirement age. The
PIA is a non-linear transformation of the AIME (average indexed monthly earnings), which
computed as the average of the highest 35 years of earnings after adjusting for inflation.
2.4.2 Sample Selection
For our analysis, we restrict attention only to individuals for whom we can observe duration
of training, camp, and the outcome of interest. Therefore, we drop individuals who have
no birth year, enrollment year, discharge year or application county, as well as those whose
entire discharge records are missing. This results in a sample of 23,722 men out of 26,292.
Appendix Table 2.A.1 details the number of observations that are lost due to missing data.
For the mortality analysis, we make additional restrictions. We include only individuals
with age of death information but investigate the effects of missing data and also use imputa-
tions in alternative specifications. The final mortality sample contains information on 17,639
men. This estimation sample generally is representative of the initial data (Table 1) except
that, by construction, the age at death is significantly higher. For the lifetime outcomes
from the SSA, our sample includes 12,455 individuals, 64% of the original analytic sample.
Again, this sample is relatively representative of the initial full sample in many dimensions
(duration, YOB, age, height, weight, education, father alive, mother alive, household size,
farm) with some notable exceptions (Table 1). By construction, the age at death in this
sample is higher because only those who survive to at least 62 are eligible to apply for pen-
sions. We also see fewer Hispanics, more people who lied about their age, and more people
who sent money to their mothers. But these differences are not too large. We investigate
the extent of sample selection further below.
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2.4.3 Summary Statistics: CCC Training and Lifetime Outcomes
Pre-CCC Characteristics. Characteristics of the men in our data are presented in Table
2.1a and 2.1b. The average CCC enrollee enlisted around 1939 and was 18.7 years old, but
many enrollees appear to have misrepresented their age: 22% overstated their age (their age
in the death certificates suggest they were younger than they reported), and another 11%
understated their age. While some of these discrepancies might be due to errors in matching
individuals to death certificates, they might also indicate that many men, particularly the
young ones, were quite desperate to train and lied about their age to gain eligibility.33
As expected, more detailed data for CO suggest that the enrollees were relatively disad-
vantaged. On average, enrollees completed 8.7 years of schooling and came from a household
of about 5 individuals. About 25% came from a farm, 20% had a deceased father and 15%
had a deceased mother. Despite height and weight examinations to exclude the unhealthy,
about 7% were underweight. Imputing the ethnic origin of the participants, we estimate that
about 45% were Hispanic.34 In the Online Appendix we show that these young men came
from poorer counties than the average males of the same age in CO and NM in the 1930 and
1940 census, consistent with them being recruited from relief rolls. Consistent with the fact
that CO and NM were very poor states, CO and NM enrollees were even more disadvantaged
than the average CCC enrollee in the nation—they are substantially younger, shorter, weigh
less, have more dependents, and more of them have fewer than 4 years of schooling.35 Data
Appendix Figure 6 documents this graphically. Data on the camps suggest that they were
typically rural in nature and as such, located relatively far from the enrollees’ hometowns
33A few of the men are not junior (less than 1%) which can also explain a small fraction of the violations
in the age criteria. Individual accounts of CCC participants include accounts of lying and over-eating in
order to qualify, see Melzer (2000).
34See Data Appendix for method of imputation.
35We check this by comparing the means in our estimation sample to the published national means. These
were published in Annual Report of the Director of the Civilian Conservation Corps: Fiscal Year Ended June
30, 1937 Appendix H: Census of Civilian Conservation Corps Enrollees.
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(150 miles on average).
Post CCC outcomes. Table 2.1b shows the mean outcomes for CCC enrollees after they
left the program. The average enrollee eventually lived to be 70 years old, below what SSA
cohort life tables predict for male cohorts born in 1920 who survived to age 17 (71). In our
estimation sample, conditioning for dying after 45, the average enrollee lived to be 73.6 years
old, which is also lower than 74.5 from the SSA cohort life tables. This evidence is consistent
with the fact CCC men were poor and came from poor states. Among those in the SSA
records, the average PIA was around 430 dollars per month. In 1940, 91% of those who had
already completed their training were in the labor force, and 72% were working conditional
on being in the labor force, making about 400 dollars in annual wages. A substantial fraction
(29%) were living in a different county from their prior county of residence. Similar patterns
are observed in the WWII enlistment data.36
2.5 Determinants of Training Duration.
We start by investigating the determinants of enrollment duration. On average enrollees in
our estimation sample trained for 9.8 months (S.D. 0.7) or .82 years. Aggregate data on the
national CCC program from a 1937 CCC Census shows that the distribution of duration
in our states (using CO) is skewed slightly towards shorter durations than the national
distribution (Data Appendix Figure 6).
There is large variation in the duration of training. Figure 2.1, Panel A shows the
histogram of duration in months. It shows spikes exactly at 6, 12, 18 and 24 months,
corresponding to 1, 2, 3 and 4 terms. However, most individuals (62%) dropped out in
the middle of their assignment (Table 2.1a, 38% ended due to “end of term”). And there is
significant variation in duration among those serving partial terms: 9% of individuals trained
36At the time of WWII enlistment (around 1942) 30% were living in a different county from their prior
county of residence.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Service Duration in the CCC Records and Jobs Corps
(a) CCC (b) Jobs Corps
Notes: We exclude durations greater than 3 years (less than 1% of the observations) in this figure. Mean
duration is 9.44 months (s.d. 7.47) for CCC and 5.8 months (s.d. 6.6) for Jobs Corps.
fewer than 2 months and a few individuals (about 1%) trained for more than 3 years despite
program rules. Figure 2.2 Panel A shows that among those who left before completing their
term, 21% deserted, 15% were dismissed “for the convenience of the government” (e.g., the
camp closed), 12% left for a job, and another 12% left because of an “urgent and proper
call” (e.g., a family member was sick, though the specific reason is not generally noted).
Figure 2.2 also shows that those leaving before completing their term tend to have shorter
average durations. Individuals with honorable discharges trained for longer, suggesting pos-
itive selection into duration. However, among those who quit early, the results are more
ambiguous: individuals with “urgent and proper calls” trained less than those who deserted.
Furthermore, those who were rejected upon further examination trained for just as long as
those who were dismissed for the convenience of the government. Thus, short durations may
have resulted from either positive or negative circumstances.
To investigate the determinants of duration we estimate simple OLS regressions of the
duration of training as a function of individual, family, and camp characteristics. We include
year-of-birth fixed effects (YOB) because different cohorts were eligible to train for different
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Reason for Discharge
(a) CCC (b) Jobs Corps
Note: Values on top of the bar graph are mean duration (in years) for each category: EOT (End of Term),
Emp (employment outside the program), COG (Convenience of the Government), UrgProp (Urgent and
Proper Call), Desert, Rej (Rejected), No Rec (No record). Reasons for Jobs Corps was harmonized to
match with CCC’s reasons for discharge.
amounts of time (Data Appendix Figure 5). We include county-of-enlistment by quarter-
of-enlistment (CQE) fixed effects for two reasons. This addresses the fact that the number
and types of camps that were opened varied over time and space, affecting where individuals
ended up serving and potentially the duration of training. It also addresses differential
selection based on location and time over the program years because the type of individuals
who apply for training (and other government benefits) varies substantially with economic
conditions (Mndez and Seplveda. 2012).
Figure 2.3 shows the results for selected characteristics, with full results shown in Ap-
pendix Table 2.A.2. In examining the relationship between personal characteristics and
duration, no clear relationship emerges. Individuals who reported being older than they
truly were trained for shorter durations whereas those who were older trained for longer
durations. Those who were farther away from home also trained for shorter.37 Surprisingly,
37Other traits predict durations: e.g. those who were paid more and those that were not juniors trained
longer.
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Figure 2.3: Determinants of Duration
(a) CCC (b) Jobs Corps
Note: Estimates and 95% confidence intervals plotted for coefficient estimates on selected variables from
regressing duration on various individual, camp, and peer characteristics. Coefficients in diamond are
statistically significant at the 95% level. Mean duration for the estimation sample is 0.84 years for CCC
and 0.49 years for Jobs Corps. Full results of the regression estimates are shown in Appendix Table 2.A.2.
individuals with a higher weight, who were presumably healthier individuals, trained for
shorter durations. Height, which is a marker of improved nutrition and health during the
growing years, does not predict training duration. Those with more education trained for
longer but so did those who came from larger households or whose parents were deceased.38
This evidence is not consistent with a single narrative of selection. There appear to be
three groups of enrollees. First, some who served for longer because they were positively
selected, such as those with more education, older, or honorably dismissed. A second group
seems to be negatively selected and in need of the CCC payments, such as those from more
disadvantaged backgrounds. Third, some appear to have more or less random reasons due to
good or bad luck, such as a job appearing, a camp closing or having an emergency at home.
38These results are qualitatively similar if we estimate regressions separately for CO and NM (see Appendix
Table 2.A.2) but some coefficients are only significant in one state. Notably Hispanics were more likely to
train longer in NM but not in CO. Individuals who were older than they reported trained longer in CO
but not in NM. Weather is a significant predictor in CO but not in NM. There are no cases in which the
coefficients are statistically significant and of opposite signs.
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The evidence also suggests that, conditional on individual characteristics and place and
time of enrollment, camp conditions mattered, as shown in Appendix Table 2.A.2. For
instance, in places with less rain and milder weather, individuals trained for longer, as did
those assigned to camps farther from cities. Peer characteristics also mattered. Durations
were longer in camps with larger Hispanic shares of the population or with more men under
18, but shorter in camps with many men who misrepresented their age or sent smaller
amounts to their families.
In sum, the primary evidence shows that desirable traits in an enrollee or in a camp did
not necessarily lead to longer durations, and there is no single narrative of selection.
2.6 The Long-Term Effect of CCC Training on Mortality and Life-
time Earnings
We now investigate the effect of duration of enrollment on lifetime outcomes, namely mor-
tality and earnings.
2.6.1 Mortality results
For this analysis, we restrict attention to individuals who died after age 45 to avoid WWII
related deaths and who have been linked to a death certificate. The results are not sensitive
to these restrictions. Figure 2.4 shows the relationship between average duration of training
and mean age at death among CCC men: the longer an enrollee trained, the longer he lived.
The relationship is positive and linear. Figure 2.5 shows the estimated density of the age at
death for individuals who trained for less than one term, between 1 and 2 terms, and more
than three terms. The distribution of the age at death appears to shift to the right for those
who trained for longer.
Next, we estimate an accelerated failure time model of the age at death on duration
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Figure 2.4: Longevity Increases with CCC Service Duration
Notes: figure plots the linear fit of mean death age within each percentile bin of duration. Data: Adminis-
trative records matched to death certificates. See text for more details.
in which we add controls for the characteristics of the enrollees and the camps to examine
whether and how our estimates change in response. The first column of Table 2.2 with no
controls shows a very precise coefficient on duration of 0.013. Controlling for cohort fixed-
effects and county-of-enrollment-quarter-of-the-year (CQE) fixed-effects (column 2) does not
change the coefficient estimate. Including family and individual characteristics (column 3)
lowers the coefficient to 0.011. Adding camp characteristics (column 4), peer characteristics
(column 5), or camp fixed effects (column 6) changes the coefficient very little. The magni-
tudes imply that one more year of training increased the age at death by one year (roughly
1.3 percent of 73.6 years of life). When we limit our sample to CO where the records contain
a lot more important baseline information, such as education, height, etc., the results are
again similar (column 7).39
39For NM and for CO records with missing data we impute using the mean and include a series for dummies
to indicate when the covariate is missing.
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Figure 2.5: CCC Enrollees Who Served More Terms Lived Longer
Notes: this figure plots the estimated density of the age at death, separately for those serving less than one
term, 1-2 terms and 3 terms or more.
The fact that the coefficient is essentially unchanged from columns 1-7 suggests that
selection bias may be small. However, to more formally assess the magnitude of the omitted
variable bias, we re-estimate these coefficients under various assumptions about the unob-
servables following Oster (2017). If delta (the proportionality value) is assumed to be 1
(i.e., unobservables as important as observables) then our coefficient would be 0.0136. Al-
ternatively, if delta is assumed to be -1, we would estimate 0.0127. Thus, one more year of
training would increase the age at death between 0.96 and 1.02 years.
Coefficients on other covariates (shown in Appendix Table 2.A.3) are interesting and shed
some light on the issue of selection. They show that variables that predict longer duration
do not always predict longer lives, providing additional evidence that selection into duration
is unlikely to drive our results. More educated individuals trained longer and lived longer
as well. Similarly, individuals who were accepted but eventually rejected trained for shorter
durations and lived shorter lives, consistent with accounts that these shorter durations were
94
Figure 2.6: Effect of Service Duration on the Probability of Survival to Different Ages
Notes: On the left y-axis, this figure reports the coefficients (and standard errors) from running linear
regressions of the probability that the person survived to a given age a on duration, where age ranges from
age 45 to age 90. The regressions use the administrative data we collected and control for all observables at
baseline (see Table 2.2 for details). On the right y-axis we plot the survival rate.
mostly related to physical disabilities. On the other hand, individuals who were older than
they reported, trained for longer durations but lived shorter lives. Similarly, those who lived
far away trained longer but lived shorter lives.
Finally, to examine possible non-linearities, Figure 2.6 shows the results of the regression
of probability of survival to age x on duration for every age between 45 and 90. The
coefficients are small and statistically insignificant at younger ages, when the survival is very
high. They become positive and statistically significant starting at age 56 and continue to
increase and peak between ages 68 and 78, and then decline thereafter. As a function of the
baseline survival rate, which is declining throughout, the effects rise until age 67, and then
decline.
Sample attrition. About 20% of the original sample is missing information on age at
95
death. We assess whether missing age at death is systematically related to training duration
(with or without conditioning on covariates). Table 2.3 shows that, without controls, the
missing rates are not a function of training duration. But conditional on camp, family
and individual characteristics, age at death is about 9% less likely to be missing for those
who trained for an additional year. This suggests that differential attrition could bias our
OLS estimates. To address this issue, we estimate survival models where we make various
assumptions about the missing data. The results in Appendix Table 2.A.4 show that our
findings are robust to various imputation approaches.
Quality of the longevity data. Our main results use the information found by trained
genealogists from multiple sources to determine the age at death. To assess the quality of
the data and whether the hand matching procedure introduces unknown biases, we replicate
the results using machine matches only. To do this we use the EM algorithm to match our
records to the Death Master File. The results in Appendix Table 2.A.8 show that we still
obtain a positive and statistically significant coefficient of duration on age at death that is
very similar in magnitude to our main estimates.
2.6.2 Lifetime income results
We examine the effects of the program on lifetime income by investigating the effects of
duration on the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), our proxy for lifetime earnings. The PIA
is the amount of Social Security pension an individual would receive if they retired at the
normal retirement age. To compute PIA, the SSA takes the average of an individuals’ best
35 years of earnings, known as the AIME (Average Indexed Monthly Earnings). The SSA
transforms the AIME into pension amounts using a non-linear formula, where each additional
dollar earned is weighted by a smaller factor as earnings increase, with the weights tapering
to zero. Thus, the formula compresses the distribution of PIA compared to the distribution
of earnings. Because the PIA computation changed in 1979, we focus on results post 1979,
but show results for the pre-1979 sample as well.
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We plot the mean PIA as a function of duration for the sample claiming after 1979 and
find a flat or slightly negative relationship between duration and PIA (Figure 2.7). We
investigate these results further by estimating OLS regressions. Without covariates there
is indeed a negative and statistically significant relationship that is however very small in
magnitude (Table 2.2 Panel B, column 1). This relationship reverses and becomes positive
and statistically significant when we add controls for birth cohort and for quarter and county
of enlistment (column 2). It remains stable thereafter regardless of the additional controls
we add: one more year of training increases the pension amount by $17 per month, or 3.9%.
If we convert this to the effect on the AIME, it corresponds to a 5.9% increase relative
to the mean. Panel C shows we obtain similar results in the sample who claimed before
1979: increasing training by a year raises earnings by 2.7%, though this is not statistically
significant. If we compute the weighted average between the two samples, we arrive at a
3.7% increase in earnings for the entire sample.
These results do not appear to be driven by sample selection or attrition in the SSA data.
This can be seen from Table 2.3 Panel B, which shows that there is no effect of duration
on whether we match an enrollee to MBR. As an additional check, Table 2.3 Panel C shows
that, even when restricting the sample to those matched to the MBR, the effect of duration
on longevity is very close to the results from the full sample.
We can compare the size of the gains by comparing our returns to the returns to schooling.
The coefficient of years of schooling in the regression of column 6 of Panel B is 10.57 (s.e. =
1.4) so the effect of a year of school on the PIA is smaller than the $17 we estimate for one
year of JC, though schooling is measured with error, potentially causing downward bias in
the estimate of schooling. Alternatively, OLS estimates of the returns to schooling for our
cohorts range from 5% (Goldin and Katz 2000) to 8% (Clay et al 2012). Based on these
estimates, the returns to one year of CCC training are roughly equivalent to a year of school
or a bit larger.
For reference, the latest evaluation of JC, which tracks individual tax records 20 years
98
Figure 2.7: CCC Duration and PIA
Notes: Authors computation based on administrative program data matched to the Master Beneficiary
Records.
after the program, finds that participation in JC had a statistically insignificant increase in
wages of 2%, with our effects well within their confidence interval [-4%; 8%]. There are at
least two reasons why the returns are lower for JC:The JC evaluation only uses 15 years
of labor market outcomes, whereas we use 35 years. The shorter length of the evaluation
may lower the estimated returns. Alternatively, the post-WWII economy was better for low-
skilled labor than the economy of the early 2000s, which had stagnant wages for low-income
groups (Piketty, Saez and Zucman 2018).
2.6.3 Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
A recent meta-analysis of 200 training programs around the world by Card, Kluve, and
Weber (2018) suggests substantial heterogeneity in estimated impacts. Other recent reviews
99
(Barnow and Smith 2015, Crpon and van den Berg 2016) come to similar conclusions. While
we cannot evaluate gender differences (women were ineligible for the CCC), we can investigate
other differences that have been found important, such as age, SES and economic conditions
at the time of enlistment (Appendix Table 2.A.5).40
We find that the poorest and most disadvantaged benefitted more, provided they were
in good health. The effects were also larger when unemployment was higher. These findings
are consistent with Card et al. (2018)’s finding of larger effects of job training in recessions
and among the more disadvantaged. Our results differ in one important way from existing
work: we find larger pension gains for the young, and significant benefits for Hispanics.41
2.7 Short-Term Outcomes: Evidence from the 1940 Census and
WWII Enlistment Records
What might explain the long-run effects? To investigate, we examine the impact of train-
ing on short-run outcomes. First, we investigate the effects on employment and wages, the
standard outcomes that are typically assessed in job training programs. Next we investi-
gate other mechanisms that include formal education, health improvements, and geographic
mobility.
2.7.1 Labor market outcomes: Evidence from the 1940 census
Table 2.4 shows estimated effect of training duration on outcomes as measured in the 1940
census. We constrain our sample to 9,623 men who participated in CCC before January 1st,
40Effects are generally larger for women partly explaining why our results are more modest than those
found by Attanasio et al. (2017) (or Kugler et al. 2015) who evaluate programs in Colombia after ten years
and find large effects on earnings of about 11% for men and 18% for women. But our estimates for men are
still lower than what these studies find.
41We suspect these differences are due to several factors: 1-we compute Hispanic ancestry and do not rely
on self-reports, b-our enrollees are from only 2 states with large number of Hispanics in the population; 3-the
country of origin among our enrollees differs substantially from today.
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1940, of whom we find 43% percent in the 1940 census.42 On average these men had left the
CCC two years before the 1940 census.
CCC training duration appears to have little effect on the short-run labor market out-
comes of CCC enlistees. Most men (91%) are in the labor force, and longer CCC training
had at best a very small effect on this outcome: a 1.5% increase relative to the mean of
0.91. We observe no effect on employment (conditional on labor force participation) during
the week prior to the Census. There appears to be a small, negative and imprecise effect
of duration on weeks worked and earnings.43 Overall, our results are consistent with the
observation in recent reviews that the labor market effects are more positive in the long run
than in the short run.
2.7.2 Health and military service: Evidence from WWII enlistment records
Table 2.5 presents results on other short-run outcomes. Because these outcomes are observed
at different points in time, in these regressions we include age at enlistment dummies. Du-
ration does predict whether we find enrollees in these records. Each year of CCC training
leads to about a 3-percentage point increase in the probability we find the individual in the
WWII enlistment records, about a 10% increase relative to the mean, robust and statistically
significant. This result is not surprising: the army organized and administered life in the
camps, and CCC men who trained for a long time were well acquainted with military life.
Some men (2% in our data) ended their CCC engagement to enlist in the military directly,
particularly toward the end of the program in 1942. Given that we have not found differen-
tial matching rates in any of our other data, we do not believe differential matching explains
this result. Rather, we conclude that the program made men more likely to serve.
42Duration does not predict whether we find an enrollee in the 1940 census once we include birth cohort
and county-quarter fixed effects (Table 2.4 top panel).
43For example, the largest coefficient for weeks worked is -0.937 which corresponds to 3.4% change relative
to the mean of 28 weeks worked. Similarly, we observe a negative but statistically insignificant effect on
earnings, corresponding to about a 3% decrease in wages at the mean.
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We observe measured height and BMI in the WWII enlistment data for about 7,300
observations. We find that one more year of training translated into roughly 1 more inch
of height—this result is statistically significant and relatively robust to the inclusion of
covariates once cohort dummies are included as controls.44 While this effect is small relative
to the mean (about 1.5%), it is large by historical standards: for example, it took British
men 100 years for their average height to increase by 6 inches (Fogel 1994). This result holds
conditional on height at enlistment, so it corresponds to additional growth rather than initial
differences in height.
It might seem surprising that the program increased heights given that these enrollees’
average age is 19. However, undernourished populations grow more slowly and achieve
their final adult height at older ages (Steckel 1986) and our results are consistent with this.
Also note that our effects are consistent with national reports of the CCC program that
the average height gain was half an inch (McEntee 1942). Our estimates are a bit larger,
possibly because our population is more disadvantaged than the average CCC enrollee. Also
recall that individuals in the CCC received food and medical care, including vaccinations, as
part of their participation in the program, likely improving their nutritional status. Finally
recall that many individuals (9% in our estimation) were likely younger than they reported.
Consistent with this, the results for BMI, which is a commonly used indicator of short-
term nutrition, also show statistically significant increases, across specifications, implying
gains of about 5-6% on BMI depending on the specification. The final CCC report documents
an average weight gain of enrollees during the program of 11 pounds (McEntee 1942), and
our results suggests that 40-60% of these gains persisted.45
44Controlling for cohort matters a lot because individuals born in more recent cohorts are taller but less
likely to serve for long, since the program ended with WWII. This possibly explains the negative correlation
in the raw data.
45For an average enrollee in our sample, adding 11 pounds would translate to a gain of 8%, so our results
suggest that about 40-60% of the weight gain obtained during the program persisted.
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2.7.3 Effects on education, and geographic mobility
We conclude by showing results on formal years of schooling and geographic mobility, which
are observed in both the Census of 1940 and WWII Enlistment Records. For these outcomes,
we combine information from the two sources to maximize sample size.46 We control for the
time since discharge (or equivalently the year of observation) to account for the fact the
outcomes are not observed at the same time.
We find a positive and statistically significant effect of duration on years of schooling of
about 0.18 years, relative to a mean of 9.4 years of schooling and controlling for education
at baseline (Table 2.5). When we restrict our analysis to those with non-missing baseline
education, the estimate declines to 0.12 and remains significant at the 5% level.47 Though
small in absolute terms, this represents one tenth of the standard deviation of schooling in
WWII records, and it is larger than the effect of many education policies, such as child labor
laws, on educational attainment during the early 20th century.48
This magnitude is somewhat larger than what one would expect based on the number
of individuals that gained formal education during their CCC enlistment and suggests that
perhaps individuals obtained school after participating in the CCC. CCC reports indicate
that 8% of men obtained additional schooling during the program.49 Assuming 8% obtained
46Because the WWII records contain the latest information, we take information from WWII if the enrollee
can be found in WWII record and 1940 Census if cannot be found in WWII record and discharged before
1940. For education and marriage, we take the value at WWII, which is later than 1940, if observed in WWII
and the value at 1940 Census if only observed in the Census. For moving, we code some as moved if they
moved counties in either 1940 or in WWII. The results are not qualitatively different if we run the regressions
separately although they are less frequently statistically significant as a result of the smaller sample size.
Results available upon request.
47Results available upon request.
48For example, see Lleras-Muney (2002) or Goldin and Katz (2008). One more year of compulsory schooling
led to about 0.05 years of schooling.
49The final report states that over one hundred thousand enrollees (3%) were taught how to read and
write in the CCC program, 4% of men received primary school degrees (8th grade), 0.6% got their high
school diplomas and a handful (270 out of more than 3 million) obtained college degrees. Thus, about 7-8%
obtained some schooling.
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one more year of school, this would result in a gain in years of schooling of 0.08, below but
close to our estimate. Given that about 3.5% of enrollees in our data cited education as an
explicit reason for leaving the program, post-CCC education gains likely accounts for the
rest of the effect.
Finally, we look at the relationship between duration and short and long-term geographic
mobility. In Table 2.6, we compare the county of individuals in their original CCC application
with the county of residence indicated in the 1940 Census records, the WWII records and in
the death certificates. Thirty five percent of participants moved in the short term. Training
for more time in the CCC substantially increased the likelihood of moving. The coefficient
on duration is positive and statistically significant in many specifications, hovering around
0.05; thus one more year of training increases the chance of moving by about 15%. This
is substantial particularly during this period, which was characterized by historically low
migration nationwide, at least across states.50 Moreover, when CCC men moved, they
moved to locations with higher paying weekly or annual wages in 1940, and thus potentially
better economic opportunities, as well as lower mortality, measured by the average county
level mortality from 1950 to 1968.51 Over the long run, however, most individuals moved
and the effect of duration on mobility fades.
In sum, enrollees who served longer had better health, more schooling and greater short-
term mobility towards healthier, richer places. But in the short run, there appear to be no
effects on labor market outcomes.52
50In the 1940 census 12% of people report living in a different county than in 1935. https://www.census.
gov/dataviz/visualizations/010/
51We use this measure instead of the county mortality from 1940 onwards because of the disruptions that
occurred during the WWII.
52For CO we have baseline measures for several outcomes: height, weight, education and prior labor
market experience. In our main results we control for these. However, this allows us to test if duration
predicts these pre-labor market outcomes. Appendix Table 2.A.6 shows that duration does not predict these
pre-CCC outcomes, except for education. These results suggest that by in large our approach produces
unbiased estimates of the effects of the program.
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2.8 Internal and External Validity: Comparisons to Modern Job
Corps Program
To shed some light on the internal and external validity of our results, we analyze data from
the modern Federal Job Corps program (JC hereafter), which was modeled after the CCC.53
Using publicly available data from a randomized evaluation of the JC program conducted in
1994-1996, we first compare JC and CCC enrollees along a number of dimensions, including
prior schooling and training duration. We then compare our estimated treatment effects
(using OLS methods) with JC estimates based on randomization to assess the validity of our
research design. We then compare estimates of duration in JC and the CCC on short run
outcomes.
2.8.1 Comparing CCC and JC Enrollees.
JC participants differ from CCC participants in two key respects: JC includes women and
married individuals, whereas the CCC excluded both. If we restrict attention to men in JC,
Table 2.7 shows that overall, JC and CCC participants are similar. Both are young (19 years
old on average) and have relatively few years of schooling. JC participants have completed
10 years of schooling, compared with 8.5 for the CCC enrollees, and 19% have graduated
from high school compared with 12% of the CCC enrollees. Our sample has considerably
more Hispanics, due to the fact we concentrate on CO and NM, whereas the JC data is
national.
Participants are also similar in terms of duration of enrollment and reasons for unen-
rolling. Mean duration is 9.44 months (s.d. 7.47) for CCC and 5.8 months (s.d. 6.6) for JC.
53The current website (https://www.doleta.gov/job_corps/) states that “The program helps eligible
young people ages 16 through 24 complete their high school education, trains them for meaningful careers,
and assists them with obtaining employment.” “Students can earn a high school diploma or the equivalent,
and college credits. Job Corps also offers tuition-free housing, meals, basic health care, a living allowance,
and career transition assistance.”
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Table 2.7: Characteristics of Eligible Job Corps Applicants and Comparison to CCC
Jobs Cors Data CCC
All Males Males
Characteristic Applicants Only Only
Baseline Characteristics
Duration (in years, only positive durations) 0.67 0.652 0.819
Male 0.6 1 1
Age at application 18.8 18.728 18.75
White, non-Hispanic 0.3 0.304 NA
Black, non-Hispanic 0.5 0.451 NA
Hispanic 0.2 0.169 0.484
Other 0.1 0.076 NA
Years of education 10.2 10.042 8.581
High school diploma or more (including GED) 0.2 0.19 0.12
Ever arrested 0.3 0.332 NA
Had a job in the past year 0.6 0.662 NA
Ever had job 0.8 0.808 0.375
Average earnings in the past year (dollars) 2974.9 3255.74 NA
Mean for outcomes
Duration for treated (years, duration > 0) 0.67 0.652 0.826
Duration for treated (years) 0.483 0.487 0.819
Years of school 11.145 11.07 9.403
Employment (in week of the survey)ˆ 0.606 0.631 0.71
Weeks worked in previous year 30.62 32.17 27.88
Total ann. earnings in prev. yr 10538.31 11947.78 382.43
Total ann. earnings in prev. yr (weeks worked > 0) 12990.85 14471.77 466.69
Movedˆˆ 0.198 0.207 0.34
Self-reported health status in 12 monthsˆˆˆ 1.786 1.733 NA
Self-reported health status in 30 monthsˆˆˆ 1.799 1.739 NA
Self-reported health status in 48 monthsˆˆˆ 1.809 1.757 NA
Self-reported health excellent or good (12-month)* 0.838 0.855 NA
Self-reported health excellent or good (30-month)* 0.838 0.856 NA
Self-reported health excellent or good (48-month)* 0.828 0.842 NA
Reason ended: End of term 0.31 0.302 0.378
Reason ended: Employment 0.042 0.038 0.116
Reason ended: Convenience of the government 0.001 0 0.145
Reason ended: Urgent and Proper Call 0.09 0.056 0.116
Reason ended: Deserted 0.331 0.373 0.223
Reason ended: Rejected upon examination 0 0 0.0101
Reason ended: No Record 0.228 0.232 0.0127
Observations: Baseline 14327 8646 NA
Observations: Outcomes 11313 6528 NA
Source: Baseline data. ˆemployment is not conditional on labor force participation. ˆˆfor Job Corps it
is defined as living more than 20 miles away from baseline residence. For CCC it is defined as living in
a different county than the county of residence at the time of enrollment. For Job Corps, employment is
defined as having a job during the 208th week after the baseline survey (four years). ˆˆˆSelf-reported health
status with 1 = excellent health, 2 = good, 3 = fair, and 4 = poor health. *Constructed variable that is
equal to 1 if self-reported health of 1 (excellent health).
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The main reason for the lower duration of the JC participants is that 20% never serve (Fig-
ure 2). Conditional on training, the duration among the treated group in JC is 7.8 months.
Rates of completion are similar across the two programs as are the reasons for leaving.54
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, when we try to predict duration in the JC, we also
find evidence of both positive and negative selection into duration, as well as evidence that
duration might have ended at a random time, just as we found in the CCC data (Figure
3).55
2.8.2 Comparison of experimental and non-experimental estimates.
We reproduce the JC randomized evaluation results in Schochet et al. (2008) using only
the sample of males (Table 2.8).56 In the first column we present estimates that compare
the outcomes of those assigned to treatment to those of the control. In the second column
we present the implied effects of training duration by estimating the implied 2SLS effect of
duration using the randomized treatment status as an instrument. Thus, these estimates
represent the causal effect of duration under a certain set of assumptions.57 The third and
fourth columns show the results of our OLS strategy for JC and for CCC, respectively, which
we discuss below.58
54About 30% of JC enrollees complete the program, compared with 38% of the CCC. And of those who
leave before completing, 30% in the JC and 22% in the CCC “deserted” while 12% and 4%, respectively, left
because of employment opportunities.
55We find that education, Hispanic ethnicity, non-native speakers trained longer and individuals with a
criminal history or those with shorter work histories trained for shorter periods of time (Figure 3 Panel B).
As in the CCC, participants that found employment and those that deserted, were rejected or had urgent
and proper calls also served shorter durations compared to those that completed their term.
56The results in the first column are almost identical to those in Schochet et al. (2008) except that we are
restricting the sample to males and we constructed a few new outcomes (years of education, mobility and
marriage). We can reproduce the full RCT results very closely using the full sample.
57Assuming that there are no heterogeneous treatment effects, and that the effect of training duration on
the outcomes is linear starting at 0.
58Appendix Table 2.A.7 shows that the treated and control groups are balanced among males only sug-
gesting that the RCT results for this subsample are valid. However, we show both groups since the original
RCT was not designed or powered to estimated effects among males only.
113
T
ab
le
2.
8:
C
om
p
ar
is
on
to
J
ob
C
or
p
s
J
ob
s
C
or
p
s
D
at
a
C
C
C
R
C
T
O
L
S
O
L
S
2S
L
S
C
o
effi
ci
en
t
on
In
st
ru
m
en
t
C
o
effi
ci
en
t
C
o
effi
ci
en
t
T
re
at
m
en
t
D
u
ra
ti
on
w
it
h
on
D
u
ra
ti
on
on
D
u
ra
ti
on
D
u
m
m
y
(I
T
T
)
T
re
at
m
en
t
(y
ea
rs
)+
(y
ea
rs
)
Y
ea
rs
of
sc
h
o
ol
0.
18
4*
**
0.
39
3
0.
36
0*
**
0.
16
9*
**
(0
.0
39
)
(0
.0
84
)
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
40
)
N
6,
28
0
6,
28
0
3,
40
7
9,
62
0
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
(i
n
w
ee
k
of
th
e
su
rv
ey
)ˆ
0.
02
6*
*
0.
05
6
0.
06
0*
**
0.
00
6
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
25
)
N
6,
02
2
6,
02
2
3,
28
5
2,
68
6
W
ee
k
s
w
or
ke
d
in
p
re
v
io
u
s
ye
ar
1.
61
5*
**
3.
44
3
2.
62
9*
**
0.
43
4
(0
.5
36
)
(1
.1
42
)
(0
.6
10
)
(1
.2
03
)
N
6,
23
5
6,
23
5
3,
38
2
2,
38
3
T
ot
al
A
n
n
u
al
E
ar
n
in
gs
in
p
re
v
io
u
s
ye
ar
96
9.
76
5*
**
2,
08
3.
46
6
1,
05
5.
43
5*
**
-1
6.
22
6
(2
80
.8
04
)
(6
03
.5
98
)
(3
36
.3
11
)
(2
6.
06
1)
N
6,
08
1
6,
08
1
3,
31
7
2,
16
8
ln
(E
ar
n
in
gs
)
(w
ee
k
s
w
or
ke
d
>
0)
0.
03
8
0.
08
0
0.
07
8*
*
-0
.0
10
(0
.0
27
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
31
)
(0
.0
61
)
N
5,
00
9
5,
00
9
2,
75
3
23
,1
03
M
ov
ed
ˆˆ
0.
01
8*
0.
03
8
0.
06
0*
**
0.
05
4*
**
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
11
)
N
6,
30
1
6,
30
1
3,
41
9
9,
60
3
114
J
ob
s
C
or
p
s
D
at
a
C
C
C
R
C
T
O
L
S
O
L
S
2S
L
S
C
o
effi
ci
en
t
on
In
st
ru
m
en
t
C
o
effi
ci
en
t
C
o
effi
ci
en
t
T
re
at
m
en
t
D
u
ra
ti
on
w
it
h
on
D
u
ra
ti
on
on
D
u
ra
ti
on
D
u
m
m
y
(I
T
T
)
T
re
at
m
en
t
(y
ea
rs
)+
(y
ea
rs
)
S
el
f-
re
p
or
te
d
h
ea
lt
h
ex
c.
or
go
o
d
(1
2-
m
on
th
)ˆ
ˆˆ
0.
03
5*
**
0.
07
3
0.
02
0*
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
10
)
N
5,
92
0
5,
92
0
3,
23
4
S
el
f-
re
p
or
te
d
h
ea
lt
h
ex
c.
or
go
o
d
(3
0-
m
on
th
)ˆ
ˆˆ
0.
01
8*
0.
03
7
0.
02
0*
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
11
)
N
5,
45
8
5,
45
8
2,
94
4
S
el
f-
re
p
or
te
d
h
ea
lt
h
ex
c.
or
go
o
d
(4
8-
m
on
th
)ˆ
ˆˆ
0.
01
6*
0.
03
4
0.
01
3
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
11
)
N
6,
27
9
6,
27
9
3,
40
7
D
u
ra
ti
on
of
tr
ai
n
in
g
in
m
on
th
s
5.
82
9
In
d
iv
id
u
al
co
n
tr
ol
s?
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
S
am
p
le
is
m
al
es
on
ly
.
+
S
am
p
le
in
cl
u
d
es
al
l
tr
ea
te
d
,
in
cl
u
d
in
g
th
o
se
w
it
h
ze
ro
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
.
C
on
tr
o
ls
in
cl
u
d
e
ye
a
r
a
n
d
q
u
a
rt
er
o
f
b
a
se
li
n
e,
ye
ar
an
d
q
u
ar
te
r
of
48
-m
o
fo
ll
ow
u
p
su
rv
ey
,
w
h
et
h
er
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
w
a
s
en
ro
ll
ed
in
n
o
n
-r
es
id
en
ti
a
l
p
ro
g
ra
m
a
n
d
b
a
se
li
n
e
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
su
ch
a
s
w
h
et
h
er
in
d
iv
id
u
al
h
ad
ch
il
d
,
w
as
ev
er
ar
re
st
ed
,
h
a
d
ev
er
u
se
d
d
ru
g
s,
h
a
d
a
jo
b
,
h
a
d
a
jo
b
in
th
e
p
re
v
io
u
s
y
ea
r,
ev
er
h
a
d
a
jo
b
,
ra
ce
,
n
a
ti
ve
la
n
gu
ag
e,
on
w
el
fa
re
as
a
ch
il
d
,
ed
u
ca
ti
on
,
b
as
el
in
e
m
a
ri
ta
l
st
a
tu
s
a
n
d
o
th
er
s.
ˆ
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
is
n
o
t
co
n
d
it
io
n
a
l
o
n
la
b
o
r
fo
rc
e
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
.
ˆˆ
F
or
J
ob
C
or
p
s
it
is
d
efi
n
ed
as
li
v
in
g
m
o
re
th
a
n
2
0
m
il
es
aw
ay
fr
o
m
b
a
se
li
n
e
re
si
d
en
ce
.
F
o
r
C
C
C
it
is
d
efi
n
ed
a
s
li
v
in
g
in
a
d
iff
er
en
t
co
u
n
ty
th
an
th
e
co
u
n
ty
of
re
si
d
en
ce
at
th
e
ti
m
e
of
en
ro
ll
m
en
t.
F
o
r
J
o
b
C
o
rp
s,
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
is
d
efi
n
ed
a
s
h
av
in
g
a
jo
b
d
u
ri
n
g
th
e
2
0
8
th
w
ee
k
a
ft
er
th
e
b
as
el
in
e
su
rv
ey
(f
ou
r
ye
ar
s)
.
E
ar
n
in
g
s
co
n
d
it
io
n
a
l
o
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
o
n
ly
in
cl
u
d
es
th
e
ea
rn
in
g
s
o
f
in
d
iv
id
u
a
ls
em
p
lo
ye
d
d
u
ri
n
g
th
e
2
0
8
th
w
ee
k
af
te
r
th
e
b
as
el
in
e
su
rv
ey
.
ˆˆ
ˆC
on
st
ru
ct
ed
va
ri
a
b
le
th
a
t
is
eq
u
a
l
to
1
if
se
lf
-r
ep
o
rt
ed
h
ea
lt
h
o
f
1
(e
x
ce
ll
en
t
h
ea
lt
h
).
115
OLS as a reasonable approximation of experimental estimates in the JC data. We find
that OLS estimates are a reasonable approximation of the causal impact of duration on
short run outcomes in the JC data. For example, the 2SLS estimate of duration on years of
schooling using assignment to treatment as an instrument is 0.39. When we use data only
from the treated group and estimate the effect of training duration on education using OLS,
the coefficient we would estimate is 0.36, statistically indistinguishable from the experimental
estimate. We find similar effects in the OLS and RCT settings for employment, weeks
worked, and log earnings conditional on employment. The OLS approach underestimates
annual earnings (including zeros) and over-estimates mobility, but the results are still similar
given the estimated standard errors.
Comparing CCC estimates with the JC estimates. We find that the JC and the CCC
programs both had positive and statistically significant effects on education, mobility and
self-reported health. The latter two outcomes had not previously been examined, although
the 20-year evaluation did report that a 40% reduction in SSDI benefits among JC partic-
ipants. We find that JC increases the likelihood that respondents report being in excellent
or very good health. Thus the JC evidence on health is similar to CCC findings for height
and BMI.59
However, we find different effects of JC and CCC training on labor market outcomes.
While small positive effects on employment, weeks worked, and annual earnings are found
in the JC program, we find that the CCC program had no significant effects on employment
and earnings. The differences might be due to the effects of experience: the labor market
outcomes are measured on average only two years after leaving the CCC program, but they
are measured 3 years out for JC. The differences could also be driven by the fact that labor
market conditions differed at the time of the evaluation and were still quite dire in the 1930s
and early 1940s.
59Results are similar if we use the entire scale or only look at whether the respondents are in excellent
health alone.
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Overall, we conclude that CCC participants are comparable in some important dimen-
sions to JC participants: they are young and uneducated, and they participate in training
for about 7 to 9 months. In the short run, both programs appear to raise educational at-
tainment and geographic mobility and improve health. JC has more beneficial labor market
effects in the short run. But CCC appears to have increased lifetime earnings, suggesting
the 20-year evaluation might underestimate the effects of the program. This suggests that
in the long-term JC participants will benefit from JC by living longer lives and enjoying
greater pensions.
2.9 Discussion
In the long run, we find that individuals who participated longer in CCC had increased
longevity by about 0.7 years. In the short run (within 2 years of training), we find no
significant effects of training duration on labor force participation, employment, or earnings.
We do however find significant income effects in the long-term despite no short-term effects,
consistent with Card et al.’s (2018) findings. We also find small improvements in education
and large increases in geographic mobility, height, and BMI.
Our longevity finding is consistent with the literature on the determinants of mortality.
Height and normal BMI are both associated with longevity (Fogel 1994), and both indicators
of health improved with CCC duration. The education of the men (formal and informal) also
increased, and education is associated with longevity (Cutler et al. 2006). Greater lifetime
earnings are also associated with lower mortality (Chetty et al. 2016). Finally, the enrollees
moved to locations with lower mortality, which Finkelstein et al. (2019) and Deryugina and
Molitor (2019) show also increase longevity.
Was the program worth it? We calculate the Marginal Value of Public Funds (MVPF)
to answer the question, following the approach by Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2019). CCC
program costs we include are 1) upfront cost of the program and 2) increases in social
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security payouts from enrollees both living longer and having increased PIA. These costs
are mitigated by tax increases from earnings benefits of the program. The program benefits
include: 1) willingness to pay (WTP) for life extensions, 2) increase in after-tax earnings,
3) $30 per month wage paid (most of which went to families), and 4) the value of other
services received by enrollees during the program, such as room and board. The MVPF is
estimated to be 2.13 including the WTP for life increase, and 0.96 excluding the WTP for
life increase.60 Thus our conclusions are similar to Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2019)61 in
that the MVFP is below one when computed based on earnings, but they differ once we
incorporate longevity gains.
Historical accounts suggest that the program may have positively affected other “soft
skills,” improved mental health, and enlarged social networks, but we have no data to assess
these effects. For example, enrollees reported making many life-long friendships and expe-
riencing improvements in their state of mind. Additionally, the Army ran the CCC camps
and imposed rules of behavior that were likely unusual for most individuals and may have
been beneficial. Criminality is an important outcome which may have been affected as well.
Though we do not observe these outcomes directly, we do observe that the CCC increased
the probability that young men served in the Army, consistent with a change in either dis-
cipline or attitudes towards national service. Also, worth noting is that the program likely
60Assumptions made and details of calculation are presented in the Online Appendix. Some of the increases
in life expectancy could lead to greater government spending through Medicare, potentially lowering the
marginal value of public funds (Hendren and Sprung-Keyser 2019). Families received transfers, which could
have benefitted them but also potentially distorted their behaviors. We do not have estimates of these effects.
We do not assess the general equilibrium effects of job training programs. Recent research suggests these
effects could be substantial and possibly offset the benefits to individuals (Crepon et al. 2013). Relatedly,
the CCC program had impacts not just on the individuals that participated in the program but also on the
communities where the CCC operated. In the short run these effects were driven in part by the economic
and social activity that the camps generated, bringing men and resources to nearby towns. These short-term
effects ended with the end of the program and the closure of the parks. But the changes in the landscape
related to the building of national parks and forests, and the irrigation of the land, might have affected
these communities more permanently. We do not incorporate these. Van der Berg et al. (2016) discuss this
extensively—full cost benefit evaluations of training programs are rare and difficult to do.
61They compute an MVFP of 0.18 for JC. This computation does not incorporate the lower SSDI claims
or the potential life extensions we compute here.
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benefitted not just enrollees and their families, but the communities and the landscape where
the CCC operated. Future work should attempt to measure these outcomes and conduct a
more extensive cost-benefit evaluation of the program.
Our results have important implications for evaluations of job training programs. The
vast majority of evaluations focus on labor market outcomes in the short- to medium-term
and find small and/or insignificant effects. We confirm these findings in our data. But
we observe large changes in lifetime outcomes that are not usually studied, namely health,
military service, and geographic mobility. As previous scholars have noted, these findings
suggest that it is essential to evaluate multiple mechanisms and indicators of well-being when
assessing the impacts of various interventions.
Individuals entering the labor force today will begin their job search in the midst of high
unemployment rates not seen since the Great Depression. Our results suggest that job train-
ing during periods of high unemployment has the potential to generate significant long-term
benefits for participants, particularly on health outcomes. Thus, the results may be highly
applicable to more modern periods with high rates of unemployment, such as the Great
Recession of 2009 and the 2020 global pandemic. Our findings demonstrate these programs
can improve both health and labor market outcomes. However, the contrast between our
findings and the long-term evaluation of the JC program also underscores that the labor
market benefits of training programs may depend heavily on the economic conditions that
prevail in the decades that follow the program. Indeed, this point has been raised by Rosen-
zweig and Udry (2019) who have documented that the causal impact of multiple types of
investment (including education) can vary significantly over time with changes in aggregate
economic conditions. Whether and how the returns to modern job training programs varies
with both current and future economic conditions is an important area for future monitoring
and study.
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2.A Appendix Tables
Table 2.A.1: Sample Selection
Sample Restriction Itself Sequential
All 26290 26290
Camp Exist 25165 25165
Enrollment Exist 24832 23943
Duration Exist 26050 23722
Final analytic sample 26050 23722
Death Age Exist 21457 19377
Death Age Restrict 24386 17639
Final analytic sample for mortality 24386 17639
The rows show many observations survive after dropping for each restriction. Itself column shows how
many observations survive if we drop for just the restriction in the row. Sequential column shows the final
observations that survive when we drop for each reason sequentially. Our working sample is 23,889, where
we additionally lose observations to Death Age Exist for death age analysis
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Table 2.A.2: Determinants of CCC Service Duration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Indiv Camp Indiv and Add CO CO Non-
Controls Controls Camp County- Only missing
qtr FE Only
Individual characteristics
Ever Rejected? -0.201*** -0.020 -0.007 -0.009 0.060
(0.033) (0.034) (0.031) (0.034) (0.038)
=1 if disabled -0.446*** -0.464*** -0.328*** -0.363*** -0.237*
(0.055) (0.055) (0.050) (0.061) (0.127)
Non-junior 0.834*** 0.840*** 0.509*** 0.574*** 0.005
(0.122) (0.119) (0.097) (0.127) (0.235)
Reported Age Younger than DMFˆ 0.033* 0.026 0.003 0.003 -0.005
(0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.020) (0.024)
Reported Age Older than DMF 0.081*** 0.089*** -0.047*** -0.029* -0.033
(0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.025)
Not Eligible 0.300** 0.265* 0.174** 0.186* 0.662***
(0.139) (0.141) (0.077) (0.106) (0.134)
Age is 17 or 18 0.100*** 0.103*** -0.037*** -0.045*** -0.020
(0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.021)
Allottee amount 0.058*** 0.060*** -0.001 0.009 0.026***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009)
Allottee is father 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.001 0.001 -0.003
(0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.019) (0.027)
Allottee is mother 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.017 0.030 0.012
(0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.027)
Gap in service -0.201*** -0.156*** -0.158*** -0.126*** -0.113***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020)
Log distance from home to camp (miles) -0.016*** -0.013** -0.011** -0.015*** -0.021**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Hispanic (imputed using hispanic index) 0.078*** 0.058*** 0.026** -0.014 0.007
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019)
Highest grade completed (CO only) 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.007*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Household size excluding applicant (CO only) 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Live on farm? (CO only) 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.016 0.012 0.017
(0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017)
Height (Inches) (CO only) 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Weight (100 pounds) (CO only) -0.189*** -0.154*** -0.085* -0.113** -0.019
(0.054) (0.052) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045)
Father Living (CO only) -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.018 -0.015 -0.006
(0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
Mother Living (CO only) -0.088*** -0.095*** -0.051*** -0.056*** -0.032
(0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.017) (0.024)
Tenure in county (years) (CO only) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
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Camp characteristics
=1 if camp is in enrollment state -0.094*** 0.053 0.154*** 0.165*** -0.027
(0.034) (0.051) (0.058) (0.059) (0.066)
Mean precipitation in camp 1933-1942 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004*** 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Mean min temp in camp 1933-1942 0.010 0.014** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.012
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Mean max temp in camp 1933-1942 -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.034*** -0.022** -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
Camp Type: Department of Grazing 0.131*** 0.123*** -0.075 0.117 -0.052
(0.044) (0.041) (0.063) (0.087) (0.116)
Camp Type: Federal Reclamation Project 0.118** 0.099** -0.055 0.147 0.031
(0.047) (0.045) (0.070) (0.096) (0.120)
Camp Type: Fish and Wildlife Service 0.106** 0.024 -0.383***
(0.051) (0.048) (0.131)
Camp Type: National Forest 0.008 -0.006 -0.106* 0.024 -0.091
(0.043) (0.041) (0.060) (0.078) (0.109)
Camp Type: National Monument 0.145* 0.121 -0.303*** -0.265* -0.166
(0.088) (0.084) (0.090) (0.147) (0.179)
Camp Type: National Park 0.069 0.060 -0.117* -0.012 -0.165
(0.044) (0.042) (0.063) (0.079) (0.101)
Camp Type: Soil Conservation 0.121*** 0.100*** -0.075 0.092 -0.070
(0.040) (0.038) (0.059) (0.080) (0.108)
Camp Type: State Park -0.031 -0.041 -0.119* -0.078 -0.176
(0.054) (0.050) (0.069) (0.090) (0.147)
Log distance to closest city (miles) -0.007* -0.007** 0.011** 0.000 0.022**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Log distance to 2nd closest city (miles) 0.028 0.035* -0.017 -0.044* 0.012
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.025) (0.037)
Peer Char: Hispanic at enrollment 0.386*** 0.239*** 0.249*** 0.015 0.051
(0.044) (0.047) (0.070) (0.071) (0.098)
Peer Char: Age at enrollment -0.200*** -0.235*** -0.319*** -0.313*** 0.052
(0.021) (0.023) (0.034) (0.035) (0.041)
Peer Char: Reported Age Younger than DMF 0.483*** 0.381** -0.607*** -0.579** 0.478*
(0.170) (0.169) (0.211) (0.254) (0.262)
Peer Char: Reported Age Older than DMF -0.276** -0.452*** -1.025*** -0.814*** 0.397
(0.127) (0.137) (0.200) (0.236) (0.318)
Peer Char: Not Eligible (First enrollment) 1.861*** 1.587*** 1.349*** -0.295 1.949*
(0.256) (0.273) (0.389) (0.452) (1.041)
Peer Char: Allottee amount 0.083*** 0.030*** -0.255*** -0.360*** -0.305***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.017) (0.024) (0.018)
Peer Char: Allottee: Father -0.083 -0.120 0.019 -0.040 0.088
(0.126) (0.122) (0.149) (0.177) (0.198)
Peer Char: Allottee: Mother -0.163 -0.117 -0.032 -0.078 -0.221
(0.126) (0.128) (0.133) (0.147) (0.202)
Peer Char: Gap in service -0.931*** -0.692*** -0.652*** -0.156 -1.462***
(0.098) (0.099) (0.133) (0.140) (0.191)
Constant -1.457*** 3.342*** 2.800*** 12.992*** 14.686*** 6.747***
(0.458) (0.518) (0.569) (0.868) (0.991) (0.807)
Observations 17,639 17,086 17,086 17,086 10,944 3,013
R-squared 0.181 0.160 0.222 0.574 0.482 0.465
Mean Dep 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.76 0.67
FE BD BD BD BD,CYQ BD,CYQ BD,CYQ
Sample All All All All CO CO
Reason N N N N N N
Number of County-Quarter Groups 1,789 1,231 477
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1. Only Duration ¡= 3 years, death age ¿= 45 are included in
regression. Variables imputed if missing and missing dummies included. County Unemployment is from ICPSR compilation of
County statistics from 1937 Census of Unemployment and 1940 Decenniel Census. Those values are given to enrollment years
1937, 1938 for 1937 Census and 1939-1942 for 1940 Census. ˆ=1 if reported age in CCC documents is smaller than in the DMF,
or maximum of all reported age for enrollee.
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CHAPTER 3
The Effect of Inclusionary Zoning Policy on Local
Housing Markets1
3.1 Introduction
Housing affordability has come to the forefront of urban policy debate in recent years. Sec-
ular increases in housing prices and gentrification have made even traditionally affordable
neighborhoods into expensive places to live. Federal and local policy tools, such as Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) or housing vouchers, tackle housing affordability for
the poor and try to encourage the creation of income-mixed neighborhoods.
In this chapter, I focus on one particular local policy measure: Inclusionary Zoning Poli-
cies (IZPs). IZPs incentivize or require property developers to set aside a certain proportion
of units in new developments at below-market price. Termed “inclusionary” to directly con-
trast ordinary zoning policies that are designed to exclude certain types of properties, IZPs
take on different forms across the U.S. Perhaps because IZPs vary widely across jurisdictions
or because they do not exist at the scale of some federal programs, there are few papers
examining their effectiveness in providing low-income housing.
Nonetheless, IZPs have been adopted or recently expanded in many municipalities, in-
1Data is provided by Zillow through the Zillow Transaction and Assessment Dataset (ZTRAX). More
information on accessing the data can be found at http://www.zillow.com/ztrax. The results and opinions
are those of the author and do not reflect the position of Zillow Group. Where noted, map tiles are provided
by OpenStreetMap under Open Database License and cartography licensed as CC BY-SA. Please refer to
https://www.openstreetmap.org/copyright for more details.
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cluding America’s three largest cities, New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago. It is likely these
policies will spread, because they generally involve no direct expenditure of public funds,
appear to directly address concerns about generating affordable housing, and provide a path
forward for developers. Moreover, with the increased severity of the affordability crisis, ju-
risdictions are turning to stronger IZP tools. New York expanded the scope of IZPs in 2016.
Los Angeles, which was limited by a legal decision striking down the enforceability of vol-
untary IZPs,2 is exploring re-enforcing IZPs following a recent revision to a key California
law. Chicago has had IZP in place since 2007, but revised the policy in 2015 and is currently
considering significant revisions.
In this chapter, I analyze the causal impact of IZPs on housing supply and prices in
New York City. I first introduce a model of developer profit with and without IZPs to
analyze the determinants of developer participation and housing market response. Standard
microeconomic theory predicts that any zoning policy that seeks to restrict land use should
act as a tax on new developments, therefore dampening housing supply and increasing prices
in the area, ultimately undermining housing affordability. In contrast, my theoretical analysis
suggests that the effect crucially depends on local housing market characteristics and policy
variations of different jurisdictions.
I then quantitatively explore the causal impact of IZPs on housing prices and supply using
a differences-in-discontinuity design by exploiting the timing and variation in mandatory IZP
in New York City. New York implemented mandatory IZP in 2016 requiring new develop-
ments within certain parts of the city to provide affordable units. Comparing the mandatory
IZ areas to neighboring areas before and after the policy allows me to net out unobserved
housing market characteristics that plague identification faced by existing studies in the lit-
erature. In particular, I extend the own-lot and external effects border-discontinuity design
by Turner et al. (2014) to a differences-and-differences framework. This is an important
contribution to the literature, as the approach in the existing literature, which compares
2Palmer/Sixth Street Properties, L.P. v. City of Los Angeles
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jurisdictions with and without IZPs, is inadequate in dealing with potential endogeneity
problems arising from unobserved, time-varying housing market characteristics, which are
very likely to exist when comparing across jurisdictions (such as counties and cities).
My empirical results show that, while prices have increased following the policy, supply
has also increased in response. My causal estimates suggest about a 18% short-term increase
in prices and a 15% short-term increases in supply. Moreover, the policy does not seem to
have meaningful spillover effects to nearby areas. These results are inconsistent with simple
models of IZPs as a tax on new housing development. However, it is also inconsistent with
increased housing affordability, which makes a straightforward interpretation of the policy’s
impact difficult. This suggests that a more careful consideration of the impact of IZPs on
local housing markets is needed.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In the rest of this section, I provide
background on IZPs and review the literature surrounding the evaluation of IZPs on local
housing markets. In Section 3.2, I explore a theoretical foundation on the developer’s decision
to take on IZ projects in the framework of density bonuses. In Section 3.3, I describe my
empirical strategy based on Turner et al. (2014). In Section 3.4, I describe the data source
that will be used in estimation. In Section 3.5, I present my findings on MIZ’s impact on
building activity and housing prices.
3.1.1 Background on IZPs and New York’s Implementation
Usually, IZPs require or incentivize developers to set aside x% of new units to households
earning y% of Area Median Income (AMI) in exchange for extra density or tax benefits.
However, IZPs take on a variety of flavors and utilize a wide set of policy tools (Schwartz et
al. 2012, Schuetz, Meltzer, Been 2009):
1. Mandatory status: whether developer compliance to set-aside rules are voluntary or
mandatory
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2. Qualifying developments: what kinds of developments are subject to IZ (e.g., build-
ings with more than 10 units)
3. Set-aside rule: how many or what percentage of units must be set aside as affordable
units
4. Incentives: what kinds of benefits developers receive in exchange for participating
5. Target Households: which households (e.g. those earning 80% of Area Median
Income) are eligible to buy/rent the affordable units, and how these households are
found or recruited
6. Tenure: whether the affordable units are sold or rented
7. Cost offsets: whether developers can use in-lieu options to pay to opt out of providing
affordable units
8. Continued affordability: whether the program contains long-term affordability guar-
antees or mechanisms
In this chapter, I focus on New York City’s recently implemented Mandatory Inclusionary
Zones (MIZ). In 1987, New York City adopted voluntary inclusionary zoning for R10 zones,
the city’s highest-density residential zones. The policy allowed developers up to 20 percent
in extra floor area ratio (FAR) from 10 to 12 if they included affordable housing in their
developments. In 2005, the city expanded their voluntary IZP to other “designated areas”
with varying degree of bonuses available to developers. During 2005-2013, within these
designated areas 19% of new units produced were affordable units, well-aligned with the
average density bonus participating developers receive.
Owing to the success of voluntary IZP and facing a stronger need for affordable housing,
in 2016, the city adopted a mandatory inclusionary zoning policy. The city designated several
MIZs scattered throughout the city: Figure 3.1a shows an overview of MIZs in New York
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Figure 3.1: New York City’s Mandatory Inclusionary Zones
(a) New York City (b) East Harlem
Mandatory Inclusionary Zones (MIZ) are shown in purple at (a) larger view of the city and (b) zoomed into
East Harlem in Manhattan. Although Staten Island is not in view, all five boroughs have MIZ areas. Map
provided by OpenStreetMap. c©OpenStreetMap and contributors.
City, and Figure 3.1b details the MIZs in East Harlem, Manhattan. Any new development
producing 10 or more units within MIZs is required to generate affordable units under one
of three options:
• Option 1: 25% affordable units at an average of 60% AMI
• Option 2: 30% affordable units at an average of 80% AMI
• Deep Affordability Option: 20% affordable units at an average of 40% AMI
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Moreover, small projects may contribute to an affordable housing fund or provide affordable
housing off-site in lieu of providing the units within the development itself.
3.1.2 Literature Review
A simple theoretical framework for IZPs was laid down by an influential article by Ellickson
(1981). Using basic economics, he argued that IZPs are indeed a tax on new development
as it forces developers to sell some of their units at below the market price, and were thus
unlikely to have net positive effects on housing affordability without additional government
subsidies. Dietderich (1996) provides a more nuanced view of IZPs by arguing that housing
markets without IZPs are not free markets, but are characterized by market failure so that
a well-defined IZP can act as a corrective tax to push the market output to the socially
optimal output. Rubin and Seneca (1991) analyze the density bonus mechanism of IZPs
and show that the effectiveness of density bonuses as an incentive depends on local housing
market conditions. In Section 3.2, I build on these papers and provide a framework that
is consistent with these theoretical contributions. Overall, the simplistic model of Ellickson
(1981) cannot capture the intricacies of IZPs that my model can.
Studies examining the effectiveness of IZPs on producing affordable units have docu-
mented a large variation across jurisdictions. This is expected as IZPs are not uniform and
can take on many different forms, as explained above. Schuetz et al. (2009) find that in the
San Francisco Bay and Washington D.C. areas, IZPs were more successful in producing IZ
units. In suburban Boston, however, IZPs were less effective. Schwartz et al. (2012) examine
11 jurisdictions with data on IZ units that were produced under IZPs. They find that, in
these jurisdictions, most IZ units are located in areas with relatively low concentration of
poverty. Thus, they posit that IZPs are effective at generating affordable housing in areas
traditionally cut off from the poor.
Few empirical studies have sought to assess the impact of IZPs on local housing markets,
and all of them compare jurisdictions with or without IZPs in their analysis. Bento et
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al. (2009) analyze jurisdictions in California in a regression framework with city and year
fixed effects. They find a modest increase in prices (2-3%) but no effect on housing starts.
They also find that IZPs dampened the effect of new single-family housing starts. This
is consistent with my findings that New York’s MIZs had price but no supply effects, and
also that the composition of new housing starts are skewed towards multifamily housing.
However, their price analysis is limited to single-family homes. Means and Stringham (2012)
also implement a fixed effects model for jurisdictions in California and find a 20% price
effect and -6% supply effect. However, they only use decennial data between 1980-2000,
which makes their analysis more limited.
Schuetz et al. (2011) uses a fixed effects strategy with time trends on a panel data of IZ
units in the San Francisco Bay Area and suburban Boston. They find that years IZ has been
in place interacted with an indicator for rising housing market status is negatively related
to permit activity but positively related to prices in suburban Boston. However, the finding
does hold in the San Francisco Bay Area. The effects overall are small and demonstrates
considerable heterogeneity across housing markets.
Hollingshead (2015) uses a difference-in-differences framework, exploiting the timing of
California’s court decision in 2009 that weakened the enforceability of mandatory IZPs.
Comparing jurisdictions that previously implemented mandatory IZPs with those that did
not, she finds that following the court decision, there were stronger positive effect on prices
for jurisdictions with IZPs compared to those without, which runs counter to Ellickson’s
(1981) claim that IZPs are a tax.
Overall, jurisdiction-level analysis in these studies are subject to severe endogeneity prob-
lems, as I will detail in Section 3.3. First, jurisdictions vary in many characteristics that
may be related to their decision to adopt IZPs. Even well-understood confounding vari-
ables such as the price elasticity of demand for housing is incredibly difficult to observe and
measure, making across-jurisdiction analyses subject to omitted variable bias. Second, the
jurisdictions are comprised of many housing sub-markets and not internally homogeneous,
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both in IZP implementation and in housing market characteristics. An obvious example is
New York’s mandatory IZs only applying to specific blocks, but many other jurisdictions
have variations in IZ policy variables across neighborhoods. I contribute to the literature
by providing an analysis involving within-jurisdiction variation in IZP, thereby dealing with
many endogeneity problems within the existing literature.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
I present a theoretical framework to analyze the developer’s problem under exclusionary and
inclusionary zoning. By comparing the profits under the two regimes, I show how IZP can
affect housing production in a neighborhood. Suppose firms face a demand curve P (q) and
cost curve C(q) over square footage of housing q. IZP requires a share s ∈ (0, 1) of floor
space be set aside to be sold at below the market price ϕP , where P is the market price and
ϕ ∈ (0, 1). Finally, suppose the current zoning laws set a limit to density of q¯, but developers
who set aside units receive density bonus, δ > 1, which allows them to build up to δq¯.
I make several assumptions in this set-up. First, floor space is not distinguished by its
quality and so the cost and demand for housing does not depend on its type—whether afford-
able or market-rate. The identical cost assumption may be reasonable, as many developers
find it difficult to lower development cost for specific units. However, the identical demand
assumption is a strong one and assumes that 1) there exists, between affordable and market-
rate units, an undifferentiated market for housing and affordable units are perfect substitutes
for market-rate units, or 2) households targeted for market-rate housing and households tar-
geted for affordable units have identical demand. Second, I assume that the incentives are
given as a density bonus, which is the most common incentive for IZPs. This is not an
innocuous assumption, as different incentives can distort developers’ profit in significantly
different ways.
Given the above notation and assumptions, profit under exclusionary zoning regime with-
138
out density restrictions is simply its revenue minus cost, piE(q) = P (q)q−C(q). Profit under
IZP with a set-aside rule {s, ϕ} constitutes three parts: 1) revenue from selling (1− s) units
at market price P , 2) revenue from selling s units at below the market price at ϕP , and 3)
cost of producing q. Thus, profit under IZP is, piI(q) = (1− s(1− ϕ))P (q)q − C(q).
Comparing the two profit functions, we can see immediately that the set-aside rule acts
as a tax on revenue, where the “tax rate” is given by τ = s(1 − ϕ). This is the graphical
analysis done by Ellickson (1981), who claimed that IZPs merely act as taxes on new devel-
opment. Here, the tax rate is increasing in s, the share of units that need to be set-aside
for affordability, and in (1 − ϕ), the rate of discount for households eligible for affordable
units. For example, a set-aside rule with 20% of units sold at 80% of market rate would
be equivalent to a 0.2 ∗ (1 − 0.8) = 4% tax rate. This is an intuitive result demonstrating
developers will under-produce with IZPs.
However, density restrictions, which are almost always present under exclusionary zoning,
is unaccounted for in this simple framework. Moreover, jurisdictions often understand the
dampening effect of set-aside rules and provide incentives to counteract them, commonly
used being density bonuses. Therefore, the choice set of developers is different with IZP and
without IZP. We can define maximized profit under exclusionary zoning regime with density
restrictions, pi∗E, and maximized profit under inclusionary zoning regime with density bonus,
pi∗I as follows:
pi∗E = max
q≤q¯
P (q)q − C(q) (3.1)
pi∗I = max
q≤δq¯
(1− τ)P (q)q − C(q) (3.2)
In this framework, q¯ defines the density restriction, and δ > 1 is the degree of the density
bonus that allows developers to build above q¯. The profit of the developer under exclusionary
and inclusionary regimes ultimately depend on the optimal quantity q∗E and q
∗
I that solve
(3.1) and (3.2), respectively, which depends on the restrictiveness of q¯.
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To see this, define qE and qI as the solution to (3.1) and (3.2) without the density restric-
tions. If qI , qE ≤ q¯ or qI < q¯ ≤ qE, then q∗E = q¯, q∗I = qI , and we are back to the previous
case where IZP merely acts as a tax. In words, if the density restriction is not very binding
then the density bonus under IZP is useless to the developer. In essence, this is the argument
made in Palmer/Sixth Street Properties, L.P. v. City of Los Angeles, where the developer
contended that density bonus under L.A.’s mandatory IZP conferred no meaningful benefit
and therefore IZP acted as local rent control.3
Suppose now that δq¯ < qI ≤ qE. This is the case when the original density restriction is
binding enough both with and without the tax from set-aside and affordability rules. Then,
p∗E = q¯, p
∗
I = δq¯, and so pi
∗
E = P (q¯)q¯−C(q¯) and pi∗I = (1−τ)P (δq¯)δq¯−C(δq¯).4 The difference
between profits is thus,
pi∗I − pi∗E = (1− τ)P (δq¯)δq¯ − C(δq¯)− [P (q¯)q¯ − C(q¯)] (3.3)
= [P (δq¯)− P (q¯)]q¯ + [P (δq¯)(δ − 1)q¯]− [τP (δq¯)δq¯]− [C(δq¯)− C(q¯)]
=
[
− 1
εδ
P (q¯)
(δ − 1)q¯
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
+ [(1− τ)P (δq¯)(δ − 1)q¯]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
− [τP (δq¯)q¯]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c)
− [C(δq¯)− C(q¯)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(d)
(3.4)
where εδ = − δq¯−q¯q¯ P (q¯)P (δq¯)−P (q¯) is the price elasticity of demand for housing from q¯ to δq¯.
The expression in (3.4) has an intuitive interpretation with four parts in its sum: (a)
loss from decreased price from increased supply, (b) gain from selling extra quantity (δ − 1)
from the density bonus at the new net price (1 − τ)P (δq¯), (c) loss from selling original
units q¯ at the decreased net price from the set-aside rule (“tax”), and (d) the loss from
increased cost of production. The loss from (a) is larger with lower elasticity of demand
because the developer would rather produce less and charge a higher price when facing a
3California’s Second District Court of Appeal sided with the developer in the case. As a result, inclu-
sionary zoning was unenforceable in California, until Costa-Hawkins was revised by the State legislature in
2017 (Chau Yager 2017, Phalon, Brisen˜o, Bradish 2017).
4This holds even as long as q¯ < qI ≤ qE , as we can redefine δ = q∗I/q¯.
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lower elasticity. On the other extreme, a developer facing a perfectly elastic demand (ε =∞)
could only increase his profit by producing more and therefore the density bonus becomes
more attractive. This means that the likelihood of developers choosing an IZ project is lower
when facing relatively inelastic demand, a situation that can occur, for instance, when a
neighborhood has few substitutes in residents’ choice set. The gain from (b) is larger with a
higher density bonus, and the loss from (c) is larger with a higher tax rate. Therefore, with
stronger set-aside rules and smaller density bonuses, developers will be less willing to pursue
IZ projects. Finally, (d) depends on the cost structure of the developers. The higher the
increase in costs of producing extra housing, the lower the likelihood of developers taking on
IZ projects.
The theoretical framework in this section demonstrates that the empirical strategies of
the existing literature is subject to omitted variables bias. As shown above, whether IZPs
lower the supply of housing depends on i) the extent to which q¯ is binding, ii) the elasticity
of demand, iii) the cost structure, and iv) the policy variables. While (iv) has been well
explored as a source of across-jurisdiction variation on IZP’s effect on housing supply, (i)-
(iii) has been less explored. For example, previous studies do not take into account the
bindingness of original density policies without IZP. If a jurisdiction’s decision to adopt IZP
is related to its pre-existing density policy, a simple comparison of jurisdictions with and
without IZP will be biased. Moreover, elasticity of housing demand and cost structure of
developers are nearly impossible to measure, making analysis of IZPs across jurisdictions
extremely difficult.
One important outcome that I do not explore here is the effect of IZPs on neighborhood
characteristics. For example, does the production of affordable units actually lead to income-
mixing? This is a crucial outcome of interest to policymakers and requires a principal-agent
model of how developers choose to comply with city policy. Many jurisdictions specify the
income level of households that are eligible for affordable units, but they do not specify
how these households should be found. Discussions with housing advocates reveal that some
141
developers take advantage of the incentives of IZP but purposely seek out tenants who, while
technically fitting the income requirement (e.g., recent college graduates), are not the target
demographics of IZPs.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
The central challenge of the IZP literature has been to identify the causal effect of IZPs on
the housing market, both on prices and supply. The literature has relied on comparisons
across jurisdictions with or without IZPs, or alternatively, across jurisdictions with varying
implementations of IZPs. The main source of endogeneity of this approach is that jurisdic-
tions often differ in characteristics which may be related to their subsequent policy choices.
For example, cities with less developable land may choose to adopt IZP due to fast-rising
housing costs. But even in the absence of IZP, those cities will face a shortage of development
due to the lack of land. Merely comparing housing starts in cities with or without IZPs will
mistakenly attribute the adoption of IZP as the source of low housing starts. In general,
one cannot understand the effect of IZP without taking into consideration the existing local
zoning and housing market characteristics as seen in Section 3.2.
Additionally, jurisdiction-level analysis is troublesome because jurisdictions are not inter-
nally homogeneous. For example, a residential zone in one neighborhood can have different
FAR than a zone in another neighborhood. Neighborhoods within jurisdictions also vary in
their housing market and demographic characteristics, making it difficult to “control for”
them as I discuss in Section 3.2. Previous literature has focused on broad measures such as
population density or housing prices for the whole jurisdiction which are inadequate controls.
To account for these shortcomings in the cross-jurisdiction analysis, I use an expanded
version of the border-discontinuity by Turner et al. (2014), who use a regression discontinuity
design at the border of municipalities to examine the effect of land use regulation on the value
of land. The idea is that very close to the border of municipalities, everything other than the
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land regulation remains the same as residents can commute for services or amenities very
easily.5 This amounts to constructing an environment where the “but-for” test can be held:
everything but-for land regulation is the same at or near the border, therefore any differences
in housing neighborhood characteristics must arise due to the differences in regulation. Their
innovation is recognizing that the regulation can have both own-lot and external (spillover)
effects, since a stringent regulation on one side of the border can affect the other side as well.
They construct a framework where they can analyze the two effects.
Consider, for example, the effect of land regulation on land prices. Very close to the
border, only land regulation distinguishes one and another side of the border. As we move
away from the border deeper into one municipality’s territory, the land regulation remains the
same but the spillover effects from another municipality’s land regulation declines. Measuring
the difference in prices between the two municipalities at the border measures both the own-
lot effect of the regulation on prices and the spillover effect from the other municipality’s
land regulation. Meanwhile, measuring the price differences within one municipality but
between areas close and far from the border measures the effect of spillovers, assuming that
spillovers fade away by a certain distance. Thus, we can measure the pure effect of regulation
on prices by taking into account both measures.
I adopt this empirical strategy to examine the effect of IZP. In the context of New York
City’s Mandatory IZ policy, own-lot measures can be constructed by comparing the prices
of properties inside MIZ to those that are near MIZ. External measures can be constructed
by comparing the prices of properties near but not inside MIZ to properties that are further
away from MIZ. Taking account of both effects can therefore give us the pure effect of IZP
on housing prices.
While Turner et al. (2014) only used a cross-sectional variation in land regulation, I
expand the strategy by also taking advantage of the time variation on IZP enactment. In
5This may not hold for certain amenities like school districts, however.
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New York, the MIZ areas were implemented in 2016. In Chicago, the 2015 revision of its IZP
created three zones that have differing in-lieu fees. Therefore, instead of comparing prices
in the cross-section, I apply a difference-in-differences regression for each measure.
The regression equation is,
yizt = α + γt + γz + βt ∗Diz + ΓHHiz + ΓXXzt + εizt (3.5)
where i is property, z is location, t is time. γt is time fixed effects, γz is zone fixed effects,
Hiz is a vector of housing characteristics, Xzt is a vector of neighborhood characteristics.
For the own-lot effect regression, Diz is an indicator for properties belonging to MIZs. For
the external-effects regression, Diz is an indicator for locations near but not in MIZs. The
coefficients of interest are βt, the time-varying difference-in-differences coefficient. I restrict
the sample to be properties within xo meters of MIZ for the own-lot effect regression and
restrict the sample to be properties within xe meters but not in MIZ for the external effect,
where xo, xe can vary.
Identification fails when there are time-varying differences in characteristics between IZP
and non-IZP areas that violate the parallel trends assumption. Given the discontinuity
design, these time-varying characteristics must be geographically specific between MIZ and
non-MIZ zones at the border. This is a much more stringent condition than the original,
cross-sectional strategy, where any fixed differences in characteristics between IZP areas
can lead to an identification failure. It is also much more stringent than previous studies’
strategies of comparing jurisdictions with or without IZPs, where any differences in housing
market characteristics across jurisdictions can be confounding factors.
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3.4 Data
In order to implement the empirical strategy in Section 3.3 to examine the effect of IZP on
housing prices and supply, I need two types of data. First, I need zoning data that describes
not only the IZP and where it operates, but also the zoning policy of nearby areas. This
data needs to detail within-jurisdiction variation of IZP. Second, I need fine-geography data
on housing prices and development to measure price and development activity in and near
IZ areas with enough precision to distinguish properties within xo, xe meters of IZ zones.
For this pilot study, I draw from three principal data sources. First, I obtain zoning map
of New York City that has information on the MIZs within the city. I use the zoning map to
construct an indicator variable of whether observations from other data are located within
MIZ, and subsequently within x meters of MIZ, with varying levels of x. I do this by creating
a x-meter buffer around MIZ zones and calculating whether the observations belong in the
buffered zones.
Second, I use Zillow ZTRAX data that has information on property transactions and
assessment histories, as well as detailed geographical information. The data is built from
publicly-available county assessment and deed transfers data, combined with mortgage, fore-
closure, auction, property tax delinquency data for about 2,700 counties in the U.S. Infor-
mation on the property’s exact address allows me to geocode the properties. One major
shortcoming of the ZTRAX data is that it does not include rent data.
I obtain ZTRAX data for five counties that form New York City: Bronx, Kings, New
York, Queens, and Richmond Counties. I exclude deed filings that do not have any sales
price information, which excludes foreclosure and mortgage deeds, as well as special deeds,
such as intra-family transfers. I only include transactions involving residential buildings and
lot size below 10,000 square feet. As some transactions involve multiple buildings, I restrict
my sample to transactions involving only one building. Finally, I exclude transactions below
the 5th and above the 95th percentile in sales price.
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Table 3.1: ZTRAX Summary Statistics on Selected Sample
N Mean Std Dev Median
Transaction Information
Document Date Year 684,681 2006.01 7.51 2005
Sales Price 685,483 423,978 304,018.82 360,000
Loan Amount 356,847 171,902 519,867 158,650
Property Characteristics
Year Built 681,869 1,945.03 32.99 1,935
Number of Units 685,483 1.75 0.94 2
Number of Stories 685,164 2.74 3.83 2
Lot Size Sqft 685,483 2,999 1,541.84 2,500
Building Area Sqft 685,471 3,626 13,444.37 1,800
Smaller Family (4 Units or Less) 685,483 0.90 0 1
Larger Family (5+) 685,483 0.06 0 0
Values From Assessment
Land Assessed Value 685,477 76,599 543,385 8,515
Improvement Assessed Value 685,472 179,980 1,272,881 18,753
Total Assessed Value 685,477 256,578 1,816,088 27,729
Land Market Value 685,474 365,682 1,195,306 200,000
Improvement Market Value 685,198 862,580 2,811,271 407,000
Total Market Value 685,474 1,227,914 3,997,690 612,000
Location Relative to MIZ
Within MIZ 685,483 0.00 0.05 0.00
Within 250m of MIZ 685,483 0.05 0.21 0.00
Within 500m of MIZ 685,483 0.11 0.32 0.00
Within 750m of MIZ 685,483 0.19 0.39 0.00
Within 1000m of MIZ 685,483 0.26 0.44 0.00
Within 1500m of MIZ 685,483 0.39 0.49 0.00
Within 2000m of MIZ 685,483 0.51 0.50 1.00
Within 2500m of MIZ 685,483 0.62 0.48 1.00
Sample includes transactions of residential buildings with price information, lot size below 10,000 square
feet, involving only one building, and between sales price 5th and 95th percentiles.
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics of key variables in the ZTRAX data for the selected
sample, according to the criteria mentioned above. Some summary statistics are worth
mentioning here. First, we see that there is a very large variation in sales price, where the
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mean is around $423,000 and the standard deviation is around $304,000. The same is true
for loan amount and assessment valuations, although we can see that only about half of
the property transaction have loans attached to them. The average year built of properties
transacted is around 1945. This is not to say that the average building year is 1945 in
New York, because some properties may be transacted more than once and some may never
be transacted at all. As is suspected from the specificity of MIZ locations in New York,
very few transactions are actually within MIZs. Specifically, 1,665 property transactions
belong inside MIZs. However, as we enlarge the radius around MIZs, more transactions are
observed. About 26% of the sample belongs within 1km of MIZs.
Second, I use city-level housing permit data that is publicly available through city open-
data portals. Most importantly, I obtain two sources of data crucial for my analysis: zoning
and building permits data. New York City has building permits data that go back to 1989,
although coverage is limited in the earlier years. I only select building permits for new
buildings and significant alterations that require use changes. The rest are permits for small
changes. For example, electrical work constitutes a bulk of all permits applied for in New
York. The sample selection results in around 212,088 permits, of which 210,960 have address
and location information.
Table 3.2 shows summary statistics from the building permits data. We see that around
57% of the permits in the sample are for significant alterations and 43% are for new buildings.
The permit data also distinguishes between 1-2-3 Family buildings and others, which include
larger multifamily buildings. About 63% of the sample are 1-2-3 Family building types.
Again, because of the specificity of the MIZ areas in New York, very few permits (1,321) are
inside the MIZ. About 33% of building permits are within 1km of MIZs.
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Table 3.2: Building Permits Summary Statistics
N Mean Std Dev Median
Permit Characteristics
Job: Significant Alterations 212,088 0.57 0.50 1
Job: New Building 212,088 0.43 0.50 0
Building Type: 1-2-3 Family 212,084 0.63 0.48 1
Building Type: Other 212,084 0.37 0.48 0
Filing Year 212,088 2004.45 7.45 2004
Location Relative to MIZ
Within MIZ 210,960 0.01 0.08 0
Within 250m of MIZ 210,960 0.07 0.26 0
Within 500m of MIZ 210,960 0.16 0.36 0
Within 750m of MIZ 210,960 0.25 0.43 0
Within 1000m of MIZ 210,960 0.33 0.47 0
Within 1500m of MIZ 210,960 0.47 0.50 0
Within 2000m of MIZ 210,960 0.59 0.49 1
Within 2500m of MIZ 210,960 0.68 0.47 1
3.5 Results
In this section, I present results from the specification I describe in Section 3.3. For permits,
however, because the outcome of interest are in counts, a direct regression is difficult to
implement. Therefore, I instead use tabulations of permit counts in each area and manually
calculate difference-in-difference estimates of own-lot effect and external effect. I first present
the results for housing transactions and then present results for permits.
Figure 3.2 shows the result from the own-lot regression on sales prices. The specification
includes log square footage of lot size and year built as housing controls. Each point on
the graph represents the relative difference of means between treated and control units from
the base year (2016), which was the year MIZ was enacted; blue ranges are 95% confidence
intervals. I constrain the sample to be properties that are within 250m of MIZ. Treated units
are those that are in MIZs, while control (or comparison) units are those that are outside
but within 250m of MIZs. Therefore, the data point 0.16 for year 2017 represents that the
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Figure 3.2: Own-lot Effect of MIZ
Difference-in-Difference regression coefficients on treated*year, with base year 2016. Treated units are those
within MIZ and control units are those within 250m but not in MIZ. Blue ranges are the 95% confidence
intervals.
difference in average prices between treated and control units in 2017 is around 16% higher
than the difference in average prices between treated and control units in 2016. Similarly,
Figure 3.3 shows the result from the external-effects regressions on sales prices. In this
specification, treated units are properties within 250m but not in MIZs, while comparison
units are properties within 1000m but not within 250m of MIZs.
These two figures combined tell us a picture of the policy’s impact on transaction prices.
First, Figure 3.2 demonstrates that there is a statistically significant relative increase in
prices in MIZ locations compared to those very near, while the results in Figure 3.3 suggest
that there were no notable spillover effects of policy onto nearby areas. This suggests that
the policy has caused about a 18% increase in prices in MIZs. This could be consistent with
the idea that MIZ is reducing the supply of housing in these locations.
However, looking at the results for permit activity, that does not seem to be the case.
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Figure 3.3: External Effect of MIZ
Difference-in-Difference regression coefficients on treated*year, with base year 2016. Treated units are those
within 250m but not in MIZ and control units are those within 1000m but not within 250m of MIZ. Blue
ranges are the 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 3.4 shows both the own-lot effect (Figure 3.4a) and external effect (Figure 3.4b) of
MIZ on permit activity. By looking at differences between 2016 and later in permit activity
within treatment area as a share of total permit activity within treatment and comparison
areas, we can measure the relative difference in permit activity between MIZ and non-MIZ
ares over time. We can see a fairly dramatic uptick, from 5% in 2016 to 17% in 2019, in the
share of total development activity occuring in MIZs compared to near but not within MIZs.
However, there is no apparent difference in the share of development activity comparing
within-250m MIZ and within-1000m MIZ areas. This suggests a strong own-lot effect but a
weak external effect of MIZ on development activity.
In Figure 3.5, I present the analysis done separately by permit types. Figures 3.5a and
3.5b show results for new building permits and Figures 3.5c and 3.5d show results for 1-2-3
Family types. An interesting finding is that permit activity results in Figure 3.4 is driven by
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Figure 3.4: Own-lot and External Effects of Permit Activity
(a) Own-lot Effects (b) External Effects
Black bars are total activity for treated and comparison areas, and blue bars are activity only for treated
areas, thus representing share of total development activity. Green line is the share of development activity
in treated areas as a fraction of activity in both treated and control areas. (a) restricts treated units to be
in MIZs and control units to be within 250m but not in MIZs. (b) restricts treated units to be within 250m
but not in MIZs and control to be within 1000m but not within 250m of MIZ.
new building permits but not by 1-2-3 Family permits, indicating that the results are driven
by new construction and multifamily units, the kinds of developments targeted by IZPs.
There are several caveats that must be mentioned. One potential problem is selection on
trends. If the neighborhoods that were designated for MIZs were specifically targeted for rea-
sons that are related to the evolution of prices over time, the parallel trends assumption does
not hold. There is some evidence this may be true. Figure 3.6 plots the evolution of prices
over time for properties within 250m and in MIZ and the rest of New York City. Properties
within 250m and in MIZ start out with lower price, but catch up by mid-2000s, and finally
overtake the rest of New York around 2015. This is suggestive of the fact that neighbor-
hoods receiving MIZ may have been those that have experienced fast price growth relative
to others, and policymakers might have targeted these neighborhoods to slow gentrification
or housing unaffordability.
However, own-lot regressions should net out any neighborhood-level differences in trend
growth, unless the MIZ boundaries are drawn specifically delineating the fast-growth areas
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Figure 3.5: Own-lot and External Effects By Permit Type
(a) New Buildings: Own-lot Effects (b) New Buildings: External Effects
(c) 1-2-3 Family: Own-lot Effects (d) 1-2-3 Family: External Effects
See footnotes for Figure 3.4 for description of the difference between own-lot and external effects figures.
(a) and (b) restricts the sample to be permits for new buildings, and (c) and (d) restricts the sample to be
permits for 1-2-3 Family type.
by the block from the rest of the neighborhood. Still, external-effect regressions, which take
a larger area into consideration (between 250m and 1000m) may be subject to these biases
from neighborhood targeting.
Another problem is the relatively low number of observations inside MIZs. This is re-
flected in the large standard errors and subsequently, the wide 95% confidence intervals. The
large variance in pre-trend (for example in Figure 3.3), although not statistically significantly
different from 2016 baseline, is worrisome as this might signify differences in trend-growth.
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Figure 3.6: Average Sales Price Over Time
Average sales prices and counts of properties transacted for observations within 250m and in MIZ and the
rest of New York City.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I explored the impact of inclusionary zoning policies (IZPs) by analyzing
the effect of New York City’s Mandatory IZ on housing supply and prices. I exploited the
timing and geographic variation of MIZ in New York by using detailed-geography data on
building permits and housing transactions. I showed that although prices rose following the
policy, building activity also rose, mostly spurred by new residential and larger multifamily
developments. These results suggest that although property transaction prices rose in these
locations, this is not due to stifled development activity.
I end this chapter with some suggestions on how to expand the scope of this chapter.
First, one extension would be to include more cities with within-jurisdiction variation of IZ.
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Figure 3.7: MIZ Variation in In-Lieu Fee by Neighborhood in Chicago
Each color represents a different in-lieu fee amount for mandatory inclusionary zoning policy in Chicago.
Red are high-income areas and require a higher in-lieu fee while blue are low-income areas and require a lower
in-lieu fee. The green outline is the downtown-area which has a more stringent IZ policy. Map provided by
OpenStreetMap. c©OpenStreetMap and contributors.
Chicago, Washington DC, and Los Angeles seem to be good candidates in this regard. For
example, Figure 3.7 shows the variation in IZ policy within the city of Chicago. Chicago has
a cost offset policy that allows developers to pay an in-lieu fee instead of including affordable
units within the development. The in-lieu fee differs across neighborhoods, which provides a
clean monetary variation of IZ policy within the city. My hope that the strategy described
in this chapter can be used for properties that are close to the border of differing in-lieu fee
zones within Chicago.
Second, using American Community Survey 5-year Summary Files (ACS5SF) to capture
demographic and neighborhood characteristics might be a promising avenue for research.
ACS5SF data are available from 2005-2009 to 2014-2018. One could obtain count of pop-
ulation in race, income bin, age, renter/owner status, employment status, occupation, and
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educational status categories for each census tract. The biggest challenge using this data
is that tracts often do not line up with zoning districts, and they frequently cross zoning
boundaries.
One major challenge is the availability and quality of data in different jurisdictions.
For example, the quality and quantity of ZTRAX observations vary across counties due
to record-keeping issues and the massive effort required to obtain and digitize the data.
Building permits data, as well as data on affordable units produced, have different coverage
and availability for different cities. For example, Chicago, Washington DC have building
permits data available online, but Washington DC’s permits data begin only in 2009, Los
Angeles data starts in 2013, and Chicago data starts in 2006. The challenge will be to
combine these varying data and zoning policies to conduct a coherent analysis.
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